



# NRDC-GR HERALD

THE MAGAZINE OF NATO RAPID DEPLOYABLE CORPS-GREECE



July - December 2025/ Issue 25



**Ready to Deter:  
Insights from Exercise LOYAL DOLOS 25**

**Steadfast Cobalt 2025 Bravo (STCO25B)  
Lessons in Interoperability, Resilience  
and the Human Dimension**

**MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS.  
A NEW WAY TO OPERATE?**

**EU-NATO Strategic Partnership:  
Evolution, Legal Framework and  
Contemporary Challenges**

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#### Contact Information

☎: +30 2310 882452 / NCN 451-2452      🌐: www.nrdc.gr  
✉: pao@nrdc.gr      📧: @nrdcgr      📷: @NRDC-GR  
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EDITORIAL: Adaptation, Integration, and the Path to FOC

Dear readers,

Welcome to this latest edition. The past several months have been a period of intense activity and historic milestones for our Headquarters, as we have sought to balance rigorous field evaluations with the intellectual exploration of the shifting security landscape. This issue serves as both a record of these achievements and a forum for the diverse perspectives of our staff and partners.

The centerpiece of this edition is the successful conclusion of **Exercise LOYAL DOLOS 25 (LODO25)**. This activity served as the venue for our **Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL)**, leading to the formal declaration of **Full Operational Capability (FOC)**. NRDC-GR is now officially designated as a **NATO Warfighting Corps (WFC)**, a milestone that reflects the professionalism of a multinational staff representing six nations, including Türkiye, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

We have chosen to complement these operational reports with forward-looking analyses of the "Multidomain" environment. One of our contributors offers the witty "Green Burger Theory" to explain **Multidomain Operations (MDO)**, suggesting that NATO uses the concept to encourage a necessary change in mentality across its structure. This intellectual shift is supported by technical reality, as seen in our overview of **Steadfast Cobalt 2025**, where we successfully federated within the new **VeVA Mission Network**—a key step in NATO's digital transformation.

Beyond the tactical, we examine the broader systemic integration required for modern resilience. We feature an analysis of the **EU-NATO Strategic Partnership**, which argues that as the threshold of 2026 is crossed, this cooperation has become the backbone of Western security. This is underscored by a detailed study on the **militarization of the European economy**, noting that combined EU defense spending reached approximately **€345 billion** in 2024.

Finally, we highlight the vital role of our training partners at the **Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center (MPSOTC)** in Kilis. Their partnership ensures that the academic rigor of Alliance doctrine is constantly refined by the "ground truth" of active Headquarters like ours.

The message within these pages is one of collective progress. While the views expressed are individual, they collectively illustrate an Alliance that is training for tomorrow, today. We hope this overview of our recent activities and strategic reflections provides you with a clear sense of the momentum carrying NRDC-GR forward.

Public Affairs Office  
NRDC-GR



## Commander's Address



**Dear Reader,**

*It is a privilege to welcome you to this latest edition of our magazine. As we release this issue, NRDC-GR stands at a historic threshold. Following the successful completion of Exercise LOYAL DOLOS 25 (LODO25) and our comprehensive Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL), I am immensely proud to announce that our Headquarters has achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC).*

*This milestone marks our formal designation as a NATO Warfighting Corps (WFC). This is not merely a title; it is a testament to the tireless dedication, professionalism, and interoperability demonstrated by our multinational staff. Throughout LODO25, which involved over 500 personnel from six nations—including Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Türkiye—working in unison, we*

*proved our ability to lead high-intensity multinational operations in a Multidomain Operations Environment (MDOE).*

*This transition to a Warfighting Corps is steered by our new leadership hierarchy. Supported by my Deputy Commander, our Chief of Staff and our dedicated Deputy Chiefs of Staff across the Plans, Operations, and Support divisions, we are committed to maintaining the highest standards of Allied readiness. Our leadership team reflects the very diversity and cohesion that make this Alliance strong.*

*Today, we operate in a contemporary security environment characterized by increasing complexity, uncertainty, and rapid change. Modern crises rarely develop along clearly defined military lines and frequently involve the interaction of military, political, informational, economic, and societal factors. Hybrid activities and pressure below the threshold of armed conflict increasingly shape the strategic landscape, requiring us to integrate traditional military considerations with political guidance and strategic communication imperatives.*

*In this non-linear environment, the role of NRDC-GR is more vital than ever. As a Warfighting Corps, we provide the Alliance with a high-readiness, deployable headquarters capable of commanding multinational operations across all domains. Our*

*mission is to transform strategic intent into credible deterrence and effective collective defense. We serve as a significant message of resolve, demonstrating that the Alliance is prepared to hold its ground and respond coherently to any threat, particularly on the Southern East Flank.*

*Our success in navigating these contemporary challenges depends on our cognitive agility and our capacity to operate under conditions of persistent uncertainty. By prioritizing decision-making, interoperability, and adaptation, NRDC-GR continues to strengthen the professional networks and institutional cohesion that are the cornerstones of NATO effectiveness.*

*As we look back on the achievements of the past several months, we are not just celebrating a certification; we are affirming our commitment to the safety and security of our member states. We are ready for the challenges of today and prepared for the uncertainties of tomorrow.*

*I hope you find this issue both informative and inspiring.*

**Preparing for Tomorrow, Today.**

Grigorios P. BOUNTLIAKIS  
Lieutenant General (GRC A)

# FORGING THE FUTURE OF ALLIED READINESS: INSIDE THE MULTINATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER (MPSOTC)



### Introduction: The Demand for Adaptive Leadership

In the contemporary operating environment, the lines between traditional combat, crisis management, and humanitarian assistance are increasingly blurred. Modern military personnel are deployed into complex, multidimensional arenas where tactical decisions have immediate strategic and political consequences. To succeed, NATO and allied forces require more than doctrinal awareness; they require immersive, specialized, and highly adaptive training.

Operating from Camp Papatheofilou in Kilkis Greece, the MPSOTC stands as a premier academic and practical training hub. Its mission is to deliver state-of-the-art, certified training to military personnel, law enforcement, and civilian professionals, preparing them to navigate and excel in Peace Support Operations PSOs and complex crisis

management scenarios worldwide.

### A Legacy of Excellence and International Accreditation

Since its establishment in 1998, MPSOTC has continuously expanded its horizons to meet the evolving demands of global security. In an era where interoperability is the center of gravity for the Alliance, training facilities must operate to the highest standardized metrics.

MPSOTC is proud to be an officially accredited NATO training facility. Our NATO Quality Assurance Accreditation guarantees that every syllabus, exercise, and evaluation meets the rigorous standards demanded by the Alliance. Furthermore, our curriculum is deeply

intertwined with the mandates of the United Nations UN, modern security requirements and challenges of the European Union EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - OSCE. This tripartite alignment ensures that whether our graduates deploy under a NATO Article 5 scenario, a UN peacekeeping mandate, or a coalition task force, they possess the exact tactical and procedural language required for seamless integration.

### The Training Environment: Where Theory Meets Practice

To prepare personnel for the unpredictability of modern deployments, a training center must offer more than traditional lecture halls. MPSOTC bridges the gap





## Affiliated & Partner Entities



(CIMIC): Our NATO CIMIC Field Workers and Staff Workers Courses are globally recognized. Modern conflicts heavily impact civilian populations and infrastructure. We train military personnel to interact effectively with local authorities, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and international agencies, turning friction into operational synergy.

- **Strategic Communication and Public Affairs:** The information domain is a critical battleground. Through our NATO Basic Public Affairs Officer Course, we equip communicators with the tools to manage information flow, counter hostile disinformation, and accurately project the Alliance's narrative.

between classroom theory and field reality through a multifaceted training infrastructure.

Our facilities boast advanced technological capabilities, most notably the VBS-NATO Laboratory, which allows for highly detailed, virtual battlefield simulations. Alongside our specialized syndicate rooms and modern conference spaces, we utilize expansive field training areas to conduct realistic, scenario-based exercises. This dual approach ensures that strategic concepts are immediately tested through practical, hands-on application.

### Pillars of Our Curriculum

MPSOTC's curriculum is dynamic. We continuously analyze lessons learned from recent global conflicts and NATO deployments to update our courses. We host dozens

of specialized training iterations annually, tailored to the most pressing needs of modern security forces. Key pillars include:

- **Civil-Military Cooperation**

- **Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT):** Designed for both military personnel and civilians (such as journalists, NGO staff, and diplomats), this intense,





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### The Vital Partnership with NRDC-GR

While MPSOTC's reach is global, our close proximity and organic partnership with the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Greece (NRDC-GR) in Thessaloniki provide a mutual operational advantage that deserves special mention in the Herald.

For NRDC-GR, maintaining its status as a highly capable Warfighting Corps requires a staff that is continuously educated on the bleeding edge of NATO doctrine. MPSOTC serves as an immediate, trusted provider of this specialized education, ensuring NRDC-GR staff officers and NCOs are prepared for any contingency.

Additionally, the high operational tempo of NRDC-GR provides a massive benefit to our center. MPSOTC relies on the ground truth and current operational experiences

immersive course provides life-saving skills for surviving and operating in high-risk, unpredictable zones.

- **Gender Perspectives and Cultural Awareness:** Fully aligned with the UN's Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, these courses train leaders to understand the cultural dynamics of an area of operations

and the disproportionate impact of conflict on vulnerable demographics.

- **Border Security and Refugee Management:** Leveraging Greece's geographic position, we provide specialized insights into securing borders while managing mass migration flows in accordance with International Humanitarian Law.





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of active Headquarters to keep our training relevant. Personnel from NRDC-GR frequently cross over to our campus in Kilkis to serve as Subject Matter Experts SMEs, guest instructors, and exercise evaluators. This continuous feedback loop ensures that the academic rigor of MPSOTC is constantly refined by the operational realities of NRDC-GR.

### **Exporting Excellence: Mobile Training Teams MTTs**

It is understood that operational commitments may, at times, prevent units from dispatching personnel to Greece. To address this, MPSOTC operates highly capable Mobile Training Teams MTTs. Our certified instructors regularly travel globally to deliver on-site, customized training packages to allied headquarters, partner nations, and multinational brigades such as SEEBRIC and RACVIAC. Whether in the Balkans,

the broader European theater, or the Middle East, our MTTs bring the MPSOTC standards directly to your doorstep.

### **Your Pathway to Excellence: How to Apply and Attend**

A core strength of MPSOTC is the diversity of our student pool. When officers, police professionals, and civilian experts from over a

dozen different nations sit in the same syndicate room, debating tactics and sharing national experiences, they build the interoperability and trust that the Alliance relies upon.

We actively encourage NATO Commands, Allied nations, Partnership for Peace - PfP members, and relevant civilian organizations to make full use of our center.

We warmly invite you to join us



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**Applications:** Civilian applicants, NGOs, or military units seeking to arrange bespoke training or request a Mobile Training Team - MTT can reach out directly to the MPSOTC Student Affairs or Training Directorate via the contact information provided on our website.

### Conclusion

In a world where security challenges are characterized as non-linear, readiness cannot be achieved passively. It must be forged through rigorous, standardized, and internationally collaborative training.

The Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center is dedicated to being the crucible where this readiness is forged. By continually expanding our curriculum, embracing new technologies, opening our doors to the international community and is actively shaping the capable, adaptable leaders required to secure peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

in Kilkis - to share your experience, collaborate with partners, and prepare for the challenges of tomorrow, today.

media.

### The Application Process:

#### 1. The Annual Course Calendar:

Our complete schedule of courses for the academic year is available on our official website: [mpsotc.army.gr/en](https://mpsotc.army.gr/en). We recommend reviewing the calendar early to identify the courses that align with your unit's training requirements.

#### 2. NATO e-PRIME System:

For military personnel from NATO and partner nations, the primary and most streamlined method of application is through the NATO e-PRIME (Partnership Real-Time Information, Management and Exchange) system.

#### 3. National Channels:

Applications can also be processed through your respective national Ministry of Defense or National Defense General Staff channels, which will liaise directly with the Hellenic National Defence General Staff - HNDGS.

#### 4. Direct Contact & Civilian

### Who Can Apply?

- **Military Personnel:** Officers and NCOs from NATO, PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Nations.
- **Law Enforcement:** Police and border security professionals involved in international missions.
- **Civilians:** Personnel from International Organizations - IOs, NGOs, diplomatic corps, and the





## READY TO DETER: *INSIGHTS FROM EXERCISE LOYAL DOLOS 25*

Trust and cohesion develop naturally through the exercise process itself. When multinational personnel work together under pressure, share responsibilities, and pursue common objectives, they build professional relationships based on mutual understanding and respect. Over time, this continuous interaction strengthens cohesion, improves coordination, and reinforces confidence among multinational staff and units.

**Q: Were there any new technologies, digital tools, or operational concepts tested during LOYAL DOLOS 25, and what impact did they have on the exercise?**

**A:** In the field of functional services, we were testing and using a new release of the Joint SDEP, which is a Greek national solution tool for command-and-control for the armed forces. As it had been released shortly before the exercise was executed, it posed some challenges for the staff. In terms of procedures, we implemented a multi-center approach, introducing a functional distribution of the points of entry for all tactical information. In particular, we mastered the procedures regarding the employment of the Joint Air-Ground Integration Center (JAGIC). This was the third time we implemented JAGIC



in operations and exercises, and my first personal experience with it and it proved to be extremely effective.

Exercise “LOYAL DOLOS 25” was a LANDCOM-scheduled land domain activity that was launched on the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2025 and designed to train NRDC-GR as a Tier 3 Warfighting Corps Headquarters in a high-intensity, multidomain environment.

**Q: From your perspective, what were the key elements that shaped its structure and execution?**

**A:** I would underline two elements as the most important features of

the exercise: the high intensity of the overall construct of the exercise and the multidomain approach to operations pursued throughout the exercise. More specifically, the high intensity fighting showcased significant levels of attrition, as well as, a high operational rhythm and tempo. At the same time, multidomain warfare, which combines operations in the land, sea, air, cyber space and space increased the stress and workload of the staff.

**Q: Could you underline the main strategic purpose of Exercise LOYAL DOLOS 25 within NATO’s current security environment?**



A: Any exercise serves as a mean to test our readiness and our preparedness, while, at the same time, portraying our capabilities as a resolved and credible force. LOYAL DOLOS 25, as an exercise of a warfighting corps conducting offensive operations, was one of the multiple activities undertaken by NATO in order to build our preparedness and demonstrate the Alliance's commitment to holding its grounds. I would stand firm that such exercises are key for deterrence, which is one of NATO's main policies.

**Q: Emerging threats and evolving trends in today's security environment reinforce the Alliance's need for deterrence. In what ways would you say that LOYAL DOLOS 25 supported NATO's Southern Flank deterrence and defense posture ?**

A: LOYAL DOLOS 25

demonstrated essential capabilities at the corps level, which in itself constitutes a significant message of deterrence. By conducting a demanding, high-intensity warfighting exercise, NRDC Greece proved its ability to plan, coordinate, and execute complex operations within a



NATO framework. This demonstration of operational competence and readiness sends a clear signal that the Alliance maintains credible and capable forces on its Southern Flank. In that sense, the exercise showed that NRDC Greece is fully prepared to fulfill its assigned role within the NATO force structure, thereby strengthening both deterrence and defense posture in the region.

**Q: What key challenges do you see the Alliance still needing to address, and how was the exercise designed to tackle them?**

A: Evidently, there are still many aspects of modern warfare where there is room for improvement. At the same time, these aspects are extremely difficult to test and train in exercises of this kind. The full digitalization of the battlefield and also evolving robotization of combat activities, is, from my point of view, the next step forward to incorporate and test in exercises.

**Q: What were the most challenging operational problems presented during the exercise?**

A: There have been identified two (2) main challenges regarding interoperability that can be improved: Firstly, our ability to use effectively and efficiently our functional area services operating across different security domains. It seems to be a challenging task, because separate security domains cannot be interconnected due to security restrictions. Nevertheless, any improvement that we can achieve



in this field will be worth the effort.

Secondly, all main, functional services of the land forces, require enhanced interoperability. We should either improve integration among those tools or move towards federal networking systems. In terms of interoperability, these are the main two areas of focus in the near future.

**Q: What lessons learned so far will most influence future training or operational planning?**

A: I would not single out one of those specifically. There were many small improvements identified throughout the exercise. The synergistic implementation of all those lessons identified with those observations are being analyzed and then being translated into necessary changes in procedures. This leads to improvement on the way we operate and will act as a better starting point and working environment for soldiers

in the field, which is my principal goal.

**Q: How did the exercise contribute to meeting the standards of the Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL), and what did it reveal about the headquarter's current level of readiness?**

A: The exercise served as the venue to demonstrate our combat readiness, which is the baseline objective. There was noticeable improvement in our performance throughout the exercise, confirming that continuous intensive practice leads to excellence. That is the only way to achieve it. My assessment is that NRDC Greece combat readiness stands at the highest level according to NATO standards.

**Q: From your perspective, what leadership qualities are most critical for operating effectively in a high-intensity, multinational corps headquarters?**

A: In today's increasingly technological battlefield, commanders and their staff must possess strong knowledge of the technologies employed, as well as detailed and in-depth expertise in the tools used for command and control of subordinate formations. While traditional military leadership values remain fundamental, this balanced technical knowledge will make a decisive difference in the future.

In conclusion, we would like to sincerely thank DCOS OPS Alfonso Castilla for sharing his valuable insights and experiences from Exercise LOYAL DOLOS 25. His perspectives on operating in a high-intensity, multidomain environment have been both enlightening and inspiring. We are truly grateful for his time and openness. It is always a great opportunity to learn from his expertise.



Anna POULIOU  
CIV (GRC)  
Intern PAO  
NRDC-GR/COMM DIV



# COMMAND IN CRISIS: THE CREVAL PROCESS AND FOC DECLARATION IN LOYAL DOLOS 25



### Introduction

The contemporary security environment facing NATO and its member states is characterized by increasing complexity, uncertainty, and rapid change. Modern crises rarely develop along clearly defined military lines and frequently involve the interaction of military, political, informational, economic, and societal factors. Within this environment, headquarters-level exercises provide an important framework for training staffs to operate effectively under conditions of uncertainty, time

pressure, and competing demands, while supporting NATO's approach to collective training, preparedness, and assurance.

Exercise LOYAL DOLOS 25 (LODO25) was conducted from 2 to 11 December 2025 as a headquarters-level training activity focused on decision-making, coordination, and situational understanding within a complex crisis environment. For the exercise, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Greece (NRDC-GR) deployed to Assiros from 10 November to 11 December 2025,

enabling preparation, integration, and sustained headquarters activity throughout the exercise period. In support of the exercise, the Exercise Control (EXCON) was conducted by NATO Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, where an organization of more than 500 personnel from over six nations—including Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Türkiye—supported the planning, execution, and management of the exercise.

LODO25 was conducted in





conjunction with NATO's Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) process, providing a structured operational context in which NRDC-GR demonstrated headquarters-level procedures, coordination mechanisms, and decision-making processes in accordance with established NATO standards. In this regard, the exercise formed part of a broader framework supporting the evaluation and assurance of the Corps' readiness within the Alliance.

At the conclusion of the exercise,

NRDC-GR Commander formally declared Full Operational Capability (FOC), marking a significant milestone in the Corps' readiness cycle. With this declaration, NRDC-GR is designated to assume the role of NATO Warfighting Corps (WFC), enabling it to provide a high-readiness, deployable headquarters capable of commanding multinational operations in Multidomain Operations Environment (MDOE), in support of NATO missions and tasks, in accordance with Alliance

requirements.

LODO25 was designed as a professional training that placed emphasis on headquarters processes, coordination across functional areas, and decision-making in an evolving operational context. Focusing on kinetic activity, LODO25 provided participants with opportunities to practice procedures, enhance interoperability, and develop shared situational understanding across military and non-military dimensions, consistent with NATO's approach to crisis management and collective defense.

### Contemporary Challenges and the Need for Adaptation

Recent developments in the international security environment have underscored the necessity for continuous adaptation by armed forces and headquarters. Hybrid activities, information challenges, and pressure below the threshold of armed conflict increasingly shape the strategic landscape. As a result, headquarters are required to integrate military considerations with political guidance, legal frameworks, and strategic communication imperatives.







LODO25 reflected this reality by immersing participants in a complex scenario environment where linear solutions were rarely available. The exercise reinforced the understanding that effective responses depend not solely on capabilities, but on cognitive agility, coordination, and the capacity to operate under conditions of persistent uncertainty.

### Training Objectives and Exercise Focus

The primary objective of LODO25 was to enhance staff proficiency in

decision-making and coordination within a complex operational setting. Particular emphasis was placed on developing a shared understanding of the operational environment, improving coordination and information flow across functional areas, practicing decision-making under time pressure and incomplete information, and strengthening interoperability at the headquarters level.

The exercise environment was deliberately designed to challenge assumptions, expose friction points,

and force participants to prioritize, assess risk, and adapt their courses of action as situations evolved.

### Decision-Making Under Pressure

A defining feature of LODO25 was its focus on decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Participants were required to assess rapidly changing situations, balance competing demands, and provide timely recommendations despite incomplete or ambiguous information.

This approach reflected the realities of contemporary crisis response, where perfect situational awareness is rarely achievable. Rather than seeking optimal solutions, participants focused on delivering coherent and timely responses, reinforcing judgment, critical thinking, and flexibility as essential competencies for headquarters-level operations.



Charalampos SACHTARIS  
OF-5 (GRC A)  
DACOS G7  
NRDC-GR/PLANS DIV



# MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS. A NEW WAY TO OPERATE?

As Napoleon said once: Nothing likes more to the military than acronyms, buzzwords and apocryphal quotes. Following this liking, in recent times we are using the new concept “Multidomain Operations” as the revolution in military affairs we need to win the next war. In this article, we will try to explain what the Multi-domain Operations (MDO) are, and see if it is really a new concept or just one of those buzzwords that Napoleon mentioned, allegedly.

When the occasional bystander meets for the first time the word multidomain immediately thinks about operations in several domains at the same time, and that sounds a lot as the good-old-fashioned Joint operations. But we have a new word, There must be something else than adding two more domains, Space and Cyberspace, so What is different with multidomain?

The NATO Terminology Database: defines Joint as an adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate. The agreed definition for MDO is Orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronised with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to create converging effects at the speed of relevance. This means that Joint is defined by the “who” and the MDO is

defined mainly by the “where”.

The critical readers will try to find more differences than just that. Looking at the principles of both types of operations should be different. The twelve principles of Joint Operations are Unity of Effort, Definition of Objectives, Maintenance of Morale, Initiative, Freedom of Action, Offensive Spirit, Concentration of Effects, Economy of Effort, Security, Surprise, Flexibility and Sustainability. On the other hand, the MDO principles are Unity, Interconnectivity, Creativity and Agility.

However, reading the definitions of all those principles, we notice that for each MDO principle we can link one or more principles of the Joint Operations. Some examples, Unity is very similar to Unity of Effort and Definition of Objectives; Interconnectivity is in between Unity of Effort and Concentration of Effects; Creativity lies among Initiative, Freedom of Action and Offensive Spirit and Agility is the link between Initiative, Offensive Spirit and Flexibility, to mention some of the most immediate relationships.

It does not matter if different kind of operations share some similarities, Multidomain is a new way to operate. Really?

Looking back in history, we

can find several instances where something “multidomain-ish” took place. During World War II, the air bombing campaign of the allies over the German territory consisted of bomber airplanes attacking land industrial facilities in order to disrupt the industrial production of the enemy, while at the same time an aerial escort of fighters was flying close by to block the action of enemy planes bound to intercept the bombing formations. Coordination of activities creating effects in several domains. That looks like Multidomain in mid-20th Century. Of course, the Air Forces were always well ahead of their time, with land forces lagging behind. Or not? In the battle of Zama (202 BCE), the Roman Army used a combination of strident noises (electromagnetic spectrum) and maneuver to disrupt the charge of the elephants of the Carthaginian army. This contributed to the defeat of the African nation and the establishment of the monopoly of the Roman Republic over the Mediterranean Sea and their lines of communication.

The definition of Multidomain operations establish a differentiation in the way we approach the activity. Military activities are orchestrated, and must be synchronized with the civilian activities.

To orchestrate is to arrange or combine elements so as to achieve

## Articles

a desired or maximum effect. To synchronize is setting things to happen together and at the same rate. We can combine all the range of military activities to achieve the desired effects, but we can just keep our eyes on the ongoing non-military activities and adapt our rhythm to them.

We have now a slightly better understanding of what MDO are. Our next step is to identify how the Warfighting Corp (WFC) contributes to these operations.

NATO doctrine relies in the fact that using a maneuveristic approach and synchronizing activities, we create effects that influence the behavior of the audiences. The standing definition of multidomain operations talks about orchestrating military activities across all domains to create effects. Hence we have to identify at our level which kind of actions we can perform to create effects.

By design, as WFC we conduct operations in the land domain and we have limited capabilities to operate with our means in other domains such as the air domain with the Army aviation and in the Cyberspace with EW capabilities. We can even have a limited capability to operate in the maritime domain, but more often than not, we require the support from the specific component commands. For that reason we organize different centers to orchestrate military activities. These are the reasons that explain why WFC is the smallest echelon able to perform MDO.



WFC were doing this activities before MDO was defined. Therefore, the question remains: Why a new concept? The possible answer: The Green Burger Theory. As parents, we want our children to eat more vegetables, so we put together some broccoli, some egg, shape it like a burger and feed them a Green Burger made from the Incredible Hulk himself. Much more exciting than a boring broccoli omelet, Isn't it? For the same reason NATO is using MDO as a way to induce a deep change of mentality throughout its whole structure.

NATO wants its new commanders to be aware of a new operational

environment where threats can come from domains that, not only did not exist just a few years ago but where the commander may not be able to operate. Simultaneously, NATO wants to extend the concept of comprehensive approach and foster a technological transformation.

The new operational domains are not so new and both have military origins. Space was one of the confrontation fields during the cold war. The space race for exploration, the intelligence satellites gathering information from the enemy, the development of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) or the



Strategic Defence Initiative<sup>1</sup> are just some examples of the competition for space.

Cyberspace has also a military origin with the development of the first net of networks as a DARPA<sup>2</sup> project.

However, the technology used in these new domains was easily expanded into the civilian application. The Cold War ended, the use of the new technologies was democratized and civilian companies started taking over the ownership of them. Private investment allowed a fast development and the military just rode the wave of those new technologies including them in our systems. Along with the military, the civil society started being more and more reliant in new technologies, which opened a huge new field of operations for the ill-intended with new types of felonies available to commit.

The skills set developed to commit those felonies in cyberspace against the individuals, could be easily used against critical infrastructures, and the attacker does not necessarily have to be a regular army. That immediately caught the attention of national governments: We must protect the cyberspace in order to protect our critical infrastructure.

A similar thing happened in the

Space domain. Communication satellites become a fast and easy way to communicate, especially in those places where the physical infrastructure was not developed yet. Satellite Navigation offered precision for weapon systems, for command and control of military units or cargo fleet and for navigation whether in a battlefield or in a new city you were visiting during holidays. The world became more and more dependent on those systems. Inevitably, at some point someone started thinking on all the chaos that the disruption of those systems could cause.

In addition, from the adversary's perspective, it was much cheaper to reduce the western technologic advantage by denying or degrading the systems than implementing better systems of their own. Then again, it dawn on the western authorities: We have to protect our space capabilities.

This need for protection of critical infrastructure and capabilities triggered the extension of the battlefield to these new domains and the need for the military to be able to operate in them and protect them.

As for the civilian activities synchronization, war exceeds the limits of the military.<sup>3</sup> We are just one part of the DIME, the four classical instruments of national power<sup>4</sup> and

as such, we are supposed to act in coordination with the other three.

In a complex world, not only nations, or alliances, participates at war. Civilian companies take part in operations. Companies that were already operating in these new domains for a living. They have the capabilities, the expertise and the infrastructure that armed forces lack. For that reason, until NATO develops an independent space capability or cyber offensive capability, we have to operate alongside these companies to achieve a proper synchronization.

The Comprehensive Approach has to be even more comprehensive. It is not just the influence in the operational environment of an individual or a social group we have to take into consideration. It is the commercial activity that a civilian company conduct and how it affects the situation and how our actions affect the civilian environment in new and unexpected ways. Disrupting the signal of a communication satellite can have an impact in bank operations out of the Area of Operations.

Soldiers have to be aware of these new repercussions. Commanders must know the new threats and the new consequences. The war is no longer a counterinsurgency operation where we can use super-precise

<sup>1</sup> Also Known as "Star Wars Program" is a USA initiative developed in the 80,s where a series of satellites will provide early warning and defense against nuclear ballistic missiles.

<sup>2</sup> Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is an agency from the US Defense Department for the development of new technologies for military use.

<sup>3</sup> As Clausewitz said, war is the continuation of politics by other means.

<sup>4</sup> DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economy. Some scholars increase these four with Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement to create DIMEFIL.

weapons against a low-tech enemy. Expensive accurate ammunition now is just very expensive dumb ammunition. We have to re-learn how to move through the world using prehistoric tools like maps and compasses. We have to educate our chain of command to assume that the electromagnetic spectrum is highly contested and maybe the VTC will not working properly. In sum, we have to educate our current and future leaders in a new warfare.

An organizational change of mind does not happen at the snap of two fingers. It takes time. The problem increases its complexity when the organization is as big as NATO with international stakeholders, coming

from different cultural backgrounds.

Finally, NATO wants to push forward the digital transformation of the armed forces. The operational environment is overcrowded with information coming from myriads of sensors and threats arising in five different domains. We need a smaller footprint to operate a bigger amount of information. The solution comes by using an interconnected network of smaller nodes linked by reliable and resilient systems able to cope with that flow of information at relevant speed so we are able to break the OODA<sup>5</sup> loop of the enemy, and resilient enough to continue operating in a degraded environment without significant loss of capability.

As a conclusion, we can deduce that, for the military part, Multidomain Operations are just normal operations, only in a more complex environment with more domains and new threats that we are not fully ready to engage. As, we must be prepared to fight tonight better than tomorrow we need to educate ourselves and procure new technology.

These new requirements in terms of technology and education require funding for implementation, and in a world with scarce resources, you need to offer something new and shiny to capture the attention of the fund allocators and get them to eat the broccoli. This Green Burger is Multi-domain operations.



Ricardo URBINA  
OF-4 (ESP A)  
Chief COLL TRG G7  
NRDC-GR/PLANS DIV



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<sup>5</sup> Observe, Orient, Decide, Assess



# STEADFAST COBALT 2025 BRAVO (STCO25B) — LESSONS IN INTEROPERABILITY, RESILIENCE AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION



Steadfast Cobalt is NATO's flagship annual Communications and Information Systems (CIS) exercise aimed at testing, validating and improving interoperability of command, control and communications across Alliance and partner forces. Supervised by SHAPE and coordinated by the NATO CIS Group, the event brings together CIS personnel, headquarters, and supporting units to deploy, operate and stress-test mission networks, collaborative tools and information services under realistic, high-tempo conditions. By exercising secure, resilient and agile Command & Control (C2) connectivity and integrating new technologies and procedures, Steadfast Cobalt helps ensure NATO's readiness to operate cohesively in crises and to sustain

credible deterrence.

Year 2025 was a pivotal one for NRDC-GREECE because it combined the successful completion of the unit's Combat Readiness Evaluation with participation in major NATO digital and multinational initiatives. Beyond validating personnel, procedures, and deployment readiness, NRDC-GR's involvement in Steadfast Cobalt 2025 — including the Alliance's first federation exercise within the new VeVA Mission Network — provided a timely opportunity to demonstrate interoperability, operational integration with partner forces, and the ability to operate in an increasingly data-driven environment. Taken together, these achievements reaffirmed NRDC-GR's readiness to meet evolving NATO requirements and accelerated its transition into the Alliance's next-generation C2 and communications ecosystem.

The Vigilant and Enhanced Vigilant Activities Mission Network<sup>1</sup> is NATO's federated, secure, and scalable digital environment designed to interconnect national and NATO systems across classifications and domains. Built to support operational planning, situational awareness, intelligence sharing, and rapid

decision-making, VeVA enables seamless information exchange while preserving national data governance and security controls. Its introduction marks a significant step in NATO's digital transformation, and federation exercises like Steadfast Cobalt are essential to validate the network's technical interoperability, operational procedures, and governance frameworks before full operational employment.

## Cooperation and coordination

The participation of the NRDC-GR HQ<sup>2</sup>, NATO SIGNAL BATTALION (NSB), the SIGNAL BRIGADE and Greek National Support Elements underscored the critical importance of close coordination in multinational operations. Differences in national systems, configurations and procedures required collaborative problem-solving and clear communication. The exercise environment fostered a spirit of teamwork and shared responsibility: personnel worked together to resolve technical issues, exchange expertise and ensure mission success. This cooperation strengthened professional relationships and built the mutual trust necessary for effective

<sup>1</sup> VeVA MN

<sup>2</sup> NATO RAPID DEPLOYABLE CORP – GREECE HEADQUARTERS



*Figure 1: The RNM deployed.*

multinational operations.

To facilitate effective cooperation and coordination, the exercise relied on integrated planning cells and embedded liaison officers from each participating nation and formation. Daily coordination briefs, joint technical working groups, and a centralized configuration help desk ensured transparency and rapid resolution of issues, while spectrum management and harmonized SOPs enabled safe, efficient use of shared communications resources. These measures reduced duplication, accelerated troubleshooting, and maintained operational tempo while respecting national caveats and security restraints. Institutionalizing such mechanisms—through codified procedures, routine cross-training, and their inclusion in future exercise planning—will further strengthen


interoperable coordination for multinational operations.

### **The human dimension**

While advanced technology underpins modern communications, the human dimension remains decisive. STCO25B succeeded because of the professionalism, expertise and dedication of the staff officers and technicians involved. Working under demanding conditions and tight timelines, teams adapted, collaborated and maintained high standards of performance—capabilities that were instrumental in achieving the exercise objectives. Participation in Steadfast Cobalt also contributed significantly to professional development, giving personnel valuable multinational experience, deepening technical

knowledge and enhancing familiarity with NATO procedures and standards.

Human performance remained at the heart of STCO25B's achievements. Staff officers, technicians, and support personnel demonstrated high levels of professionalism and technical competence while establishing and sustaining complex communications—including satellite links and the first-time federation of VeVA components—under compressed timelines and shifting priorities. Their ability to prioritize tasks, share expertise across national boundaries, and execute rapid troubleshooting maintained mission tempo and ensured continuous connectivity for command and control. These hands-on experiences reinforced practical skills in systems integration, cross-domain information handling, and operational security procedures that cannot be learned solely in classroom settings.



*Figure 2: Staff Officers in action.*



Equally important were the human-support factors that sustained performance: leadership, morale, and resilience. Small-unit leadership, clear tasking, and effective language- and culture-aware communication fostered trust and cohesion among multinational teams, while formal and informal mentorship accelerated junior personnel's learning curves. The exercise also highlighted areas for improvement—pre-deployment familiarization with new mission-network governance, better-managed rest cycles, and enhanced mental-health and family-support planning—to preserve readiness during extended operations. Capturing these human-dimension lessons through targeted after-action reviews, updated training syllabi, and structured cross-training will strengthen personnel preparedness for subsequent VeVA federations and other technologically complex NATO operations.

## Redundancy and resilience

A central lesson from the exercise was the value of redundancy and layered architectures. The combined use of satellite communications and alternative connectivity solutions, such as terrestrial fiber-optic links, ensured continuity of operations and demonstrated the effectiveness of resilient network design. These measures preserved command and control functionality despite environmental and technical challenges.

Dispersion of CIS assets was adopted as a deliberate resilience

measure to minimize the physical and electromagnetic footprint of the force. By distributing modular, low-signature nodes and mobile communication suites across multiple sites — while relying on resilient backbone connections (satellite and terrestrial fiber) — the exercise reduced the risk of a single point of failure and limited targetability by hostile ISR or EW effects. Dispersed deployments also lowered logistical concentration (smaller, more mobile support elements), enabled rapid local reconstitution through pre-positioned spares and hot-standby nodes, and reduced emissions density through power- and antenna-management techniques. Successful implementation depended on careful planning for network topology, spectrum deconfliction, secure synchronization, and standardized relocation procedures; balancing dispersion with bandwidth and latency requirements remains an important

trade-off to optimize in future exercises.

## Training, standardization and readiness

STCO25B highlighted the need for continuous training and standardization to sustain interoperability. Ongoing exercises, regular training and sustained investment in personnel and equipment are essential to maintaining operational capability. The successful completion of more than 330 interoperability tests demonstrated a high level of readiness and technical proficiency. The ability to deploy and operate CIS assets in a complex environment is a critical component of NATO's operational capability, enabling commanders to exercise effective C2 from the outset of a mission, enhance situational awareness and accelerate decision-making.



*Figure 3: NRDC-GR and 2NSB participants family photo*

### Field deployment and support

Following site surveys and detailed pre-deployment planning, an intensive period of technical and administrative deployment ensued. A supporting detachment was deployed for nearly two months and also provided connectivity support to Exercise Loyal Dolos. In close coordination with the Signal Brigade and the national Internet service provider, the detachment delivered robust, resilient and effective connectivity to the backbone Mission Network. The successful interoperability testing validated the HQ's ability to operate in agile and challenging environments without interruption to C2 systems.

For the first time Steadfast Cobalt incorporated federation within the new Vigilant and Enhanced Vigilant Activities Mission Network (VeVA MN), marking a key milestone in NATO's digital transformation. VeVA provides a federated, secure and scalable environment that enables national and NATO systems to interconnect for operational planning, situational awareness and intelligence sharing across classifications and domains. NRDC-GR's participation—supported in the field by a Remote Network Module from the 2nd Signal Battalion—allowed national nodes to join the VeVA backbone and exercise end-to-end connectivity, access control, cross-domain information flows and service federation under realistic, high-tempo conditions. Beyond validating technical interoperability, this first deployment tested governance arrangements,

authentication/authorization procedures, and operational workflows needed to sustain coalition operations on a shared mission network. The results yielded immediate, practical lessons on integration sequencing, performance tuning and command-level coordination that will guide subsequent VeVA federations and implementation across the Alliance.

### Lessons identified

Every NATO exercise offers opportunities to learn and improve. Key lessons from STCO25B include the importance of early coordination, detailed preparation and sustained standardization. These insights will inform future training and operational planning and contribute directly to NATO's deterrence and defence posture.

NRDC-GR HQ's participation was exemplary: by deploying highly skilled staff, integrating national and coalition assets, and successfully completing all interoperability tests, the HQ validated its technical proficiency and operational agility. Its decisive leadership in planning and execution—demonstrated through seamless coordination with the Signal Brigade, national ISPs and allied partners—ensured resilient connectivity across the VeVA Mission Network and sustained C2 capabilities throughout the exercise. NRDC-GR's performance reinforced Troop Contributing Nations' commitment to NATO readiness and set a benchmark for multinational CIS integration,

showing that sustained investment in personnel training, modernization and cooperative procedures delivers tangible improvements to alliance deterrence and collective defence.



Apostolos PITSIKOS  
OF-3 (GRC A)  
SO2 PLANS G6  
NRDC-GR/SPT DIV



# EU-NATO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: EVOLUTION, LEGAL FRAMEWORK, AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

## Introduction

For decades, the relationship between the European Union and NATO was characterized by formal proximity but functional distance a cautious dance of overlapping memberships and bureaucratic hurdles. However, the geopolitical earthquakes of the mid-2020s have rendered this ambiguity a luxury of the past. As we cross the threshold of 2026, the partnership has evolved from a mere coordination mechanism into the primary backbone of Western resilience. With around four in every five people in the European Union also living in a NATO country, the stronger the EU, the stronger the Alliance is what the NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana wrote in June 2020.<sup>1</sup>

The EU-NATO cooperation is based on common values and strategic interests that connect those two organizations. Their strategic partnership is also based upon the 23 states that are both members of

NATO and EU.<sup>2</sup> The EU and NATO have a combined population of almost 1 billion people and some of the more robust economies of the world (USA, UK, Canada, Germany, France) as well as some of the most sophisticated armed forces of the world.

The cooperation of NATO and EU goes back to 1992 and the Maastricht Treaty which finally enabled the EU to establish a mutual defense policy under the lens of the WEU (Western European Union). Specifically, in the Maastricht Treaty WEU is referred as an “integral part of the development of the Union” and also calls WEU to “elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”. In this framework, within the Alliance the WEU-NATO military capabilities are considered to be “separable but not separate” when it comes to mutual assets and HQ<sup>3</sup>. Some years later, the Helsinki Council Meeting by European nations led to the EU-led voluntary cooperation operation by 2003. Based on this meeting the EU

nations must be able to deploy in 60 days and for at least one-year military forces with 50.000 to 60.000 troops. In the year 1999, Washington Summit Communiqué clearly reaffirmed the commitment of NATO countries for the transatlantic link and more specifically the article 9a of this Summit declared that “the European Union has the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” and also focuses on how to prevent duplication of the missions<sup>4</sup>.

## Main cooperation pillars

The first and maybe the most important cooperation sector is the development of defense capabilities. EU defense mechanisms programs (such as the Capability Development plan) are combined and orchestrated alongside NATO defense programs such as the Planning and Review Process<sup>5</sup>. Thus, they both support the ammunition program in view of

<sup>1</sup> (Briefing EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Tania Lațici) <[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/659269/EPRS\\_BRI\(2020\)659269\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/659269/EPRS_BRI(2020)659269_EN.pdf)>

<sup>2</sup> Specifically in the year 2026, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Romania

<sup>3</sup> Final Communiqué Article 7 (NATO) <<https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/1996/06/03/final-communication>>

<sup>4</sup> creator T, “An Alliance for the 21st Century” (NATO) <<https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/1999/04/24/an-alliance-for-the-21st-century>>

<sup>5</sup> The 2023 EU capability development priorities to be ready) <<https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/qu-03-23-421-en-n-web.pdf>> accessed 9 February 2026

the Russian aggression in Ukraine<sup>6</sup>. In this framework, there is the Military Mobility sector where, within a dialogue platform, NATO and EU officials discuss issues such as infrastructure and transportation of dangerous goods<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, besides physical attacks there are the hybrid attacks. For example, the European Centre of Excellence for Hybrid Attacks in Helsinki, Finland is a cooperation symbol on the mutual hybrid defense of both organizations<sup>8</sup>. The protection of high value infrastructure is ultimately a demanding need that ought to be addressed by both NATO and EU. It is clear that those infrastructures can also be energy or transportation related. At the same time and especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks an important common objective of the EU-NATO cooperation is combatting terrorism<sup>9</sup>. To be more precise, via regular NATO staff talks with the EU External Action Service's counter-terrorism section a mutual understanding and complementarity of counter-terrorism is achieved. The exchange of information can be related to capacity building support and protection of civilians also against CBRN attacks<sup>10</sup>.



*NATO(2025). Relations with the European Union.*

### Legal Framework

The "Berlin plus" agreement was signed in December of 2002 between NATO and EU and its main aim was to upgrade the cooperation of those organizations by implementing the decisions of the 1999 Washington summit. The main points of this Agreement were the following: a) intelligence sharing between NATO and EU under security protection rules b) access of NATO to European crisis management operations (CMO) c) NATO communication units and Headquarters availability for EU-led CMOs d) Procedures for release, recall, monitoring and return of NATO assets e) Terms of reference for the Deputy

Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also the European Commands Option in NATO, which means that in any EU-led operation using NATO assets, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is appointed as the Operation Commander f) Arrangements and NATO capability requirements for European-led operations. Last but not least it was decided the consultation arrangements between NATO and EU the EU-led CMO<sup>11</sup>.

On top of that, it is highly important to analyze the procedures under which those provisions can be activated. According to Berlin Plus provisions, the approval of North Atlantic Council

<sup>6</sup> (EU-NATO-cooperation consilium) <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-nato-cooperation/>>

<sup>7</sup> IMMC.JOIN%282022%2948%20final.ENG.xhtml.1\_EN\_ACT\_part1\_v9.Docx) <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52022JC0048>>

<sup>8</sup> 'What Is Hybrid CoE?' (Hybrid CoE - The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 5 February 2026) <<https://www.hybridcoe.fi/who-what-and-how/>>

<sup>9</sup> CreatiT, 'Countering-Terrorism'(NATO) <<https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/countering-terrorism>>

<sup>10</sup> CreatiT, 'Countering-Terrorism'(NATO) <<https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/countering-terrorism>>

<sup>11</sup> 'Cooperation with NATO: EUR-Lex' (EUR) <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/cooperation-with-nato.html>>



(NAC) with the full consensus of all NATO countries is needed. After the approval of the NAC, SHAPE (NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) provides use of its assets and infrastructure. When the full transportation of assets is completed the EU assumes full responsibility, with a potential recall of those responsibilities if priorities shift<sup>12</sup>. The first operational application of this framework was tested in 2003 in the Republic of North Macedonia during Operation Concordia, outside an armed conflict situation.

Besides the Berlin plus agreement, another treaty that is crucial for EU-NATO cooperation is the Lisbon Treaty which was signed by EU members in 2007 and activated in 2009. This treaty shifted all the balances inside and outside of the European Union and it is reasonable to argue that it also changed the NATO-EU relations because of the following arguments:

First and foremost, according to the provisions of Art.42.2 TEU the defense policy of the EU should not interfere with the defense policy of certain states under their NATO obligations which are not compatible with the common security and defense policy of the EU<sup>13</sup>. Secondly,

according to Article 42.7 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty each member state of the EU has the "obligation to assist another member state in the case that it is a victim of armed attack, in accordance with the article 51 of the United Nations Charter, this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States". However, those commitments ought to be in line with state commitments under NATO<sup>14</sup>. Besides that, the Lisbon Treaty establishes the European External Action Service as well as High-Representative and Vice-President roles for the CFSP (Common Foreign Security Policy)<sup>15</sup>. That is the reason why EU foreign external policy became more structured and unified, a reality that of course affected NATO. Additionally, it is imperative to mention that via the Lisbon Treaty EU finally obtained a single legal personality, which of course strengthens the international role of the EU as a whole and enables the capability to acquire diplomatic relations with other international actors such as NATO<sup>16</sup>. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty establishes EDA (European Defense Agency) which is part of CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy). EDA is considered to be a cooperation milestone in the 17<sup>17</sup>. The

main reason for that is the prevention of duplication of operations between EU and NATO as well as European capabilities to meet "NATO standards". Besides that, EDA managed to better instrument the EU defense plans by establishing PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), which is a nations-based group focusing on defense projects instructed by 42.6 of TEU.

### Case study: Ukraine

The war in Ukraine is a common security threat for both EU and NATO but at the same time it was a major opportunity for closer cooperation in the security sector. Their cooperation was focused on supporting Ukraine and ensuring complementarity of efforts through constant bilateral exchanges between respective experts on military support, population movements, humanitarian assistance, CBRN, hybrid and cyber threats, disinformation, energy, and critical infrastructure. Moreover, the EU Defense Innovation Office as well as the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform to Ukraine (EUAM) also cooperating intensively with NATO on the ground. In addition, crucial progress was developed by the Political and Security Committee

<sup>12</sup> 'Berlin Plus Agreement' (Groklopedia, 21 January 1970) <[https://groklopedia.com/page/berlin\\_plus\\_agreement](https://groklopedia.com/page/berlin_plus_agreement)>

<sup>13</sup> '12008M042' (EUR) <[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu\\_2008/art\\_42/oj/eng](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_42/oj/eng)>

<sup>14</sup> '12008M042' (EUR) <[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu\\_2008/art\\_42/oj/eng](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_42/oj/eng)>

<sup>15</sup> (EUR-lex - 12016M018 - en - EUR-lex) <[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu\\_2016/art\\_18/oj/eng](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/art_18/oj/eng)>

<sup>16</sup> 'Legal Personality of the EU' (EUR) <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/legal-personality-of-the-eu.html>>

<sup>17</sup> 'European Defence Agency - EDA' (European Union) <[https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/search-all-eu-institutions-and-bodies/european-defence-agency-eda\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/search-all-eu-institutions-and-bodies/european-defence-agency-eda_en)>

(PSC) and NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) informal meeting on military mobility. This meeting emphasized the importance of crucial military corridors as well as the significance of EU-NATO relations in reduction of logistical costs<sup>18</sup>. Regarding the weapons cooperation, within the Ukrainian Defence Contract Group EU and NATO members (57 countries) are coordinating the continual delivery of military assistance<sup>19</sup>. The EU also assists NATO operations in Ukraine by freezing Russian assets in Europe and utilizing those assets in favor of the defense of Ukraine.

### Challenges and opportunities

The NATO-EU relations were tested by common challenges such as the international financial crisis in 2008, the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as the 2016 decision of Great Britain to exit the EU, the so-called "Brexit" and the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the 2008 financial crisis resulted in the Chicago Summit Declaration, according to which NATO's "Smart Defense system" and EU's Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing. At the

same time, the EU initiatives in Air-to-air refueling, medical support, maritime surveillance and training are welcomed by NATO<sup>20</sup>. Additionally, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 resulted in the Wales Summit Declaration, which clarified in the article 102 the EU-NATO "work side by side in crisis management operations and broaden political consultations". The war in Ukraine made clear that "a more capable European defense contributes positively to global and transatlantic security complementary to NATO<sup>21</sup>". At the same Declaration,

the article 104 address "issues of common concern" between EU-NATO, "including security challenges like cyber defense, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism and energy security<sup>22</sup>". Throughout all these years, the NATO-EU relations were constantly developed by informal Ministers of Foreign Affairs meetings as well as joint declarations between the two organizations. Formally speaking, since 2017 the future of the EU-NATO relations is evaluated by progress reports.



*Alamy Limited (2022). The flag of NATO, European Union and Ukraine waving together in the sky with a tree on the right side.*

<sup>18</sup> ( plenary I European Parliament) <<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/texts-adopted.html>>

<sup>19</sup> Briefing EPRS I European Parliamentary Research Service. (n.d.-a). [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/772922/EPRS\\_BRI\(2025\)772922\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/772922/EPRS_BRI(2025)772922_EN.pdf)

<sup>20</sup> Chicago Summit Declaration' (NATO) <<https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2012/05/20/chicago-summit-declaration>>

<sup>21</sup> Joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation. NATO(2023) f(<https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2023/01/10/joint-declaration-on-eu-nato-cooperation>

<sup>22</sup> 'Wales Summit Declaration' (NATO) <<https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2014/09/05/wales-summit-declaration>>



Indeed, history proves that the EU and NATO have the ability to further their cooperation, especially nowadays since they are facing the most serious security challenge since the Second World War due to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. In this framework, NATO remains and will remain the cornerstone of Western collective defense. However, it is difficult to neglect the fact that there is a need for closer EU-NATO cooperation in view of the common challenges<sup>23</sup>. The military capabilities between EU and NATO ought to be upgraded by joint procurement, where required,

## Conclusions

To sum up, it would be valuable to note that EU-NATO relations are of strategic importance for the Euro-Atlantic security, peace, stability and prosperity. The main reason that this cooperation is extremely important is the combination of defense capabilities provided by the Alliance with economic and political capabilities of European countries. The fact that there are mutual member states between NATO and EU foster the cooperation capabilities of those two organizations.

The need for NATO consensus for European-led operations with NATO assets ("Berlin Plus" Agreement) makes them dependent on NATO's assistance and hinders the EU's



potential for more independent military capabilities. This provision has been activated only twice in the EU operations in the Republic of North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Regarding the Lisbon Treaty, even if it is considered to be a ground-breaking legal document that changes the dynamics inside the EU, it does not correspond to the EU's major challenges. Despite the higher integration rate imposed by the Lisbon Treaty, it is not clear whether it has managed to address the shortcomings of European strategic development, which clearly affects the EU-NATO relations. Those

long-standing disadvantages reflect on strategic, military and political EU-NATO cooperation. In this framework, the cooperation capabilities of EU and NATO could easily be expanded in areas such as space or disruptive technologies. However, as indicated in the case of Libya, the EU-NATO cooperation is not always realistic due to structural challenges of the EU, which are related to different national priorities and decisions of the member states of the EU.

Nevertheless, it is becoming gradually clear that we ought to stay optimistic for the potential of EU-NATO cooperation on the field. After all, it is this cooperation that undoubtedly remains the major pillar of peace, security and strategic cooperation of the Western civilization's prosperity and future.



Ioannis GEORGIOU  
CIV (GRC)  
Intern LEGAD  
NRDC-GR/COMMAND GROUP

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# MILITARIZATION OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY AFTER 2022: CONSEQUENCES AND PERSPECTIVES

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Background and Context

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a profound turning point in the security and economic landscape of Europe. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, European states faced a large-scale conventional war on their borders, prompting a rapid review of their defence postures and fiscal priorities. In response, the European Union (EU) and its member states initiated a process of military expansion and integration that has since been described as the «militarization of the European economy».

This transformation extends far beyond an increase in defense budgets. It involves the redirection of industrial capacity, innovation funding, and public spending towards security-related objectives. The European Commission's initiatives—such as the European Defense Fund (EDF), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) reflect a growing agreement that Europe must develop strategic autonomy not only in political terms but also in defense industrial capability. However, this shift raises complex questions about its economic sustainability, social acceptance, and compatibility with



Europe's long-term commitments to green transition and social welfare. The militarization of economic policy, while justified by geopolitical realities, risks reshaping the very model of the European economy.

### 1.2. Research Aim and Objectives

The aim of this paper is to analyse the consequences and the perspectives of the militarization of the European economy after 2022, exploring how the new defence pattern influences fiscal structures, industrial policy and strategic governance within the EU. Specifically, the research pursues the following objectives :

1. To assess the scale and

dynamics of defence spending growth among EU member states since 2022.

2. To examine the fiscal and industrial challenges resulting from this shift, including debt implications and technological dependence.

3. To evaluate the socio-economic and environmental impacts of sustained militarization.

4. To discuss possible future scenarios and policy options for balancing security priorities with sustainable development goals.

In doing so, the paper aims to contribute to the ongoing academic and policy debate on the connection between economics, security and European integration.

## 2.The Level and Dynamics of militarization (2010-2024)

The evolution of Europe's militarization over the last decade reflects a dramatic transformation in both political priorities and economic orientation. From the relatively low defence investment levels of the early 2010s to the unprecedented outbreak after 2022, the trajectory demonstrates how security crises can reshape entire economic models. This section provides an inclusive overview of the trends, drivers and institutional shifts that have redefined European defence and economic policy in the post-Ukraine era.

### 2.1 The Post-2022 Turning Point: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

The Invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 served as the primary catalyst for a paradigm shift in European security thinking. Until that point, the European Union (EU) had largely viewed defence spending as a secondary concern, emphasizing diplomacy, crisis prevention, and "soft power" mechanisms as the foundation of its international role. Russia's actions, however, shattered the assumption that peace and stability in Europe could be sustained without credible military interception. Within weeks, member states announced massive increases in defence budgets. Germany, for example, launched the *Zeitenwende* initiative, pledging a 100 billion euros special funds for its armed forces. Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries

followed suit, speeding procurement programs and defence modernization. The European Commission and the Council of the EU also responded institutionally, embodiment defence considerations into economic and industrial policies. Initiatives like the European Peace Facility (EPF) originally designed to support peacekeeping, were repurposed to finance arms deliveries to Ukraine-an precedent step in EU history. This convergence of economic and security policy signalled the beginning of a new era: the militarization of the European economy.

### 2.2 Growth of Defence Budgets Across the EU.


Between 2010 and 2021, EU defence expense remained relatively stagnant averaging around 1.3% of GDP. However, from 2022 onwards, growth became exponential. According to SIPRI (2024), the combined defence spending of EU member states reached approximately 345 billion euros in 2024, a 30%

increase compared to pre-war levels. The rise was not uniform. Eastern and Northern European countries-those closest to Russia-experienced the sharpest increases. Poland's defence budget rose from 2.1% of GDP in 2021 to 3.9% in 2024. The Baltic states reached similar levels, while Western European countries such as France and Germany moved toward NATO's 2% target, reversing decades of underinvestment. This budgetary expansion was accompanied by major procurement programs: the acquisition of F-35 aircraft, cast defence systems and next-generation tanks. Defence industries across the continent experienced unprecedented demand, prompting governments to expand production capacity through support and joint investment mechanisms.

### 2.3 Key Policy Shifts:From the Strategic Compass to NATO Commitments

The policy dimension of militarization is as significant as its

Figure 1: European Defence Expenditure, 2010-2024





fiscal ingredient. The EU's Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (adopted in 2022) provided a formal framework for integrating defence into the Union's broader strategic vision. It emphasized the need for greater operational readiness of EU forces, enhanced coordination between national defence industries and reinforcement of Europe's technological sovereignty.

At the same time, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) intensified their role in coordinating investments and research projects across member states. By 2024, the EDF had allocated over 2,7 billion euros to collaborative R&D programs in areas such as drone technology, cyber defence, and advanced materials. NATO remained a central actor, but the balance between transatlantic dependence and European self-reliance became a recurring debate. While cooperation with the United States deepened through arms imports and joint exercises, several EU policymakers emphasized the importance of reducing dependency by fostering an autonomous European defence industrial base.

#### **2.4. Industrial and Technological Implications**

Militarization has deeply affected Europe's industrial and technological Defence manufacturing-once fragmented and limited by strict export controls-has been strengthened as a strategic growth sector. Governments increasingly classify defence industry

investment as «strategic», allowing it to benefit from relaxed fiscal and competition rules. The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS, 2024) promotes cross-border cooperation among major firms such as Airbus Defence & Space, Leonardo, Saab and Rheinmetall. At the same time, smaller and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have entered the supply chain through EU funding schemes.

Technologically, the emphasis has shifted toward dual-use innovation-technologies that serve both civilian and military purposes, including artificial intelligence (AI), satellite communication and cybersecurity. This dual-use approach has blurred traditional boundaries between defence and civilian research, accelerating innovation but also raising ethical and regulatory challenges. The expansion of production capacity, however, has exposed structural weaknesses. Fragmentation among national procurement systems persists and interoperability remains a major issue. Moreover, the EU's dependence on critical raw materials and components-such as semiconductors and rare earth elements-poses long-term risks to self-sufficiency.

#### **3. Challenges and Risks of Economic Militarization**

While Europe's post 2022 militarization has strengthened its defence capacity, it has also generated a series of interconnected challenges that test the resilience of

its economic and social systems. The sustainability of this transformation depends on the EU's ability to balance security imperatives with fiscal responsibility, industrial autonomy, and environmental commitments.

#### **3.1 Fiscal Pressures and Public Debt Sustainability**

The rapid surge in defence spending – often financed through extraordinary budgets – has intensified fiscal pressures across EU member states. While short-term GDP growth may be stimulated by increased investment in defence industries, the long-term effect is higher public debt and reduced fiscal flexibility. Countries such as Germany and Poland have created special off-budget funds, effectively bypassing fiscal rules but raising concerns about transparency and accumulation. The European Commission has warned that sustained militarization could complicate the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact.

#### **3.2 Industrial Dependence and Strategic Autonomy**

Despite new EU initiatives like European Defence Fund (EDF) and EDIS, Europe still relies heavily on non-EU suppliers – especially the United States – for advanced weapons, digital systems, and components. This dependence limits Europe's strategic autonomy and exposes it to external supply chain disruptions.

Developing a unified European

defence industrial base remains essential to reduce vulnerability, but progress is slow due to fragmented national procurement systems and competing industrial interests.


outcomes.

competing industries.

## 4.1. Macroeconomic Effects: Growth, Employment and Productivity

## 4.2. The Shift in Budgetary Priorities: Defence vs Social Investment

EU Public Spending Composition Before and After 2022



## 3.3 Social and Environmental Impacts of Defence Expansion

The strengthening of defence in Europe has led to divided public opinion, with concerns about its cost at the expense of social and environmental priorities. At the same time, increased military activity places additional pressure on the environment, raising emissions and making it harder for the EU to achieve its climate goals.

## 4. Economic Consequences of Military Expansion


The militarization of the European economy has produced significant macroeconomic and fiscal repercussions. While defence investment can stimulate short-term industrial activity, its structural effects on growth, productivity and fiscal stability remain mixed. The following subsections outline the principal dimensions of these economic

The post-2022 defence buildup contributed to temporary growth momentum in several EU economies. Countries such as Poland, Germany and Finland reported increases in industrial output linked to defence manufacturing, logistics and supply chain demand. Employment in defence-related sectors rose by approximately 8% between 2022 and 2024, particularly in metal industries, electronics and engineering.

However, these gains are uneven and largely cyclical. Defence industries tend to generate limited productivity spillovers compared to technology-intensive civilian sectors. Moreover, high military demand can strain labour markets, driving up wages and production costs in

Increased defence allocations have inevitably shifted national budget priorities. Funding for social programs and environmental initiatives has either stagnated or declined in several member states. Eurostat data for 2024 indicate that while average EU defence spending rose from 1.3% to 1.9% of GDP, social protection expenditure declined by roughly 0.4% in relative terms. This realignment reflects a broader policy trade-off: governments prioritize immediate security over long-term social investment, potentially widening inequality and limiting human capital development.

Fiscal Impact Simulation: +1.5% GDP in Defence Spending





### 4.3. The fiscal Impact of Search of Strategic Autonomy Increased Defence Expenditure

The European Commission's 2025 fiscal simulations suggest that a sustained increase of 1.5% of GDP in defence spending could raise aggregate EU public debt by 2-3 percentage points by 2028, depending on interest rates and growth assumptions. While military spending can stimulate demand through public procurement, its multiplier effect is generally lower than that of infrastructure or innovation investment. As borrowing costs rise, heavily indebted member states-such as France and Spain-face higher refinancing risks. Fiscal fragmentation could thus re-emerge as a structural vulnerability within the euro area.

### 4.4. Long-term Risks for the EU's Economic Cohesion

Militarization may aggravate structural disparities within the EU. Wealthier member states can sustain higher defence investments without undermining fiscal balance, whereas smaller economies depend more on EU support mechanisms. Uneven industrial capacity-especially in defence production-risks deepening the economic divide between Western Europe's manufacturing hubs and peripheral states with limited industrial bases. In the long term, this divergence could weaken the unity that supports both the euro area and the EU's collective security architecture.

## 5. Europe's Dependence and the

Europe's rearmament after 2022 has exposed deep structural dependencies that undermine its long-term security autonomy. Despite the growing rhetoric of "European sovereignty", the continent remains highly reliant on external – especially U.S. – technological, industrial, and logistical support. This section examines the nature of this dependence and evaluates current EU efforts to strengthen internal capacity.

### 5.1 Arms Imports and Transatlantic Dependence

Since, the outbreak of the Ukraine war, European States have dramatically expanded defence procurement, much of it from non- EU suppliers. According to SIPRI (2024) over 60% of new weapon imports to the EU between 2022 and 2024 originated in the U.S. including F-35 aircraft, air defence systems and precision – guided munitions.

This transatlantic dependency reinforces NATO interoperability but weakens the EU's strategic autonomy. European manufacturers struggle to compete to with U.S. defence giants in both technology and scale. Moreover, reliance on American systems can generate political and logistical restrictions: maintenance, spare parts and software remain under U.S. control. While the partnership with Washington provides short-term capacity benefits, it also risks

entrenching an inferior role for Europe within the transatlantic defence ecosystem.

### 5.2 The role of the European Defence Fund (EDF)

Established in 2017 and reinforced after 2022, the EDF represents the EU's main instrument for reducing industrial dependence and promoting joint research. By 2024 the EDF had financed over 2.7 billion euros in collaborative R & D and prototype projects across 26 member states. The fund focuses on dual – use technologies – those applicable to both military and civilian domains – such as advanced materials, drones, AI, and cybersecurity systems. It also motivates cross – border industrial cooperation by requiring consortiums from at least three member states for funding eligibility. However, the EDF remains modest in scale compared to national budgets or U.S. defence programs. Without parallel procurement reforms and shared strategic planning, its impact on genuine autonomy remains limited.

### 5.3 Industrial Cooperation and Fragmentation in the EU

A major obstacle to European defence independence lies in persistent industrial crumbling. Despite recent progress, defence industries remain largely organized along national lines, competing for the same markets rather than integrating. Projects like the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground

Compat System (MGCS) – joint Franco – German initiatives – illustrate both the potential and the political friction of collaboration.

The lack of a unified European procurement policy results in inefficiencies, duplicated R & D efforts, and interoperability problems. Smaller EU states often lack the scale to sustain domestic defence industries and therefore depend heavily on imports. Achieving true strategic autonomy will require not only funding but also harmonized standards, shared capabilities, and political willingness to pool sovereignty in the defence domain.

## 5.4 Dependence on Non-EU Defence Imports, 2021- 2024

This figure presents comparative data on EU arms import origins between 2021 and 2024. The chart shows that imports from non-EU sources-mainly the United States, the

United Kingdom and South Korea-rose from 52% in 2021 to 63% in 2024, while intra-EU trade declined proportionally.

## 6.Environmental and Socio-economic Impacts of Militarization

The militarization of the European economy has important environmental and social consequences. While defence expansion strengthens security, it also increases carbon emissions, intensifies resource use and creates pressures on labour markets. The defence sector is highly energy-intensive and growing military production contributes to a larger carbon footprint, potentially slowing progress toward the EU's climate goals.

At the same time, the shift of financial and industrial resources toward defence creates tensions with green transition priorities, as key resources and funding are

diverted from renewable energy and sustainable development. In the labour market, rising demand for specialized skills in defence industries generates new opportunities but may draw talent away from civilian and green sectors. Overall, balancing security needs with environmental sustainability and economic development remains a key challenge for Europe.

## 7. Strategic Directions and Policy Priorities for Europe


### 7.1 Policy Scenarios for Europe

By 2030, Europe faces three main strategic paths. A militarized scenario emphasizes high defence spending and stronger deterrence but risks fiscal strain and reduced social and environmental investment. A balanced scenario seeks to combine security with sustainability, stabilizing defence budgets while promoting innovation and coordination. A green-priority scenario shifts focus toward climate and social policies, supporting long-term development but potentially weakening defence readiness if threats persist.

### 7.2 EU Coordination, Innovation and Policy Actions

EU institutions play a key role in guiding Europe's strategy through coordination of defence, industrial policy and investment. Stronger cooperation is needed to reduce fragmentation and improve efficiency. At the same time, investment in dual-use technologies such as

Dependence on Non-EU Defence Imports, 2021–2024





AI, cybersecurity and advanced manufacturing can enhance both security and economic growth. Effective policies should focus on coordinated procurement, fiscal responsibility, climate accountability and reduced dependence on external suppliers to strengthen Europe's long-term resilience and autonomy.

## 8. Conclusion: Security, Sustainability and Europe's Future

Since 2022, Europe's economy has shifted toward a more security-focused model, driven by increased defence spending following the war in Ukraine. This transformation strengthened security and cooperation within the EU and NATO, but also created challenges such as fiscal pressure, external dependence, social

and environmental concerns.

Europe now faces the challenge of balancing defence needs with long-term sustainability. While military expansion is necessary, it competes with social investment, green transition and innovation. Excessive militarization could increase public debt and slow environmental and technological progress, making

a balanced approach the most sustainable option. Looking ahead to 2030, Europe's path will depend on geopolitical developments and policy choices. Greater cooperation, stronger industrial integration and long-term planning will be essential to ensure both security and economic resilience, while maintaining sustainability and strategic autonomy.



Sofia Georgia Tzouveleki  
CIV (GRC)  
Intern G8  
NRDC-GR/SPT DIV



Christos Terezis  
CIV (GRC)  
Intern G8  
NRDC-GR/SPT DIV

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# NRDC-GR HOSTS THE 1<sup>ST</sup> COMMANDER'S VALIDATION MEETING (CVM1) FOR EXERCISE "CONNECTED LOGISTICIANS 2026"(COLO 26)



From Tuesday, 2 September to Thursday, 4 September 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Greece (NRDC-GR) hosted the 1st Commander's Validation Meeting (CVM1) of the Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre (MLCC), in support of the development of the upcoming Exercise Connected Logisticians 2026 (COLO26).



CVM1 brought together senior representatives and subject matter experts from across NATO and partner nations, reinforcing the multinational spirit of cooperation in the field of logistics. Participants included representatives from NATO Command Structure (NCS), NATO Force Structure (NFS), and other Headquarters (HQs).



Over the three-day meeting, participants worked collaboratively to develop and agree on the COLO26 Exercise Specifications (EXSPEC), conduct the final deconfliction of the COLO26 Exercise Establishment (EE), and deconflict the COLO26 Training Schedule, thereby validating key concepts, coordinating planning efforts, and ensuring interoperability in preparation for COLO26.



### NRDC-GR “IKAROS I/25” SEMINAR

A two days seminar called “IKAROS I/25” was conducted on 10-11 Sep 25 by the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Greece/ Air Operations Coordination Centre (NRDC-GR/AOCC).

The aim of the seminar was to enhance the knowledge of NRDC-GR Staff on matters related to air domain.

The seminar focused the first day on providing air operational briefing for the aforementioned area of interest, while the second day, legislative aspects have been discussed.

Valuable interaction, exchange of ideas among participants and sharing of experiences, resulted in a successful and productive outcome.



### NRDC-GR INTERNS INDUCTION TRAINING

On Monday, 6<sup>th</sup> October 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Greece (NRDC-GR) conducted, on its premises, the 2025/II Internship Induction Training within the framework of the NATO Internship Program (NIP).

The purpose of the training was to welcome the newcomer interns and provide them with initial guidance and instructions.

During his address, the Chief of Staff (COS) of NRDC-GR, Major

General Vasileios TSAMIS encouraged the interns to bring fresh, innovative, and “out-of-the-box” ideas, contributing to the special tasks and projects within the Branches they are assigned to.





### NRDC-GR 21<sup>ST</sup> PLENARY CONFERENCE

On Wednesday the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Greece (NRDC-GR) Headquarters hosted the 21st Plenary Conference, under the auspices of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS).

During the Plenary, the Senior Representatives of the participating nations, confirmed their commitment to NRDC-GR, while they reached a consensus on issues related to the HQ's organizational changes and manning requirements.





## NRDC-GR CELEBRATES THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INDEPENDENCE DAY

On Friday the 4<sup>th</sup> of July 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) held an official ceremony on its premises in Thessaloniki to commemorate the 249<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Independence of the United States of America.

The event was attended by multinational personnel from the 12 nations serving at the headquarters and was honored by the presence of the U.S. Consul General in Thessaloniki, Mr. Jerry ISMAIL.

NRDC-GR Commander, Lieutenant General Athanasios GARINIS, welcomed Mr. ISMAIL, along with Consuls from the contributing nations, and expressed his gratitude for their presence. He congratulated the US personnel on this important anniversary and acknowledged their valuable contributions to the mission of the headquarters.

During the event, the U.S. Senior National Representative at NRDC-GR delivered a speech, thanking the command, the host nation, and the Consul General for their continued support. He emphasized the significance of celebrating Independence Day while serving abroad, highlighting the shared values and enduring bonds among Allies.





## Community Relations

### COMMANDER OF JOINT LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP NAPLES VISITS NRDC-GR HEADQUARTERS



Commander of Joint Logistic Support Group Naples Visits NRDC-GR Headquarters

On Thursday the 10<sup>th</sup> of July 2025, Brigadier General Ionel VLASIE, Commander of Joint Logistic Support Group Naples (JLSGNP), accompanied by a delegation, visited NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Greece (NRDC-GR) Headquarters in Thessaloniki.

The visit began with an office call with NRDC-GR Deputy Commander, Major General Valentin KRASSTEV. Following the office call, the JLSGNP Team delivered a presentation on the JLSG Campaign Plan, highlighting key elements and potential implications for NRDC-GR operations.

This engagement provided a valuable opportunity to exchange insights and strengthen cooperation, in line with NATO's ongoing commitment to readiness, interoperability, and operational excellence.

### NRDC-GR CELEBRATES FRENCH NATIONAL DAY



On Friday the 19<sup>th</sup> of September 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) held an official ceremony at its premises for the celebration of the French National Day.

NRDC-GR Deputy Commander Major General Mitko GRIGOROV, welcomed the Consul General of France, Mr. Jean-LUC LAVAUD and the participating Consuls from allied Contributing Nations, who honored the event with their presence.

The Deputy Commander warmly congratulated the French contingent on the occasion of their national anniversary. He acknowledged the historical significance of the French National Day and commended the French Armed Forces for their dedication and commitment to peacekeeping efforts.



### NRDC-GR CELEBRATES SPANISH NATIONAL DAY



DCOM congratulated the Spanish personnel for their anniversary and expressed his appreciation for their significant contribution to this HQ.

On Friday 10<sup>th</sup> of October 2025, at NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) premises, the official ceremony took place for the celebration of the Spanish National Day (Fiesta Nacional de España).

Deputy Commander (DCOM) NRDC-GR Major General Mitko GRIGOROV, welcomed the Honorary Consul of Spain, Mr. Samuel NAHMIAS, the participating Consuls from allied Contributing Nations and members of the Spanish community, who attended the event. The

### NRDC-GR CELEBRATES TURKISH REPUBLIC DAY



On Friday 31<sup>st</sup> of October 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) held an official ceremony on its premises for the celebration of the Turkish Republic Day.

NRDC-GR Chief of Staff Major General Vasileios TSAMIS welcomed the Consul General of Türkiye, Mr. Serkan GEDIK and the participating Consuls from allied Contributing Nations, who honored the event with their presence.



### NRDC-GR CELEBRATES ITALIAN NATIONAL DAY



On Tuesday the 4<sup>th</sup> of November 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) held an official ceremony at its premises for the celebration of the Italian National Unity and Armed Forces Day.

NRDC-GR Commander Lieutenant General Athanasios GARINIS, welcomed the Honorary Consul of Italy, Mrs Georgia SARANTOPOULOU and Consuls from the Contributing Nations, who honored the event with their presence.

### NRDC-GR CELEBRATES POLISH INDEPENDENCE DAY



On Wednesday the 5<sup>th</sup> of November 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) held an official ceremony at its premises, for the celebration of the Polish Independence Day.

NRDC-GR Commander Lieutenant General Athanasios GARINIS welcomed the Charge D' Affairs a.i. Ambassador of the Republic of Poland Embassy in Greece (Athens), Mr. Wojciech PONIKIEWSKI and the participating Consuls from allied Contributing Nations, who honored the event with their presence.



### NRDC-GR CELEBRATES ROMANIAN NATIONAL DAY



On Friday the 7<sup>th</sup> of November 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) held an official ceremony at its premises for the celebration of the Romanian National Day.

NRDC-GR Deputy Commander Major General Mitko GRIGOROV, welcomed the Romanian Consul General, Corina CRETU and Consuls from the Contributing Nations, who honored the event with their presence.

### NRDC-GR CELEBRATES ALBANIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY



On Monday the 15<sup>th</sup> of December 2025, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) held an official ceremony on its premises for the celebration of Albania's Independence Day.

NRDC-GR Deputy Commander Major General (BGR A) Mitko Stefanov GRIGOROV, welcomed the Consul General of Albania in Thessaloniki, Mrs. Erida DOBRUSHI and the participating Consuls from Allied Contributing Nations, who honored the event with their presence.



# NRDC-GREECE

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# NRDC-GR HERALD



**NRDC-GR**  
**Herald**



## **NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - GREECE**

*Leoforos Stratou 1  
54639 Thessaloniki  
Greece*