




NRDC-GR HERALD

THE MAGAZINE OF NATO RAPID DEPLOYABLE CORPS-GREECE



January - June 2021 / Issue 16



LIVEX "CENTAUR 21" -
"DEFENDER EUROPE 21"

Inclusive Leadership:
Managing Diversity

An Overall Review of
NATO Covid-19 Response

Italian Division
"Vittorio Veneto"

Warfare Economics

Overview

EDITORIAL BOARD

COMMUNICATION DIVISION/Public Affairs Office (PAO)

Chief PAO
OF-5 (GRC A) Athanasios PAPATHANASIOU
D.Chief PAO
OF-4 (GRC A) Paschalis KAMPOURIS
PA SO
OF-4 (GRC A) Nikolaos BARMUPERIS

Production
OF-1 (GRC A) Georgios THEODOROU
Combat Camera
OR-7 (GRC A) Konstantinos BALAMPANOS
OR-6 (GRC A) Alexandros ATSKAKANIS

Communication Information

Tel.: +30 2310 882452 / IVSN 451-2452
email: infopao@hrfl.grc.nato.int, email: nrdcgr@gmail.com
www.nrdc.gr Twitter: @NRDC-GR
Facebook: NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Greece
YouTube Channel: www.youtube.com/user/nrdcgreece

Commander's Corner

NRDC-GR Commander's Corner p.01

Affiliated Units

- LIVEX "CENTAUR 21" - "DEFENDER EUROPE 21" p.02
- "Vittorio Veneto" Division:
Realignment to a NATO Headquarters p.08

Articles

- Operations Planning for Retrieving an Occupied Territory after its Surrounding: Restrictions by the Law of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law p.13
- Big Data and Social Media Analysis: Innovative Ideas for NATO p.18
- NATO's Role in Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Dealing with Crises in Modern Times p.21
- Warfare Economics p.26
- An Overall Review of NATO Covid-19 Response p.30
- The Puzzle/Enigma of Strategic Autonomy - EU-NATO Synergy p.34
- Inclusive Leadership: Managing Diversity in a Multinational Working Environment p.40
- Historical Logistics Challenges: The Spanish Road (1567-1659) p.45
- Logistics and the Gulf War p.51
- NATO's Role in Peace Support Operations (Non Article 5 Crisis Management Operations) p.55

Visits - Community Relations

- NRDC-GR Change of Command p.58
- ARRC Commander Visit p.59
- LANDCOM Commander Visit p.60
- NRDC-GR Officers' Medals Award p.61
- US Military Attaché Visit p.61

Seminars - Conferences

- The Multi Corps Land Component Command (MC LCC) Seminar - Deep Dive on the new NRDC-GR Role p.62
- NRDC-GR Internship Induction Training 2021 p.63
- IKAROS I-21 Seminar p.64
- STEADFAST LEDA 21 Crisis Response Planning p.65
- Operational Order Development for STEADFAST LEDA 21 p.66

ON THE COVER

2021 Soldier of the affiliated 71st Airmobile Brigade (GRC A)
Standing ready...



January - June 2021/Issue 16

EDITORIAL

Dear reader,

As the entire world tries to get back to normalcy following the COVID-19 pandemic, we get even closer to a new landmark for NRDC-GR; Exercise "STEADFAST LEDA 2021". This means following "old" procedures and timetables (planning circles, documentation revisions, adjusted battle rhythms, etc.) but operating under "new" conditions (wearing masks, social distancing, etc.). Even so, we are more than confident about our success!

Probably those inside our organization that were more affected by the protective measures against the pandemic were our interns. They were not able to be physically present at the HQ premises at the desired rate and they had to work harder (remotely) to fill the gap. But they managed this difficult situation well; maybe better than we expected! As a "reward" for their efforts and successful completion of the undertaken projects we host many of their articles in this issue; more than ever! Please be fair on your "evaluation" about their writings; bare in mind that they are still young students or graduates. Yet, we feel confident about the future and one of the reasons we are optimistic is the quality of our youth!

Enjoy all the interesting articles we host in this issue and allow us, the Public Affairs Office team to acknowledge the writers for their contribution. It is more than valuable and strengthens the goal of PAO to inform NRDC-GR Staff, NATO community and the Public about our latest developments and more. Please, bear in mind that the views expressed in the articles are those of the contributing writers and do not represent the official opinion of NRDC-GR or NATO.

See you in the next one!

Very respectfully,

OF-5 (GRC A) Athanasios PAPATHANASIOU
NRDC-GR Chief Public Affairs Officer

Commander's Corner



Dear Herald Readers,

I am more than glad for having the chance to address you and to express my appreciation for the great work that the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Greece personnel fulfills on a daily basis, especially in these difficult times, since we are already in the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic and our lives have changed in ways and to a degree that no one imagined until 2019.

However, what remains the same is our mission, the continuous efforts for improvement and experimentation, the need for successful execution of training activities and effective

response to challenges. The Alliance was and still is responsible to achieve Deterrence and if necessary ensure the Collective Defence of its member states, as the North Atlantic Treaty dictates and so successfully does since 1949.

In this context, I would like to focus on the demanding and unique task, our mission as NRDC-GR and the roles that may be assumed. (Not only do these roles remain significant, but also keep constantly being upgraded). For our

HQ, its new role since the 1st of January and for the next three years will be that of Multi Corps Land Component Command (MC LCC). Taking into account the different orientation that NATO and its entities had for many years, the need for experimentation, development and testing of procedures and practices, seems tight in time and challenging at all levels (of professionalism, collective effort, cooperation, etc.)

Allow me to stress that we should turn whatever obstacles into driving force, but also that we are not alone when facing this challenge! The exceptional cooperation and the exchange of

ideas, operational experiences, lessons learned and best practices with the other NFS HQs, are the guarantee of success. The continuous communication amongst Staffs and the recent visits at NRDC-GR of the Commanders of LANDCOM, Lt Gen (USAA) Roger L. CLOUTIER Jr. and ARRC, Lt Gen (GBRA) Sir Edward SMYTH-OSBOURNE, point out the common approach inside the NATO community regarding the Security and Defence.

We are already at the final stage of preparation for the Exercise “STEADFAST LEDA 2021” (STLE21), that will be executed simultaneously in Greece, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom, from the 23rd of November until the 2nd of December 2021. STLE21 will be the highlight of our preparation as MC LCC and our cooperation with other HQs (LANDCOM, ARRC, MNC NE, NRDC-ESP, US V Corps) and NATO entities (JFTC).

With these thoughts and my best wishes for health, mental fortitude and optimism, I leave you to study the interesting articles that our magazine hosts.

Respectfully,

Anastasios SPANOS
Lieutenant General (GRC A)

Affiliated Units

LIVEX “CENTAUR 21” - “DEFENDER EUROPE 21”



LIVEX “CENTAUR - 21” was a bilateral Force-on-Force exercise, agreed and designed between the Hellenic Army General Staff and United States Army Europe and Africa. It was conducted by the XXV

Armored BDE, 71st Air Mobile BDE and 1st Army Aviation BDE of the Hellenic Army and the 1st Battalion -167 Infantry Regiment/53 Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) of the United States National Guard, at

Petrochori Xanthi, Greece from 17 to 25 May 21.

The exercise was connected with the “DEFENDER - Europe 21”, an annual large-scale US Army-led, multinational, joint exercise designed to build readiness and interoperability between USA, NATO and partner militaries. This year’s exercise:

1. Focused on building operational readiness and interoperability with a greater number of NATO allies and partners over a wider area of operations.

2. Was defensive in nature



Affiliated Units



and focused on responding to crisis if necessary.

3. Demonstrated that the U.S. commitment to NATO is iron clad.

4. Integrated approximately 28,000 members of armed forces from 26 nations conducting nearly simultaneous operations across more than 30 training areas in 12 countries.

5. Included strict COVID prevention and mitigation measures, such as pre-deployment COVID testing and quarantining.

6. Had significant involvement of the US Air Force and US Navy.

7. Utilized key ground and

maritime routes bridging Europe, Asia and Africa.

Among the principal aims of the exercise was to highlight the efficiency on planning and executing common operations at the Tactical level, using a two-way simulation system giving participants an opportunity to explore options and take tactical risks, to offer unique perspectives and insights that complement other forms of training,



Affiliated Units



to integrate different methods, tools and techniques and to develop interoperability between Hellenic and US Armies.

The main phases of the exercise included:

Phase 1 / 17th May 21. During this Phase, Interoperability tests and other technical procedures took place. An Opening Ceremony was organized, with all the participants, in order to achieve familiarization and create bonds of partnership. Finally, the troops were briefed on various issues, such as safety instructions and general information of the training area and an on spot reconnaissance

Affiliated Units



was executed.

Phase 2 / 18-24 May 21. During this Phase the personnel from both nations, was trained in critical selected Combat Functions and processes, in order to achieve the respective Training Objectives. During training, special focus was put on both, offensive and defensive operations, with the participation of combined forces, utilizing elements of Air-Mobile and Special Operations Forces, Land Aviation Forces, Armor, Mechanized and Motorized Infantry, Artillery and Combat Engineer. Defensive and offensive operations were examined simultaneously with the use of MILES gear and all the live fires were

executed on the automated pop-up targets, which were contributed by the 7th Army Training Command/ Training Support Activities Europe. The training activities also included:

1. Convoy and Ambush Ops,
2. Execution of Squad Live Fire,
3. Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) training,
4. Check point ops,
5. Command Post infiltration during Night and
6. Urban offensive and defensive operations training and



Affiliated Units



exercise.

7. The coronary of the fore-mentioned training was a high intensity combined arms live fire exercise, that took place on the 24th May 21, which was also the Distinguished Visitors Day of the exercise

Phase 3 / 25th May 21. This Phase was devoted to the Assessment and the After-Action Review (AAR) of the exercise. DV Day was attended amongst others by:

- Deputy Minister of the Ministry of National Defence of the Hellenic Republic, Alkiviadis Stefanis.

Affiliated Units



Charalampos Lalousis (GRC A).

- USA Consulate in Thessaloniki, Consul General Ms. Elizabeth K. Lee

- USAREUR-AF Commanding General, General Christofer Cavoli (USA A).

- British Field Army Commander, Lieutenant General Ralph William Wooddisse (GBR A).

countries and NATO are significant.



Kosmas KRITSIS
OF-5 (GRC A)
Chief of Staff
XX Armoured Division

- USA Ambassador in Athens, Mr. Jeffrey Payat

- Deputy Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff, Vice Admiral Ioannis Drymousis (GRC N).

- Chief of Hellenic Army General Staff, Lieutenant General

The Exercise was totally successful and strengthened the ties between the two Armies and especially the participating personnel. It is a common decision to continue organizing and conducting training activities like «CENTAUR - 21» since the benefits for the participating



Affiliated Units

“VITTORIO VENETO” DIVISION: REALIGNMENT TO A NATO HEADQUARTERS



*“Vittorio Veneto” Division motto:
Sit Nomen Omen(The name is an omen)*

History

The “Vittorio Veneto” Division was established in Florence on July 1, 2019 as a result of the transformation of a National military unit and the renaming of the “Friuli” Division. The name of the Division is a direct

link to the Italian city where the last victorious battle of the First World War occurred. Moreover, it marked the end the war on the Italian front and when the ‘Risorgimento’ dream of a unified Italy finally came true. Additionally, the “Vittorio Veneto” Division also incorporates and celebrates the traditions of the “Friuli” Division, that was reconstituted in July 2013 in Florence. This includes strong historical and spiritual ties with the “Friuli” Brigade whose soldiers distinguished themselves during the Second World War under the banner of values such as Country, Honour, Loyalty, Freedom and Sacrifice.

National to Multinational

In October 2019, with the support of the Italian Government and NATO

member countries, Multinational Division-South (MND-S HQ) started the journey to become a Command included in the NATO Force Structure. The new multinational Command will be implemented within the framework of “Vittorio Veneto” Division HQs.

The new Headquarters will exercise its functions in all operations to support the three essential core tasks of NATO: Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security, as a Division level Command. The realignment of MND-S HQs will be marked by two fundamental milestones: the achievement of Initial Operational Capability (IOC), projected for 2021 (TBC), which will certify initial connectivity and interoperability capabilities with the NATO Command and Control chain of



Column of Ariete C1 tanks of “Ariete” Armored Brigade



SP Howitzer PzH 2000 of "Ariete" Armored Brigade during an exercise in Monteromano training area

command. Finally, the declaration of Full Operational Capability (FOC), to be achieved by 2024, will validate that MND-S is fully capable of supporting operations or missions for the Alliance. Once FOC is achieved, MND-S HQs can be included in the Command rotation plan as a tool available to the

Alliance.

[Mission, Commander's vision](#)

Currently, the "Vittorio Veneto" Division represents a modern and fully operational unit. Its mission is to train and prepare its manoeuvre

Brigades and subordinate units to maintain a high level of readiness, conduct planned operational and training commitments and execute other unplanned tasks. The four organic manoeuvre brigades include the Folgore airborne Bde, the 132nd Ariete (armoured) Bde, the Pozzuolo del Friuli cav Bde and Friuli Aviation Bde. The Headquarters Support Group completes its organizational table.

The "Vittorio Veneto" Commander directed a three-year plan that organically integrates all the future activities of the Division Headquarters and its Brigades and units, up to regimental level. The whole organization will collectively work to develop, consolidate and maintain the capability to respond to full spectrum capabilities, while preserving the ability to adapt to unexpected events. This requirement, while even more challenging and complex during the pandemic, is essential for the "Vittorio



Paratrooper - Pathfinder of "Folgore" Paratroopers Brigade ready for a free fall

Affiliated Units



Recovery of "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade personnel by winch

Veneto" to remain resilient and ready. Additionally, with force protection as a priority, the Division is establishing protocols and processes, consistent

with national regulations, the ITA Army and the Higher HQ direction and guidance, to protect personal and equipment.

In accordance with its higher Headquarters Commander's vision, the Division's operational approach includes four Lines of Development (LOD):

- LOD 1 Training and Operations: including all activities that achieve and consolidate full spectrum operational capabilities with high operational readiness and adaptability;

- LOD 2 Infrastructure and Territory: maintaining efficient infrastructure and strengthening relations with local civil authorities to maintain and improve the reputation of the Army in public's eyes;

- LOD 3 Personnel: enhance leadership, professionalism, consolidate our military identity,



"Friuli" Airmobile Brigade MEDEVAC Training



Centauro armored vehicle of the Genova Cavalleria Regiment, "Pozzuolo del Friuli" Cavalry Brigade

international operational and training commitments;

- set high training and operational standards focusing on warfighting training and on the planning and executing high intensity combined army tactical activities in complex scenarios;

- prepare and train units capable of moving, fighting, supplying, rescuing, communicating day and night, to operate in degraded environments and with reduced possibility of using technology, in

conditions of limited mobility;

- develop and consolidate autonomous tactical thinking;

- create effective and competent leadership, strengthening the chain of command at all levels (focusing on Bn and Regiment Commanders);

- implement the actions that will realign the Division Headquarters to a multinational unit, without compromising the ability to carry out national tasks;

- create and consolidate an effective control system of professional skills and training, to be adopted at all levels according to a standard Division model;

- frequently revise risk assessments and the associated mitigation measures to preserve the health and safety of personnel under all circumstances.

The End State is resilient subordinate units that are capable of executing national and international commitments and the Vittorio Veneto

Affiliated Units



Marines of the Serenissima Regiment, "Pozzuolo del Friuli" Cavalry Brigade

Headquarters and Support Group are ready to realign to a NATO multinational Headquarters in line with the roadmap established by the higher Authorities.

While the realignment process is still awaiting final approval, but nearing completion, recalibrating as MDS-HQ is a challenge and significant opportunity. Recalibrating will teach our staff to grow and learn as a NATO FS HQ in a multinational environment.

The Future

The instability and uncertainty of international geopolitics, the evolution of different threats, the complexity that characterizes the modus operandi and

the rapid evolution of the operational contexts within which they operate, requires flexibility from military units. We are constantly searching for the best possible configurations to respond effectively to the operational needs associated with changing threats. The aforementioned environment is another motivation for the "Vittorio Veneto" Division HQs to transform to support the future needs of NATO.

As HQ MND-S, the "Vittorio Veneto" Division HQs will be prepared to exercise Command and Control in NATO land operations within the entire spectrum of missions envisaged for the divisional level. Furthermore, it

will have the capacity to contribute to the projection of stability with Defence Capacity Building activities in countries at risk of instability. The future holds new and exciting challenges for the "Vittorio Veneto" Division, and the strength, dedication and professionalism of its men and women will guarantee our success.



Pasquale DI BISCEGLIE
OF-4 (ITA A)
Chief JVB
Vittorio Veneto Division

OPERATIONS PLANNING FOR RETRIEVING AN OCCUPIED TERRITORY AFTER ITS SURROUNDING: *RESTRICTIONS BY THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW*

Imagine a scenario in which enemy forces invade NATO territory. In consequence, the principle of collective defense established by the article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is lawfully activated by the North Atlantic Council. The Allied forces successfully conduct operations to reestablish peace and security, the enemy is being dislocated and defeated, NATO is winning. Yet, isolated enemy forces still occupy an area of the member state territory, for example a city or a region containing villages. NATO forces surround the area and prevent the enemy from being reinforced. Of course, NATO is still in a favorable position of power. All that is left is to retake this specific area. But is it as easy as it appears to be? Are there

any restrictions posed by International Law that operations planning will have to consider in this phase? How does the existence of civilians in the occupied territory affect the means and intensity of the force that can be used?

Indeed, this scenario is not so far-fetched. Even an enemy that is at the brink of defeat can benefit from occupying a region in the member's territory. Such an act can lead to the creation of a threat from the inside and thus deter NATO's military advancing. In addition, the enemy could aim at the creation of a "frozen conflict" status. What is more, as such operations may implicate casualties in the civilian population, and, in

our case, in the Ally's civilians, they require very subtle handling in order not to violate the International Law of Armed Conflict and the International Humanitarian Law, and therefore they pose a risk of impacting negatively on the Alliance's public image. The following analysis examines the restrictions established by these two areas of Public International Law, but we should keep in mind that there may be more limitations imposed by the Host Nation

Restrictions by the Law of Armed Conflict

All military actions for the restoration of the occupied and surrounded area must comply with the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. At all cases, the principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity must be applied when using force.

A. The principle of proportionality

Based on the principle of proportionality, an estimation of the collateral damage should be made before any decision to use force. The possibility of human losses should not be excessive in comparison with the concrete and direct military advantage expected. Avoiding excessive





losses in human lives should be the primary goal in every stage of the operation. Therefore bombardment, non-precision airstrikes and/or wide artillery strikes constitute excessive use of force and shall not be under consideration. On the other hand, military operations by ground forces for the infiltration of the area and the neutralization of the enemy forces with as few human life losses as possible are more in accordance with the principle of proportionality.

B. The principle of military distinction

According to the uncontroversial principle of military distinction, which is expressively regulated in the article 48 of the Additional Protocol I, parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian

objects and military objectives. To spare civilians and civilian population from hostilities and their effects, it is essential to define who and what may be attacked¹.

B1. Attack on civilian objects

There is a general rule on the protection of civilian objects, regulated in article 52 of the Additional Protocol I. According to this article “Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial

destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”

According to article 27 of the 1907 Hague Regulations² “in sieges and bombardments, all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.”

B2. Attack on dual-use objects

A dual-use object serves both civilian and military purposes. Particularly in times of war, the military uses civilian infrastructure, telecommunications and logistics also for military purposes. In industrialized countries, power-generating stations are crucial for civilian access to clean water, but they also provide power to war industries – and in an integrated power grid all stations provide power to both. When a certain object is used for both military and civilian purposes, it may be held that even a secondary military use turns it into a military objective. However, if the effects on the civilian use of the object imply excessive damages to civilians,

¹Marco Sassòli, Legitimate Targets Of Attacks Under International Humanitarian Law, International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative

²Convention (IV) Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War On Land. Annex To The Convention: Regulations Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War On Land - Section II : Hostilities - Chapter I : Means Of Injuring The Enemy, Sieges, And Bombardments - Regulations: Art. 27.

an attack on such a dual-use object may nevertheless be unlawful under the proportionality rule. Under the wording of Protocol I, an attack on a dual-use object is, in any event, unlawful if the effect on the civilian aspect is intended.

Sometimes, a civilian object can turn into a military objective. In cases where there is doubt as to whether a civilian object has turned into a military objective, the [1977] Additional Protocols state that one is to assume that it is not a military objective unless proven otherwise (article 52.3 ADI).

C. Human Shields

C1. Prohibition

The human shield is a legal, military and political term denoting a non-combatant (or a group of non-combatants) who is either forced or volunteers to shield a legitimate military target to deter the enemy from attacking it. It requires an intentional co-location of military objectives and civilians or persons hors de combat with the specific intent of trying to prevent the targeting of those military objectives.

Armed forces confronted with human shields are faced with the dilemma between causing civil casualties that may undermine the legitimacy of their actions and refraining from an attack which results in military disadvantages. An attack of a legitimate target that is shielded by protected persons incurs collateral damage. While this may be justified by the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage, thus would be lawful according to the principle of proportionality under IHL, civilian casualties may undermine an attacker's acceptance and support among the population where the fighting takes place, the domestic constituencies and the international community. If the collateral damage is not justified by the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage, the attack would even qualify as an IHL violation committed by the attacker. Refraining from attacking, however, may require additional efforts to combat the target and expose troops to higher risks. The restraints in military action resulting from human shields thus may significantly hamper the achievement of military objectives³.

In the context of international armed conflicts, the use of human

shields is expressively prohibited by the Third Geneva Convention⁴ (concerning prisoners of war), the Fourth Geneva Convention⁵ (concerning protected civilians) and the Additional Protocol I⁶ (concerning civilians in general). Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, "utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations" constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.⁷ Also, the prohibition of using human shields is contained in numerous military manuals⁸ and national legislations.⁹

The prohibition against using human shields covers only the "civilian population or individual civilians" but not civilian objects. Camouflage, such as hiding military assets in civilian objects or making them look like civilian objects, is permitted by IHL.

Furthermore, the use of human shields is prohibited under the Law of Armed Conflict because it is contrary to the principle of distinction and violates the obligation to take feasible precautions to separate civilians and military objectives.

³Tobias Vestner, Addressing the Use of Human Shields, Strategic Security Analysis, December 2019, Issue 8, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

⁴Third Geneva Convention, Article 23, first paragraph

⁵Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 28

⁶Additional Protocol I, Article 51(7) (adopted by consensus)

⁷ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii)

⁸ See, e.g., the military manuals of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

⁹ The legislation of the following states criminalizes - either explicitly or implicitly by reference to the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statute - the use of human shields: Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belarus, Burundi, Canada, Congo, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Lithuania, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay and Yemen.



C2. Operational and Tactical Measures to Circumvent Human Shields

The use of human shields by the opposing party constitutes a war crime. Yet this does not legitimize NATO forces to attack military objectives protected by civilians.

From a legal perspective, precautionary measures can support operational decision-making when faced with human shields. The use of weapons and tactics that can harm civilians used for shielding military objectives should be minimized or completely avoided. Warning before an attack is also a precautionary measure. This alerts civilians and other protected persons, especially when they are not aware that they are being used as human shields, and gives them time to get away from the target. Warnings might, however, be

counterproductive because they may allow assembling further civilians to increase the incidental harm. Delaying or suspending an attack may be the only option in this case.

Restrictions by International Humanitarian Law

A. The prohibition of starvation under IHL.

Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare/combat is expressly prohibited in both international and non-international armed conflict. This prohibition is extremely relevant in the occasion that a siege takes place, which in the case of a surrounded occupied territory is highly possible. The right to food is violated not only when a lack of food or denial of access to it causes death, but also when the population is caused to

suffer hunger because of deprivation of food sources or supplies.

This prohibition can be found in various international conventions. Article 54(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides: “Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.” Article 14 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II provides: “Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited.” According to Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[i]ntentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.

Of course, allowing sieges and prohibiting starvation are not

compatible at first sight. A key issue here is whether siege warfare when civilians are present is indirectly prohibited by the prohibition of starvation of civilians since, in practice, civilians will be the first to suffer from deprivations arising out of the siege-induced isolation. What matters here is how the prohibition against starvation is interpreted. The most popular view seems to be that sieges are not prohibited even if they cause starvation, as long as their purpose is to achieve a military objective and not to starve the civilian population. It's difficult to prove that the purpose of the siege is the starvation of civilians. However, failing to attempt an evacuation of civilians or at least the most vulnerable among them, coupled with a denial of humanitarian assistance should suffice to indicate that the purpose of the siege is to starve civilians.

B. The prohibition of incidental starvation under IHL.

Many acts can indirectly lead to the starvation of civilians. Such acts are also prohibited by the Additional Protocols. As a corollary to the prohibition of starvation of civilians, IHL also prohibits attacking, destroying, removing or rendering

useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (e.g., foodstuffs, agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking water and irrigation systems) for the specific purpose of denying these items for their sustenance value to the civilian population or the adverse party.

Incidental starvation is therefore also prohibited under certain (not all) circumstances. Article 54(2) covers only situations where the belligerent party deprives the enemy of existing resources (see 'attack, destroy, remove or render useless'), not when it prevents the enemy from being resupplied.

Resuming, the Additional Protocols considerably restrict the possibility to resort to sieges because in practice sieges will almost inevitably have the side effect of starving the civilian population or forcing its movement. On the other hand, isolating the territory and preventing the belligerent from receiving supplies complies with the API.

Conclusion

Retaking a temporarily occupied territory, especially by force, can be a very difficult task. Its complexity calls for quick but effective political

and military decisions to prevent the prolongation of the war. What is more, each move needs to be accompanied by careful planning and estimation of possible collateral damage, otherwise it may undermine the legitimacy of the operation by violating the Law of Armed Conflict and the International Humanitarian Law.



Paraskevi THEOFANOUS
GRC CIV
Intern
NRDC-GR/LEGAD

References:

- North Atlantic Treaty, 1949.
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
- Convention (IV) Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War On Land and Annex To The Convention: Regulations Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War On Land.
- Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
- Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

BIG DATA AND SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS: INNOVATIVE IDEAS FOR NATO

In recent years big data dominate the field of social media analysis since they provide unique opportunities and new characteristics and parameters. According to the social scientists, “we are living in the era of Big Data”. Big data are a large volume of data that can be used for complex analysis and allows organizations to improve their efficiency. Big data are so large and complex that none of the traditional data management tools (a centralized database architecture stores and maintains the data in a fixed format or fields in a file) can store it or process it efficiently. Big data can be described by the following four characteristics: huge in Volume, high in Velocity, diverse in Variety and Variability.

Social media monitoring can be enhanced and achieve exceptional results with big data. There is seemingly endless number of channels that can spread information to users. Which are the suitable channels for a specific purpose? What is the number of people/users that must be monitored? What kind of information to keep track of? These are some of the questions need to be answered in order to use big data efficiently. It is important to make such distinctions as the conversations on Twitter differ from those on Instagram, Facebook and WhatsApp, as do the ages of users, their geographic locations, and the overall missions of the different platforms. Each platform attracts different audiences and provides different opportunities and



functions.

Some examples of popular social media platforms and their characteristics are:

Twitter is fast-paced and provides a great way to establish an audience. It's an easy and simple platform with 326 million active monthly users. The platform can be used for news updates, quotes or inspiration but allows limited number of characters. Twitter is great for polls, images, videos, plain links in order to track audience reactions and opinions. Twitter is one of the most efficient platforms to build relationships with an audience.

Instagram is a platform suitable for visualizations and images, so an account should be “attractive”. Images of a high resolution and the account, must “tell a story” behind the user. The audience of the Instagram is younger (approximately 18-35 years old).

Facebook is the biggest social

network with more than 2,32 billion monthly active users. The audience of Facebook is approximately on the age of 35-60+ and it's a platform that organizations use to share news. People reach Facebook pages to find out more about their owners' culture and values. The popularity of Facebook makes it familiar and people feel safe in it. Facebook is a way to link audiences to organizations and to show the reasons why they should trust them.

Social media, in many cases, have become a conduit for unsubstantiated information, such as rumors, hoaxes, and conspiracy theories. Contemporary conflicts, especially those that fall within the hybrid spectrum, increasingly play out over social media aiming to manipulate the space. Disinformation on social media appears in many shapes and norms. Malicious use of social media poses a clear security challenge or even threat. The opportunities provided by

new digital technologies are exploited to undermine trust in democratic institutions and legitimate news sources, to distort public discourse and opinion formation, to influence elections and short-circuit decision-making processes. The speed at which information flows between users and the changing types of data generated, complicate the picture even more. Big data provide new technics and tools so as to identify and track disinformation and malicious actors. The huge volume of data provides the opportunity of a quick and coordinated approach in the new hybrid warfare.

Social media monitoring with big data requires advanced technological capabilities, using an application programming interface (API: set of programming code that enables data transmission between one software product and another) or a web scraper (refers to the extraction of data from a website. This information is collected and then exported into a format that is more useful for the user) works best. Various API tools exist for researchers with limited funding to aggregate and analyze data. Identifying who, what, and how to monitor will depend on the desirable findings. The procedure for

measuring the impact of a message will be different from that for discovering the source and spread of a message. It is not enough to identify what the message is, why it is being spread, and which networks are spreading it; it is also important to identify the original source. However, in many cases attribution can be nearly impossible. Attribution is particularly important in cases of government-sponsored disinformation, where it might lead to international action, sanctions, or issues between countries. Among the challenges of social media monitoring by using API is the platform itself. The user has to constantly navigate through restrictions and limitations imposed by the platforms. Language can also be a challenge when attempting to monitor social media.

Big data target specific audience and give the possibility to extract valuable insights from social network activities. Big data are received from social media platforms in order to be analyzed for insights that lead to better decisions and strategic moves. They provide useful information about an effective content analysis based on the behavioral patterns of users. Meta-analysis (the examination of data from a number of independent

studies of the same project) of big data can lead to strategic decisions in social media environment. Analytics tools of big data support predictive and prescriptive analysis and enable users to analyze large amounts of data. Using advanced analytics techniques such as text analytics, machine learning

and data mining, organizations can analyze untapped data sources to gain new insights resulting in significantly better and faster decisions. By deploying listening tools and sentiment analytics complemented with human intelligence, organizations can filter out noise and extract the critical and required data. Through tools that analyze big data it's possible to gain the macro view and see relationships between actors and between topics of discourse.

NATO and Big Data

Social media give the ability to big organizations like NATO, to engage quickly and dynamically with widespread audiences in an economical and effective manner. They have become important tools for NATO messaging, outreach and communication with both internal and external audiences. Social media analysis through big data can provide to NATO new opportunities and extend the existing abilities for research and planning in military operations. Research can identify influential audiences and information needs, which will inform decisions such as appropriate messages, preferred delivery methods and required intensity. Especially, a properly researched plan will help the NATO to anticipate possible issues and adapt more easily to situations. Finally, a plan will help you maximize the capacities of other units or commands. Multi-media contextual analytics techniques that harvest forensic social and digital media will boost agility of military operations both in the physical and information





domains through deep understanding of adversaries' perspectives, intents, and threats. This integration of analytics is critical in the current complex environment where adversaries operate with information-based tactics designed to achieve strategic goals.

Big data allow NATO to approach the public in a more personalized way based on users choices and likes. It gives in-depth insights and a holistic understanding of an audience, which results in enhancing retention and elevate their trust. Big data will help NATO to reach and strengthen its relationships with the audience after identifying the most effective platform, time and format for their posts. Big data will allow the Alliance to identify social media trends and gain insights, which can be used to make

engagement decisions, keep track of the demographics, understand the sentiments of the audience and build effective social media strategies and campaigns.

Data Literacy (describes the ability to read, work with, analyze, and argue with data) within NATO is needed in order to achieve the most suitable function of big data analysis. Steps are being taken to adjust NATO information systems (and system managers) to a data-centric paradigm. It is clear that NATO is on a steep learning curve as it deploys data-centric technology to support its mission. However, NATO is not starting from scratch and has valuable experience in the analysis of open-sources intelligence, tools for data analysis and visualization and the application of data centric technology

to support operations.

Conclusion

Big data have been hailed as the key to crucial insights into human behavior accelerating innovation. Big data and Social Media promise to change the digital environment, since untapped opportunities are emerging. Big data analytics fuel the tools that help organizations fulfill public expectations. By knowing how to effectively measure the value of social activities, organizations can gain critical insights that allow them to improve and promote their goals and content. Finally, there is a need for critical data analysis, utilizing digital methods for capturing and analyzing social media according to platform dynamics. NATO can benefit and explore big data which will give the opportunity to enhance audience engagement, perform better on social media platforms and shape its content based on the needs of the public.



Ioanna ESKIADI
GRC CIV
Intern
NRDC-GR/PAO

Sources:

- Blunt, R., Riley, C., Richter, M., Street, M., & Drabkin, D. (2018, May). Using data analytics and machine learning to assess NATO's information environment. In *IST-160 specialists meeting on Big data and artificial intelligence for military decision making, Bordeaux*.
- Bowman, E. K., Madahar, B., Hagan, T., Burghouts, G., & Overlier, L. *Content-Based Multimedia Analytics for Big Data Challenges*.
- Felt, M. (2016). Social media and the social sciences: How researchers employ Big Data analytics. *Big Data & Society*, 3(1), 2053951716645828
- NATO ACO/ACT, *Digital Media Management, SHAPE*. Retrieved from https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/website/Digital_Media_Management_Guide.pdf
- Twetman, H., Paramonova, M. and Hanley, M., (2020, December). *Social media monitoring: a primer. Methods, tools, and applications for monitoring the social media space*. Published by the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence.


NATO'S ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION: *DEALING WITH CRISES IN MODERN TIMES*

NATO history of ADN policies

NATO has played an important role in shaping the history of the global nuclear order (Nuti L. 2021), although the Alliance as such has never been a formal party to an arms control treaty.¹ In fact, by serving as a forum for exchanges among allies, it has helped them manage their divergent views and thus reach important agreements in the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ADN) field. NATO was actually instrumental in the development of much of the contemporary ADN's architecture, including the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT), which is still the only global instrument regarding this field.

However, the Alliance also provided the platform to negotiate and implement the most important treaties regarding conventional arms control regimes, such as: *The Vienna Document*, *the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (CFE) or *the Open Skies Treaty*. In addition, the United States has used NATO to consult with allies on several bilateral treaties with the former Soviet Union, such as *the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks* (SALT) and *The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* (START).

Despite the important role



played historically by the Alliance, it is necessary to specify that it has been increasingly difficult for NATO to reconcile the two logics of deterrence and arms control.

During the Cold War the issue of arms control represented a way to contain the bipolar confrontation, a de-escalation tool, especially after the Berlin and the Cuban Missile crises. The dialogue on ADN has been therefore the fundamental principle to maintain the equilibrium originated from the logic of the deterrence.

After the end of the Cold War, some member countries increasingly came out in favor of effective disarmament measures, and the tension between the two approaches (deterrence and arms control) became more controversial than before.

The Euro-Atlantic effort has therefore been to find a compromise between the need to maintain a deterrent posture - as an essential part of NATO's nuclear identity - and the growing importance of taking into account nuclear arms control as a prerequisite for ensuring both the international and the allies security.

The "two-track" policy of deterrence and defense² on the one hand and dialogue on the other has long been maintained by the Alliance, and was also reflected in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept. The latter contains a very clear reference to both logics in question, stating that: "*It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear*

¹ L. NUTI, "NATO's Role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: A (Critical) History", IAI Papers, January 2021, p.38.

² R. GOTTEMOELLER, S. HILL, "NATO's Current and Future Support for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation", IAI Papers, December 2020, p. 5.

Articles

weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance".³

In light of the current strategic environment, many scholars (Gottemoeller R. former NATO Deputy Secretary General; Nuti L. Professor of History of International Relations at Roma Tre University; Kubiak K. Senior Policy Fellow at European Leadership Network) believe that it is very unlikely that NATO's attitude on ADN will change. Indeed, there are numerous ongoing developments that affect and threaten the security environment, starting with Russia's growing posture of force, reflected in an increased weapons systems development and exercise program.

Certainly, there are many other actors and factors that influence the international security environment and negatively affect the effectiveness of all present and future measures in the field of ADN. These include: the strong restraint placed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on nuclear arms control; The chemical attacks in Syria; China's progress on nuclear development, which now more than ever requires NATO to make an effort to involve Beijing in arms control and non-proliferation negotiations. Generally, it is no longer possible to avoid considering China a determining variable in the international security framework.

Finally, it is also worth mentioning the risk but also the opportunity posed by emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) in the field of armaments, that urgently require new systems of regulation, verification, and control.

It is therefore not surprising that at the *High-level NATO Conference on Arms Control and Disarmament*, in 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated: "*These are tough times for arms control*".⁴ Notwithstanding NATO could still play a critically important role in the ADN field, by interpreting this moment as an "*opportunity and a chance to look to the future*".⁵

NATO's future role in Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation - food for thought

The global nuclear order, built around the NPT, seems to have reached an uncertain point. Growing challenges are threatening the stability of the international security. We are witnessing the decline of nuclear agreements and the violation of them, as well as, in some states, a constant modernisation of the nuclear arsenals.

Following the Russian Federation's proven breach of the *Intermediate-Range Nuclear*

Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) and the subsequent demise of the agreement, announced by the United States in 2019, it seems clear that there is a need to take up the issues regarding the area of ADN.⁶

Likewise, it is clear that all such developments are affecting the security environment of NATO allies and pose risks to the international stability. The Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's words at the *16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation* underlined that concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons are legitimate and it seems remote to imagine a complete nuclear disarmament.⁷ This feeling of disillusionment with disarmament is widespread among the allies.

Consequently, this particular situation leads to a reflection on what will be the next steps to take in order to ensure a secure international environment. And, at the same time, to think about who is eligible to bring forward the dialogue on ADN.

In this regard, the Atlantic Alliance could take on a significant role in the area of ADN in the future for many different reasons. First, NATO has the political base and the appropriate institutional framework (such as the

³ NATO, *Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Lisbon 2010, Preface, point 4

⁴ Jens Stoltenberg, *Speech by NATO Secretary General at the High-level NATO Conference on Arms Control and Disarmament*, 23 October 2019, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169930.htm.

⁵ R. GOTTEMOELLER, S. HILL, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁶ NATO, *Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty*, 2 August 2019, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_168164.htm.

⁷ Cfr. Jens Stoltenberg, *Speech by NATO Secretary General at the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation*, 10 November 2020, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_179405.htm.

Non-Proliferation Committee within the NAC) in which discussions on ADN could take place. Second NATO has also the expertise and experience in military operations and training, education and the technical knowledge to create new arms control measures. Last but not least, NATO has an extensive network of partnerships that could influence the spread of best practices also in non – allies countries.

Thus, this could be the right moment for NATO to play a significant role and bring this issue to the fore, promote changes and revise the existing policies, adapting them to current and future challenges. It could play an important moderating role in this area and even try to involve in the discussion nations that have not been party to agreements and treaties on

non-proliferation so far.

Adapting NATO's ADN policy to new realities

During the *High-level NATO Conference on Arms Control and Disarmament*, in 2019, the Secretary General stated that: “[...] if arms control is to remain effective it needs to adapt.” He also pointed out “[...] four areas where we could act together to reflect these new realities”.⁸ These refer to: the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the development of new rules and standards for emerging technologies; the modernization of the Vienna Document and the adaptation of the nuclear arms control regimes to new realities.

These areas offer a good starting

point to highlight what are the most pressing issues that NATO should focus on in order to advance its contribution in ADN policies.

The first important action that NATO should take is to renew its commitment to the NPT and ensure its credibility through it, considering that: “*The NPT remains the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons, the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture [...]*”.⁹ So an effective treaty would help to reduce the Alliance's major security threats, but it needs to be strengthened and receive a great support from all Member States.

This year the Review Conference will take place in occasion of the 50th anniversary of the NPT (actually 2020 was the 50th Anniversary, but due to the Covid-19 pandemic situation it was postponed). NATO should use its existing structure as a place to share and coordinate the allies position and use the Conference as a springboard to present a set of common proposals with the objective to preserve and implement the treaty.

Another interesting point regards the importance to develop new rules and standards for the emerging and disruptive technologies. In particular, several concerns regard the development, especially by countries that often are not following the global rules and are not part of any nuclear agreement. Hence, it is vital to analyse



^{8 - 13 - 14} Jens Stoltenberg, Speech by NATO Secretary General at the High-level NATO Conference on Arms Control and Disarmament, 23 October 2019, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169930.htm.

⁹ NATO, North Atlantic Council Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 5 March 2020, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_174104.htm?selectedLocale=en.



what are the opportunities and the risks deriving from the EDTs and deepen the research given from the correlation of nuclear arms and EDTs. At the moment this topic remains widely unexplored. In fact: *“So far, NATO’s delivery of the Emerging and Disruptive Technology Implementation Roadmap does not include a nuclear component”*.¹⁰ Therefore, advancing the discussion and proposing new measures in this field would reinforce the strategic stability of the Alliance and facilitate an approach towards China, which is at the cutting edge in developing these technologies.

A third point of focus is the revision of the Vienna Document.¹¹ Adopted in 1990, this document is the main framework for confidence and security building measures, with the aim to increase transparency and verification in the military sphere.¹²

It is important for NATO to make its contribution and take the lead in modernising this document, in the light of the changed international security context as the Secretary General said: *“There is more military activity in Europe than we have seen for decades”*,¹³ that requires a revision of what was agreed in Vienna. Actually, *“NATO allies and our partners have agreed on proposals for the most comprehensive modernisation package of the Vienna Document since 1994. To reduce the risk of miscalculation and accidents on land, at sea and in the air”*.¹⁴ Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) a review process is already underway, to which NATO could contribute by providing a strong political support and highlighting proposals agreed within the allied countries.

The last issue to be dealt with is the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in January 2021.¹⁵ This treaty triggered quite a few discussions within the Alliance since it was criticised that it doesn’t have support from nuclear countries and it could undermine the NPT creating division among its member states. In addition, the fact that it is lacking of verification mechanisms was underlined. Promoted by the United Nations and supported by 122 states, this treaty has its origins in a group of non-nuclear weapons states which focused on the serious humanitarian consequences of a nuclear war. The humanitarian arguments need to reach an important attention from NATO, as *“the humanitarian perspective will become part of the new global nuclear order – the very same order that NATO needs to shape”*.¹⁶

This last point suggests that it is no longer possible to exclude from the ADN dialogue this perspective, that is increasingly felt by many states fearing the risk of destructive consequences of a potential nuclear escalation. So, while until now the emphasis has often been on maintaining a balance between deterrence and arms control efforts, the humanitarian approach towards nuclear weapons needs space and support, in particular from the allies.

¹⁰ K. KUBIAK, “Reviewing NATO’s Non-proliferation and Disarmament Policy”, IAI Papers, February 2021, p. 12.

¹¹ OSCE, Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence – and Security – Building Measures, 30 November 2011, available at: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/4/86597.pdf>.

¹² Cfr. R. GOTTEMOELLER, S. HILL, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁵ UNITED NATIONS – GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017, available at: <http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>.

¹⁶ K. KUBIAK, op. cit., p. 12.

Conclusions

The analysis carried out shows that even if the moment to advance the issue of ADN is particularly difficult, NATO has all the potential to become the centre of the dialogue. NATO's long tradition as a major proponent of arms control treaties can only be an asset and shape what will be a new global nuclear order, adapting it to new challenges.

The four areas of action described are just some of the fields in which NATO can make a strong contribution and many other initiatives could be integrated, among them certainly actions aimed at risk reduction and the promotion of more stringent verification methods with regard to the current measures used in arms control.

Moreover, since the issue has huge implications for every security and defence policy of any state in the world and NATO is the only actor that could bring Europe and the United States together, it is vital that the Alliance develops a comprehensive approach to it.

For this reason, it is important to promote diplomatic spaces and opportunities for dialogue, starting by strengthening existing structures. A NATO leadership on future ADN progress could also have several benefits for the Alliance itself, in terms of increasing its prestige, stability, credibility as well as its level of security.

Finally, given the current crisis caused by Covid-19 pandemic, governments are faced with the need

to rethink their security priorities and the role played by military forces, in view of the potentially serious threats that are maturing during the current crisis. In this regard, a new deepening of ADN-related activities could be not only an excellent starting point but also an essential action in the framework of countering and preventing future threats to international security.



Maria Vittoria CORRADO ITA CIV Intern NRDC-GR/STRATCOM
Giada MOSANER ITA CIV Intern NRDC-GR/PAO



WARFARE ECONOMICS

Executive summary

What is warfare economics? How does a country fund and allocate resources before, during and after warfare conditions, and what are the results of such disruptive conflicts?

Warfare economics encompasses all the economic conditions that facilitate war, the resources that countries need to finance and distribute during war and the economic environment after disruptive conflicts. The following report captures the complicated and intertwined set of conditions which lead to war, highlights the importance of providing the right resources to the involved parties during each stage of war, illustrates the consequences of conflict and presents an outlook of this century's current geopolitical situation.

1. Conditions leading to warfare

Is war hardwired in human nature, or did warfare arise after creating organized societies and under specific preconditions? This controversial topic has been studied and discussed by anthropologists and historians over the years. Nevertheless, throughout history we observe countries coming into armed conflict with each other, driven by different incentives. This section aims to discuss the main reasons these countries come into conflict, as detailed below.

One main cause of warfare is the need for territorial gain. A country may attempt to annex new territories



because of insufficient raw materials and agricultural space, in order to gain more wealth or because of rising population growth and inadequate living space. Furthermore, territorial gain could be the result of the rise of nationalism or caused by imperialism. Another main reason countries come into external conflict is religious differences, within the same dogma or between different religion. Moreover, revenge has been a key factor in many wars in history. It is steered by mischief and can cause an endless chain of disruptive conflicts. For example, the war on terror was initiated by the 09/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre.

It should be underlined that economic and political circumstances are strongly interconnected, and play a vital role in triggering wars. The observed political and economic landscape before war differs

significantly from regular operating economies. Typically countries experience economic hardship and the economic pain of depression embraces political change. Populism arises and extremist leaders emerge in both the political right and left. These internal conflicts between the political parties cause reactionary leaders to come to power. A prime example worth mentioning is the economic and political conditions in Germany after World War I and before World War II. The funding of war equipment during World War I and treaty of Versailles caused an unbearable fiscal deficit for Germany. As a result, the country suffered immensely from hyperinflation, which fueled the rise of the far-right wing (National Socialist German Workers Party) and Hitler as a leader.

2. War economies

A war economy describes the transition of a country's operating economy to that steered towards war production. It captures the set of mandatory actions a country takes before, during and after warfare. The analysis of a war economy reveals a state where countries utilize their economic power to increase their production of weaponry, military funding, and resource allocation in order to prepare and endure a war. This section will break down the analysis in three different stages of war economies; pre-war economies, during warfare economies and post-war economies.

For pre-war economies, the aim of each country is to create and apply a strategic plan, in order to distribute the government budget to necessary resources at an efficient manner. That includes a variety of important issues that need to be addressed strategically to ensure the country's security and competitiveness over the opponent. One main issue to be addressed during planning is the armature of soldiers that will be entering the battlefield. Specifically, the government must utilize their military budget to fund military products such as vehicles, weapons and armor, proportional to their military personnel. Furthermore, nations use their military budget to fund research and development for accelerated technological progress, which results in the creation of destructive weapons




Figure 1

without the need of mass labor power. For instance, the government of the United States created and funded its "atomic weapons development program" during World War II and used the world's first atomic bomb over Hiroshima.¹ It is also important to note that the increased military spending acts as a fiscal stimulus which in return increases the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and decreases the unemployment rate due to the raise of military service. This economic policy of excessive spending for military purposes is supported by the theory of "Military Keynesianism" and was used by the National Socialist Germany and the United States before and after World War II. The contingencies undertaken by countries to shift to a war economy will be illustrated by the following charts; the first chart shows the increase in military personnel and the second in military spending, by averaging a number of war cases. It should be pointed out that both military personnel and spending (as a percent of the population and GDP respectively) roughly increased by four times, as depicted in Figure 1.²

Moreover, in pre-war economies, countries form alliances and assist each other with funds and/or military equipment. However, each governmental entity has each own incentives and usually countries with the most economic power over-lend weaker countries. The consequences of a country getting into a lot of debt are devastating.

During warfare, the most important priority for each country is to maintain a steady supply of resources, such as military equipment, raw materials and medical aid. In most cases, it has been observed that the aggregate demand for such resources exceeds the aggregate supply that is offered in a specific timeframe. In order to diminish the gap between supply and demand, governmental entities control the distribution of resources, goods and services. For example, during World War II, the United States implemented a "rationing" system, where the federal government set limits on purchasing certain high-demand items.³ This enforces limits on individual consumption and therefore allows the governmental

¹History.com Editors, Published by A&E Television Networks (2009, November 18). Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Retrieved from <https://>

² Dalio, R. (2018). Principles for navigating big debt crises. Westport, CT: Bridgewater.

³Marshall V. (2018, July 11). Rationing: The National WWII Museum: New Orleans.

Articles

entities to control the allocation of their resources more efficiently. Ultimately, it should be emphasized that a war's outcome is highly determined by the availability of such resources.

When the war ends, the participating countries need to transition from a war economy to a normal operating economy. Typically, they enter a state of economic recession because of the big contraction of military spending and the increased unemployment rate of people formerly working for the military. Furthermore, the post-war economic environment consists of big war debts that countries attempt to diminish with periods of deleveraging. However, the economic environment of each country varies, as it depends on the final results of the disruptive conflict. Specifically, the countries that lost the war experience a deeper depression, and apply more aggressive monetary and fiscal policies. Such policies may include money printing or/and cutting down their reserves which usually results in the increase of inflation rates.

In extreme cases, such as Germany after World War I (1918-1924), countries inevitably experience hyperinflation, which leads to devastating economic and political consequences. It should be noted that the countries that experience inflationary depression -debt crisis and hyperinflation- have common post-war conditions, such as large budget deficits, negative real interest rates and lack of reserve currency. In the previous example, by the end of World War I, Germany met all those conditions. In order to avert their severely depressed economic state, Germany policy makers had to apply strict monetary restrictions, negotiate with the Allies, and enforce austerity measures.

3. Repercussions of disruptive conflict

Warfare has devastating consequences on the economy, as illustrated in the previous chapter. These consequences reveal that

disruptive conflicts negatively impact societies on a microeconomic and a macroeconomic scale. This section is focused on the effects of war in society caused by the atrocities of warfare, as well as war economies.

Firstly, it is evident that warfare inevitably results in many casualties of innocent civilians. In other words, armed conflict leads to the decline of human population overall. Unfortunately, deaths and violent events cause extensive emotional and psychological stress to individuals. The psychological damage can be short term or long term. In cases of permanent psychological trauma, individuals usually get diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), particularly veterans that were exposed to the violence of disruptive conflict.⁴

It is also important to cover the impact of the previously discussed economic depression to society. Specifically, economic hardship directly shifts the labor dynamics of a country; labor demand decreases, cuts in wages are enforced, military service is made redundant and unemployment rates rise sharply. Furthermore, the labor force size decreases because of the casualties of civilians and the movements of refugees. If the labor force decreases and unemployment increases, poverty increases and the economic inequality gap noticeably becomes bigger.

Moreover, with an increased economic deficit and a decreased labor force, countries are unable to repair the infrastructure destructed



⁴VA.gov: Veterans Affairs. (2018, July 24)

during the armed conflict. Particularly, the educational infrastructure, the healthcare infrastructure, the services and transportation infrastructure remain damaged or destroyed after the end of warfare. This affects the civilians' quality of life and society as a whole. For instance, the destruction of educational institutions cause serious disruptions, such as a potential future increase of unemployment caused by the lack of education, low economic productivity and rise of violent crimes. Furthermore, the destruction of healthcare infrastructure has disastrous consequences to the wellbeing of civilians, since the demand for physical and mental support that people seek after traumatic and violent experiences will eventually exceed the supply that the healthcare institutions can offer.

In conclusion, societies suffer deeply from disruptive conflicts; on a micro-scale, people endure psychological and physical health issues. On a macro-scale, countries

endure economic depression, destroyed infrastructure, increase of unemployment and income inequality. Evidence of the devastating consequences of war can usually be found decades after the war ended.

4. Closing statement

Humanity continuously evolves over time and disruptive conflicts can be avoided by a unanimous desire for peacekeeping. With the rise of globalization, organizations such as the United Nations,⁵ encourage diplomacy and negotiation as means to resolve conflicting interests. Another example of such an organization would be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which forms a political and military alliance between thirty member countries, and therefore prevents the rise of conflict. However, globalization encourages different types of war by its nature. For example, the big geopolitical differences between the United States and China have already led into a

minor trade war observed over the past year. There are strong indications that the internal political conflict and external friction between rising and incumbent powers will lead to a war in the near future. Nevertheless, as technology advances and education is broadly available, there is hope for mankind to look back at history, reconsider diplomacy and negotiation against disruptive conflict and avoid the destruction and division of nations.



Electra KOUPATSARI
GRC CIV
Intern
NRDC-GR/G8

⁵ About Us. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us>

References:

- Dalio, R., 2018. *Principles for Navigation Big Dept Crises*. 1st ed. Glendinning PI Westport: Greenleaf Book Group, pp.61-108.
- Dalio, R., 2021. *Our 2021 Global Outlook*. [online] Bridgewater.
- Owlcation - Education. 2021. *The 8 Main Reasons for War*.
- *The role of military expenditure and arms imports in the Greek debt crisis 2021*.
- Encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net. 2021. *Organization of War Economies I International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)*.
- History.com Editors, Published by A&E Television Networks (2009, November 18). *Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki*.
- VA.gov: Veterans Affairs. (2018, July 24).
- Marshall V. (2018, July 11). *Rationing: The National WWII Museum: New Orleans*.
- About Us. (n.d.).

AN OVERALL REVIEW OF NATO COVID-19 RESPONSE

Introduction

2020 shocked the globe when a highly infective respiratory virus emerged and disrupted the expected course of developments. COVID-19 posed an imminent threat for everyone - to both civilians and military personnel - and its spreading diverged, from the perspective of time and intensiveness, in every European country. For this particular reason, the Allies had a different understanding of the scale of this threat. Nevertheless, NATO's primary priority was to

establish that this health crisis would not turn into a security one.¹

In early 2020, Governments had to focus on their domestic issues that included the lack of experience in dealing with such a contagious virus, the numerous COVID-19 cases and the lack of medical equipment, such as face masks, ICUs etc. A parallel opening of a new "front" in the case of an armed attack would not only further deteriorate the social, economic and health situation but also risk a delayed and inefficient response to that threat.

Adjusting to the pandemic

NATO was determined to prevent any of these risks and preserve the Alliance's credible and effective deterrence and defence capabilities. The Alliance followed and deepened its protocol for hybrid threats³ and took action in various fields.

• Operations and Missions

As it's widely known, NATO has ongoing military operations and missions in several parts of the world, such as the one in Kosovo or the one in Afghanistan. These missions adjusted fairly easily to the pandemic's condition and contributed decisively in various fields.

The enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) preserved its readiness and capabilities and continued to be a determining deterrence asset in the region despite the challenges that arose by COVID-19.⁴

NATO's KFOR mission has been proven to be invaluable for the local community during the pandemic. In various instances, the personnel of KFOR came to the aid of the local



NATO flags at the NATO Headquarters²

¹ Giovanna De Maio, "NATO's Response to COVID-19: Lessons for Resilience and Readiness" (Brookings, October 28, 2020), 3

² U. S. Secretary of Defense, 200212-D-AP390-7095, February 12, 2020, Photo, February 12, 2020

³ Sten Rynning, "A Renewed Collective Defense Bargain? NATO in COVID's Shadow," NDC POLICY BRIEF (NATO Defense College, September 2020), 1

⁴ De Maio, "NATO's Response to COVID-19," 3

population and authorities. There are many examples including, but are not limited to, the donation of medical supplies by Turkey, Poland, Austria and KFOR itself to Kosovo's authorities, as well as the sanitation of public buildings by Italy's 7th CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) Defense Regiment.⁶

The Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan built two field hospitals in the airfields of Bagram and Kandahar, while Afghan troops switched to online training conducted by JFTC in Poland.⁷

• Training and Exercises

One of the largest areas of operation of the Organization is that of training and exercises. However, given the circumstances, this sector had to allow for restrictions and redesign.

Prime examples of these limitations can be seen in two main exercises; BALTOPS and DEFENDER-Europe 20. The first is an annual military exercise that is conducted in the Baltic Sea and for the year 2020, it was limited to the sole use of air and maritime assets, excluding any amphibious drills to prevent COVID-19 from spreading amongst the sailors.⁸

The latter was a longtime planned U.S.-led exercise that aimed



KFOR providing assistance to local communities in Kosovo to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic⁶



South Carolina National Guard unit prepares for DEFENDER-Europe 20

to deploy the largest number of forces in Europe - 20.000 soldiers - since the end of the Cold-War. Its main objective was to test the Allied strategic readiness in the event of

Russian aggression in the BSR. In March of 2020, the size and the scope of the exercise were altered, due to the new health restrictions and the worries regarding the large

⁶NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *KFOR Providing Assistance to Local Communities in Kosovo to Help Fight He COVID-19 Pandemic*, April 6, 2020, Photo, April 6, 2020

⁸Mario Col. Renna, "NATO RESPONSE TO COVID-19," *KFOR CHRONICLE*, May 2020, 9

⁷Jozsef Szpisjak, "Can Virtual Exercise Replace Traditional Residential Pre-Deployment Training? :: JFTC - NATO," *JOINT FORCE TRAINING CENTRE*, July 23, 2020

Articles

movement of land elements. One year later, DEFENDER-Europe 21 returns dynamically with the simultaneous operation of 28.000 troops in 12 different countries, while at all times respecting COVID-19 safety protocols and measures.

• Disinformation

One of the most worrying threats during the era of the pandemic came in the form of disinformation. Reports indicated that China and Russia took advantage of people's willingness to be informed and that they spread false and defamatory information regarding the Alliance. NATO was subject to coordinated information attacks, such as the one of April 2020, where a fake letter - supposedly sent by the Secretary-General - informed about NATO's decision to withdraw its troops due to an outbreak of COVID-19 within NATO's multinational battlegroup in Lithuania. Another instance of a disinformation campaign was when Russian state-controlled media and pro-Kremlin outlets contended that NATO labs created COVID-19.⁹

NATO tackled these attempts through its Public Diplomacy Division, which kept track of and reported this kind of information and checked them by cooperating "with the European Union through the European External Action Service and the European

Commission, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, the United Nations and its Verified campaign and the U.S. State Department's Global Engagement Center".¹⁰

COVID-19 Initiatives and EU Cooperation

Despite the nations' tendency to turn to their domestic affairs as a result of the pandemic, NATO focused on its operational functions by utilizing its outstanding capabilities in crisis management, which is based on the close coordination of civilian and military personnel as well as material.

A result of the Foreign Affairs Ministers' VTC in April of 2020 was the authorization to create a

COVID-19 Task Force. This Force was established within the Supreme Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and its objective is to coordinate military support and activities to ensure the most effective utilization of Allied military resources. The Task Force relied heavily on the already-existed Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC). The latter functioned as a clearing-house system for coordinating both requests for and offers of international assistance of NATO and partner countries as well as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). There are several instances where international assistance was provided; some of them include the donation of ventilators from the United States,



Coronavirus response: second C-17 cargo plane arrives in Romania¹¹

⁸ Sebastian Sprenger, "Warships Mass in the Baltic Sea for a Coronavirus-Conscious Battle Drill," *Defense News*, June 4, 2020

⁹ NATO, "NATO's Approach to Countering Disinformation: A Focus on COVID-19," NATO, July 17, 2020

¹⁰ NATO

¹¹ NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Coronavirus Response: Second C-17 Cargo Plane Arrives in Romania*, March 28, 2020, photo, March 28, 2020

Hungary and Slovakia, personal protective equipment from Germany, surface disinfectant from Latvia and the donation of a field hospital from Norway to North Macedonia.¹²

To curb the pandemic, NATO utilized the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) and the Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS) programmes, which are managed by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). These two programmes allowed the timely delivery of over 1,000 tonnes of medical supplies to the Allies.¹³

As far as partnerships are concerned, NATO always remained in contact with the European Union. In particular, the Alliance coordinated with EUROCONTROL for the NATO Rapid Air Mobility

initiative, which aimed to ease and speed up the process of military flights with humanitarian causes. There was also frequent exchange of information between the EADRCC and the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre, something that was also happening between NATO's COVID-19 Task Force and its EU counterpart, created by the European External Action Service (EEAS).¹⁵ Lastly, the cooperation between NATO and the EU was also seen in the medical field where the two parts had already founded in 2018 the Multinational Medical Coordination Center (MMCC) and the European Medical Command (EMC), whose task is to provide coordinating support to the medical services of NATO and EU.

Conclusion

With vaccines now circulating and the prospect of freeing ourselves from this pandemic getting even closer, we can now certainly say that a major security crisis was avoided. The Alliance's capabilities and initiatives played a pivotal and vital role in curbing the pandemic and deterring any external threats; either conventional or hybrid. What is certain is that the Lessons Learned from addressing the pandemic's consequences are going to be plenty and invaluable for the future of NATO and its members.



Stavros PIPERIDIS
GRC CIV
Intern
NRDC-GR/G5



Coronavirus response: Allied plane brings 45 tons of supplies to Bucharest¹⁴

¹² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic" (Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) – Press & Media Section, February 2021)

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization

¹⁴ NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Coronavirus Response: Allied Plane Brings 45 Tons of Supplies to Bucharest, March 26, 2020, photo, March 26, 2020*

¹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic."

THE PUZZLE/ENIGMA OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY - EU-NATO SYNERGY

*Our political institutions work remarkably well. They are designed to clang against each other.
The noise is democracy at work.*

Michael Novak
(Philosopher, journalist, novelist, and diplomat)

Introduction

The concept of European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) is evidenced by a dialogue of controversy over the European Union's (EU) role as a global player on the planet's chessboard, in a changing world. Interdependence is a tool of power between coalitions as well as individuals in the complex post-bipolar scene or a security environment consisting of "traditional and non-traditional threats," or old and "new types of wars."¹ The narratives of the Global Strategy, NATO 2030 and the Strategic Compass, are "guides" to the renewal of strategic doctrine and emphasize the EU-NATO synergy, which is increasingly important in the context of a polycentric world order or, as Amitav Acharya (2017) characterizes, a «multiplex world».² This old concept raised the question in the twenty-first century of the "Euro-Atlantic security dilemma" or what Granovetter (1973) called «the strength of weak ties».³

Some also wonder, if it is a tool for collaborative strategic alliances in the new era of globalization.

Situational Awareness

The architectural debate that now surrounds the vague term of strategic autonomy is almost 70 years old. It dates back to the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the Paris Agreements of 1954-55, which occurred during the founding of the Western European Union (WEU). The birth of this term is attributed to the French White Paper on Defense published in June 1994.⁴ Since then, the Franco-British Declaration of Saint-Malo of December 4, 1998, stated that *"the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces and the ability to decide the means of using them to respond to international crisis."*⁵ In essence, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was established with the Cologne Declaration (1999) and

later became the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with the Lisbon Treaty (2009), where the political substance of the WEU became part of the EU Treaty and especially through 42, (7) article. In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, the Headline Goal was established with a time horizon of 2003. This concerned the Union's operational capability, and it sought to build a 60,000-strong military force capable of carrying out the tasks of the Petersberg missions. As such, this activated the military component of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which was further strengthened by the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism at the Göteborg European Council of 2001. In December 2003, the Brussels European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS or Security Strategy), and in May passed the Headline Goal 2010.

¹ At this point it is worth noting that in relation to the "new type" of war different names were given, such as a) high-tech war or technological war (Edwards, 1986c), endless war (Klare, 1972), Cyberwar (Der Derian, 1991), hypermodern war (Haraway, personal communication, 1991), Cyber-warfare information war, netwar (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993), war amongst people (Brown et al. 2019).

² Acharya, "After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order," 271-285

³ Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 1360-380.

⁴ The 1994 document contains the first six instances of the concept : pages 49, 50, 52, 78, and 139.

⁵ CVCE.eu, "Déclaration franco-britannique de Saint-Malo," 1-2.

In 2013 the concept of strategic autonomy was adopted by the Commission under the title *“Towards a more competitive and efficient European defense and security sector.”* The Commission also stated that European Defense Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is a key element in Europe’s ability to ensure the security of its citizens by prioritizing the security of supply of and access to critical technologies and operational dominance. However, the term was reborn in the EU global strategy (2016) through the broader approach of the EU’S ambition to operate, as a Global Actor, because the international environment changed and the visible effects of globalization and digitalization transformed the international order, leading to the rise of the “Yellow Peril” or what is currently referred to as the “New Great Power Rivalry”. Europe finds itself in this contest between China and the United States and has to make a parallel strategic choice because, its main threat comes from the instability of the Islamic world and the management of North Africa by developing an economic model that can offset the uncontrolled migration flows within it.⁶

Weaponization of strategic autonomy

United States President Trump’s controversial leadership sparked recent debate over the strategic autonomy of transatlantic security, and the pandemic highlighted the danger of Europe’s “strategic downturn”.⁷ The Franco-German schism at the November 2020 talks between the French President Emmanuel Macron and the German Minister of Defence Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer reinforced the need for strategic autonomy in terms of sovereignty. However, the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, in the need for more Europe declared that *“The EU there will never be a military alliance”*,⁸ whereas Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer stressed that Europeans must abandon “illusions” of European strategic autonomy. Several scholars have described this attitude as reflecting the EU “underperforming” in the implementation of many of its external strategic objectives and the “open strategic autonomy”⁹ through free trade, as well as the promotion of separate proposals such as greenhouse gas emission standards and data protection.¹⁰

But to this day, the key problem of terminology remains, as “strategic autonomy” has become an umbrella term. It is used recklessly to describe the EU’s ability and skill to turn its quest for autonomy into a reasonable reality, or, as Charles Michel, President of the European Council states, *“it is goal # 1 for our generation. For Europe, this is the real start of the 21st century”*.¹¹ Additionally, and as the High Representative of the EU (HR/VP) Josep Borrell (2020) emphasized in an era of heightened global uncertainty, we must *“strengthen our ability to act autonomously as a Union and make the EU a better global partner and security provider”*.¹² The fear of a strategic transatlantic disengagement is a narrative of national divisions, but at its core, Emmanuel Macron pointed out, “European defense cooperation should not be conceived as an alternative to NATO”.¹³ Moreover, Annegret Kramp - Karrenbauer mentioned that “We must become more European in order to remain transatlantic”.¹⁴

Strategic Autonomy according to the Security and Defense Plan in the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) is the EU’s ability to act in security and defense together with partners when it can, alone when it

⁶ Mahbubani, “Has the West lost it?: A provocation,” under the West on Autopilot.

⁷ Paris: Ministry of Armed Forces, “Strategic Update 2021,” 25-26.

⁸ Emmott, “EU creates defence and space branch ‘to complement NATO,’ under “File photo.”

⁹ Paris: Ministry of Armed Forces, “Strategic Update 2021,” 25-26.

¹⁰ European Commission, “Horizon Europe Strategic Plan (2021 – 2024),” 7-9

¹¹ Michel, “European Strategic autonomy is goal #1 for our generation,” Twitter.

¹² Borrell, “European security and defence: the way forward,” 21 June 2020.

¹³ President Emmanuel Macron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference Special Edition 2021, 19 February 2021.

¹⁴ Kramp-Karrenbauer, Second Keynote Speech, (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, 2019).

must.¹⁵ Given the variety of definitions, it is important to distinguish the term from its various cognates such as sovereignty, independence, unilateralism, autarky, isolation and rejection of alliances, as it is a state that acts as a precondition and has an internal and external component in the foundations of multilateralism according to rules. More specifically, according to the Greek roots of the term auto “self” and nomos “law” strategic autonomy can be defined as the idea that the self (Europe, the EU) will have the ability, in terms of capacity and capabilities, to set its own priorities through domestic, European and international laws. In other words, strategic autonomy could be the answer to the enigma of European power, the key to which they thought was power through norms and acting hastily in world politics as a humanitarian - normative, civilian, civilizing – power. This view, however, has been extensively criticized,¹⁶ because in the last decade, the EU seems to have lost its distinctiveness as a normative actor in international relations.

It turns out to be a contested concept that has many different definitions, although the concept usually refers to maximizing capacity in matters of defense. This attitude is referred to the EU by several scholars, and the definitional paradox involves two processes “freedom to act” and

“freedom through dependence”, distinguishing three visions that are due to different national attitudes:

a) **autonomy as responsibility:** recognition of the transatlantic relationship through the EU, and the division of NATO’s responsibilities

b) **as hedging:** in the scenario where US shifts her interest elsewhere. Compensation does not reduce dependency but represents a smart strategy leading to overall alignment

c) **as emancipation:** the inseparable linking of operational and political autonomy with industrial autonomy.¹⁷

Particularly, It is noteworthy that many experts mention “Strategic autonomy” through military and defense perspectives, but after the current EUGS, they expanded the meaning of encompassing areas such as **industrial and digital capabilities** with the ultimate goal to include all policy areas, designating back to the idea of a “*Geopolitical Committee*”. Also, an attempt has been made to give a holistic approach to a capable Europe that not only speaks as a mild power but also responds to the language “demand of power” without removing from its grammar, the concept of cooperation.¹⁸ Thus, the extended and expanded meaning

of ESA can now be described as a model with four (4) dimensions:

(a) **political autonomy:** based on “EU + x”(after Brexit).

(b) **institutional autonomy:** through the structures such as the political and Security Committee, EU Military Committee and Military Staff as well as Military Planning and Conduct Capability

(c) **capabilities autonomy:** fulfilling the commitments they made on Defense Investment Pledge and under PESCO.

(d) **Industrial autonomy:** spreading the principles of the internal market through third party access to markets on a quid pro quo basis.¹⁹

Si vis pacem, para bellum

NATO, the world’s largest defense and stability provider, consists of the world’s two largest economic players—the EU and the US —and three nuclear powers—France, the UK, and the US – encompassing nearly a billion people and half of the global GDP across a space that stretches from the Pacific coast of North America to the Black Sea. Cooperation between the EU and NATO, in addition to the convergence on a list of seventy-four issues of joint action, must lead to the necessary political adjustment of NATO, as this is

¹⁵ Council of the European Union, “Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (14392/16),” 4.

¹⁶ Hyde-Price, “Normative ‘power,’” 217–234.

¹⁷ Fiott, “Strategic autonomy: towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence,” 3–4.

¹⁸ Beaune, “Europe after COVID” in Atlantic Council’s “Future Europe Initiative.”

¹⁹ International Centre for Defence and Security, “European strategic autonomy: operationalising a buzzword,” VI.

a “basic requirement for its survival”.²⁰ This adjustment will be achieved through political consultations at the highest level but also by ensuring institutionalized interaction and coordination with the EU. European defense capabilities are fully aligned with the basic principles of the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), while the overall strategy provides the instruments of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) that ensure there is no overlap of responsibilities.

In the context of the alliance, in 2016 the EU and NATO adopted a Joint Declaration that formulated a new type of relationship, where in the new “*imperatus*” is broken into seven common sectors:

- a) Countering hybrid threats,
- b) Operational cooperation in the maritime domain,
- c) Cyber security and defense,
- d) Defense capabilities,
- e) Defense industry and research,
- f) Exercises, and
- e) Resilience of partners.

Contributing to this is the strengthening of PESCO, the Coordinated Annual Review on

Defence (CARD), the Military Planning and Conduct Capacity (MPCC), the European Peace Facility (EPF), military mobility, and EU rapid-response facilities, including combat units and civilian capabilities. At this point, the US is challenged to move away from what David Calleo calls the “monopoly fantasy,”²¹ while ESA is for some a means to Europe’s complete autonomy from the US. Unblocking should be replaced by an equal—and thus more sustainable—transatlantic relationship, with membership in alliances such as EU and NATO acting as a compensatory force against such monopolistic tendencies. For, as Kissinger (2014) points out, “A balance of power does not guarantee peace on its own, but it can limit the scope and frequency of fundamental challenges and limit the likelihood of success when they occur”.²² This kind of “balance of power” can be established by Biden’s presidency with a cyclical revival of the EU–NATO partnership, based on a common vision. The instrumentalization of EU “*enlargement*” through liberal-democratic social and political transformation can be reinforced, despite the temporary reactions of Poland and Hungary simulating the scenario of democratic rebirth. The challenge lies in China’s continued presence as a key competitor that needs to limit its range. China is developing its economic presence

through its “Belt and Road Initiative,”²³ which can be used as a diplomatic security tool. On the other hand, since the Obama administration, we see the US necessary consolidation of the EU’s industrial regime, which will serve EU autonomy when the US shifts its focus to the Indo-Pacific. The European defense industry has already been strengthened by the signing of the Investment Commitment in 2014, which set as its main goal the increase of defense spending to two percent of its GDP by 2024—with 20 percent spent on major equipment, as well as diplomatic emergency exits.²⁴

Expanding the agenda beyond defense is a necessary adaptation to the current challenges of rapid technological transformation in areas such as climate change and cyber warfare. The establishment of a common “norm” of threat perception through the adoption of a “Global Example of Politics”²⁵ by “reflexive power,” is also essential. As is the belief that international authority is above national sovereignty and that shielding a common security through strategic autonomy is critical. The strategic compass, a German initiative, creates an axis to identify “*common threats*” while linking the EU’s strategic operational and capability needs. Strategic autonomy is an affirmation of the EU’s global dynamism, and all policy papers

²⁰ Reflection-Group-Final-Report, “NATO 2030,” 64.

²¹ Calleo, “Follies of power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy,” 75.

²² Kissinger, “World Order,” 10.

²³ Janardhan, “Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Diplomatic-Security Tool in the Gulf,” 1-2.

²⁴ Moller and Rynning, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” 183–185.

²⁵ Zürn, “A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation,” 248, 258.

represent attempts to build a “strategic culture”²⁶ that helps clarify the Union’s role in the world and thus increase its influence. The 2016 global strategy of HR/VP Federica Mogherini is mentioned five times and nourishes “the ambition of the strategy of autonomy” “in an international system based on rules and multilateral cooperation”.²⁷ Community cultivates the “we-feeling” and burden-sharing, which is also the central demand of the US that fueled the renewal of the divisive debate on strategic autonomy under Trump. The use of joint military mechanisms under the auspices of ESDP and CSDP reveals this evolution and outlines a “possible establishment of an effective and relatively coherent European security policy and strategic culture”.²⁸

In this context, Tardy (2021)²⁹ makes a bold proposal that compares the parallel agendas of NATO and the EU in light of NATO’s burden-sharing and distinguishes the benefits of synergy in the security sector through role-sharing as first or second responders. NATO will be the first responder in collective defense, while the EU as second responder would be responsible for overall crisis management and human security activities and focus on capability development through PESCO and

EDF. However, by doing so, the EU shifts the military dimension into the hands of (European) states rather than the EU, at least for the next few years. Moreover, Brattberg (2021)³⁰ suggests building a stronger European pillar in NATO rather than rhetorical discussions on vague concepts such as autonomy while also acknowledging Europe’s responsibility culminating in a continued transatlantic engagement of the US. At the same time, Laïci (2021)³¹ confirms that a stronger European pillar in NATO is consistent with the EU’s ambitions for strategic autonomy, while Sten Rynning (2021) states that NATO works best when it functions as a concert of member states that is a “compromise between the strategic cultures of the US, Canada, and Europe”.³²

The future of the NATO-EU synergy will be influenced by addressing the COVID 19 crisis and climate change, while establishing a culture of open democracy. Increased economic interdependence will reduce the likelihood of conventional war between major powers but could influence operations such as economic espionage and cyber attacks that require coordinated action. Competition for political influence, governance models, technological dominance and strategic advantage

between the China-US-Russia triangle will be a key challenge in which the EU-NATO synergy will act as a balancing force. According to the NIC Global Trends Report, *A More Contested World 2040*, there are five (5) possible future scenarios, as elaborated below:

A. Renaissance of Democracies:

Under America’s leadership, a culture of cooperation is established through the revival of democracies and Western values.

B. A World Adrift: Russia aligns with China as a smaller partner, while China’s economic and military coercion fails to win the World Championship

C. Competitive Coexistence: In this scenario, the United States and China will prosper and compete for leadership in a bifurcated world.

D. Separate Silos: Globalization breaks down and economic and security groups emerge to protect the country from increasing threats.

E. Tragedy and Mobilization: There is a bottom-up change due to the devastating global environmental crisis that leads to a collapse of global food chains.³³

Moreover, NATO 2030 seeks to

²⁶ Krotz and, Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy,” 565, and Mälksoo, “From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: External Policy, Internal Purpose,” 374-388 ²⁷Cornish, and Edwards, “The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report,” 801.

²⁷Eugs, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,” 5

²⁸ Tardy, “For a New NATO-EU,” 2. ²⁹ Brattberg, “Middle Power Diplomacy in an Age of US-China Tensions,” 219-238.

³⁰ Laïci, “From one master of survival to another: a tardigrade’s plea for NATO2030,” 2.

³¹ Calleo, “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy,” 16.

³² National Intelligence Council (US), “Global trends 2040- A more contested world,” 108- 120.

³³ Bjerg & Rynning, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” 181-192.

outline a new *raison d'être* concerning the need for political adaptation and modernization of NATO. High on the agenda is security, which characterizes the resilience of the Alliance in an open and stable international order. The mix of present challenges, however, requires a revision of the 2010 strategy and calls for a 360-degree shift, redefining the future of collective defense from the top-down to resist international rivals (Russia and China), protect collaborators (e.g. Australia, Japan and India), but furthermore in playing a role in crisis management to include areas such as cyber security and space, and in broadening its geographic horizons to include the Indian Ocean and North Atlantic / Arctic.³⁴

The need for change is also emphasized, not least in the presentation of 138 proposals by the ten 10 experts, the complexity of which lies, among other things, in the parallel but synchronous confrontation of systemic rivalry found in a persistently aggressive Russia as well as the rise of China and the growing role of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT). Meanwhile, the necessary revision of the 2014 Green Defense Framework and the optimal use of the Science for Peace and Security program, together with the scenario

of establishing a Center of Excellence for Democratic Resilience, are also important additions to an adaptation policy. Indeed, in NATO's search for relevance of notion of security as a "trade-off"³⁵ is redefined, and the call for open-source security in the 21st century is being addressed. The goal of all security alliances based on Article 5 "collective defense" and transnational relations is at the core of the success of transforming a zero-sum game into a cooperative one. Specifically, the EU and NATO could "create an institutionalised staff link through a permanent political liaison element in NATO's International Staff (IS) and the European External Action Service (EEAS)".³⁶

Conclusion

In essence, the EU and NATO must work hand in hand as strong allies, as they are mutually reinforcing because the world's security is "interconnected".³⁷ Most importantly, they must work together because their security is «interrelated».³⁸ NATO 2030 and the Strategic Compass' joint action all these years is the answer to any concerns about the termination or the impossibility of joint coexistence. The future is uncertain, and NATO and EU will complement each other based on the «comparative advantage of each

organization». The "complementarity between NATO and the EU is in the interest of both organizations"³⁹ because modern challenges require a degree of smart diplomacy as war simply changes shape, and the world passes through the third period of "renewed dynamism".⁴⁰ The EU and NATO should and can play complementary and reinforcing roles, and have a relationship of "cooperative competition."⁴¹



Athina PAPAPAVLOU
GRC CIV
Intern
NRDC-GR/G5

³⁴ TEDx Schneier, "The security mirage," in 18.47 minute.

³⁵ Reflection Group, Final Report, "NATO2030," 15.

³⁶ EEA, 2019b, "Countering Hybrid Threats," 16–17.

³⁷ Smith, "Countering Hybrid Threats. Paris: in Lindstrom G. and Tardy T. (editors) *The EU and NATO*."

³⁸ Mesterhazy, "NATO-EU Cooperation after Warsaw," 5.

³⁹ Papaioannou, "Strengthening EU-NATO relations." Under, "How did the institutional relationship evolve?"

⁴⁰ Locatelli et al., "Intra-allied competition and alliance durability," 345–362.

INCLUSIVE LEADERSHIP: MANAGING DIVERSITY IN A MULTINATIONAL WORKING ENVIRONMENT



© NATO

Diversity and Inclusion in Workplace

Modern society is marked by diversity, shaped by technological evolution and globalization in a world more complicated and interconnected than ever before. Workplaces are characterized by a collage of diverse individuals with inherent differences, such as gender, age, nationality, along with acquired ones, such as personality style, socio-economic status, industry experience, and career path.

Diversity refers to “the key elements that make us individuals and thus different (e.g., nationality, gender, age, race or ethnic origin, religion, or belief, cultural background, sexual orientation or disability). Diversity describes the workplace an organization seeks to create to benefit from a wide range of identities incorporated by individuals. Global and multinational

organizations understand that a diverse workforce can be the primary source of competitive advantage. However merely having a diverse organization is not enough.

Inclusion is acting in a way to make this wide range work. It is about sustaining an operating atmosphere during which all people are treated fairly and respectfully, granted equal opportunities, and can participate in the organization’s goal accomplishments. Members of dominant and non-dominant groups, represented or under-represented groups, do not face discrimination and inequity, when included. For example, men in most societies are the dominant gender group and concentrate more economic and cultural power. A first look on inclusion could be that all other gender classifications, considered as non-dominant, have equal access, and use of the processes, as the dominant men group has.

Inclusion in the workplace is of great importance for any organization aiming to build a strong sense of connection and belonging, and an engaging culture. We feel included when we use our voice, when we participate in the decision-making processes within a group, when we use the amount of power we have within the group, and when we feel we actually belong there. When people feel the sense of belonging, they positively engage within the organization leading

to overall success. Diversity and inclusion together lay the foundation of sustainability and development. It could be said that diversity is the ingredients and inclusion the directions of a recipe.

Recent research has revealed that organizations focusing on inclusion experience individuals with higher levels of performance and accomplish their mission. Nonhomogeneous teams focus more on facts, process those facts more methodologically, and are more innovative. Employees/staff are more productive, creative, collaborative, and satisfied. They have more unique ideas based on their background. They communicate more effectively, make better decisions, openly express their opinions, manage risks better, tend to resolve interpersonal conflicts easier, and are more likely to recommend their supervisors. Hence, organizations attract diverse individuals, have a better reputation, and positive Public Relations.


Inclusion describes the processes that help everyone in an organization feel valued and respected regardless their differences. People feel valued when they feel important and useful. Two factors that encourage a sense of being valued are belonging and uniqueness. Belonging refers to feeling accepted, just as a person is. It also refers to feel included in formal and informal networks and to feel the same person at home and

work. Belonging “is about how you feel when you are at work. Do you feel valued? Should you be there? Do your insights, commentary, and perspectives matter?”.


Uniqueness means that each person is one of a kind and appreciated because of the multiple qualities that possesses. A female colleague once shared her experience. Colleagues and supervisors often wanted her to represent their unit. They asked for her advice on gender issues. They invited her to share meetings to make them diverse, without considering other ways she could contribute. For example, they did not consult her for her expertise she was trained for. As a result, she did not feel fully appreciated and doubted whether she belonged in that organization or not.

Respect is often related to communication. People feel disrespected when others ignore, interrupt, mispronounce their name, or make fun of their accent. Two factors are especially important for members of non-dominant groups to feel respected: equity and non-discrimination.

Equity attempts to identify the specific needs and requirements of each group. It then tries to provide solutions according to the differing needs by bridging the gap between dominant and non-dominant groups. It refers to unbiased treatment and offers varying levels of support based on needs. On the contrary, equality provides the same options, rules, and opportunities for everyone. Providing meal options for vegans, and vegetarians along with meat



Diversity and inclusion, belonging, and engagement coexist



Individuals are included when they feel valued and respected

meals as well could be a step towards equity, whereas, in terms of equality, an organization should provide meat meal options for everyone. Non-discrimination refers to fair and unprejudiced treatment especially for groups who have faced inequities.

Inclusive Organizations and Inclusive Leadership

Slogans, policies, trainings, fancy promoting, or communication campaigns alone do not produce

inclusion. Inclusion is not an end state. It is an ongoing process. Diversity and inclusion practices are not simple and easy-going. In order to become inclusive an organization needs to be fully committed and dedicated.

Organizations should establish fair employee/staff decisions, equal access to resources, and a sense of teamwork. They should provide protection from mistreatment, a work-life balance, and urge everyone to bring authentic selves to work. Moreover,

Articles

they should strive to establish core values including compassion, empathy, self-awareness, judgment, and intellectual integrity. Diversity and inclusion efforts need to be led by the organization's top leadership.

Effective leaders are inclusive leaders. These leaders are expected to be supportive, committed, compassionate, fair, trustworthy, flexible, inspiring, inquisitive, humble, courageous, empowering, impartial, authentic, adaptable, resilient, empathetic, creative, innovative, and self-aware.

Being self-aware means being fully present. Inclusive leaders try to clearly understand themselves and figure out others' opinion about them. They monitor their emotions and look for the impact of their emotions on others. They ask for 360-degree feedback and act upon it to improve themselves, to cope with their weaknesses and hidden biases. They avoid being defensive when they receive negative feedback, thus encouraging others to express freely themselves. They are humble because they know that they do not know everything and at the same time they recognize that they need to set up an inclusive platform where everyone has the same access to contribute to finding solutions.

Studies show that self-aware leaders are more likely to meet their business goals by achieving high performance. Leaders gain the trust of team members and increase their own credibility. Organizations are less likely to experience internal conflict.

Characteristics of Inclusive Leaders

Based on studies inclusive leaders demonstrate six characteristics. These are commitment, courage, cognizance of bias, curiosity, cultural intelligence, and collaboration. Leaders who approach everyday activities using these characteristics create an environment where diverse ideas are accepted, and diverse individuals demonstrate performance equal to their full potential. They also create more cooperations with diverse organizations. These characteristics are not inherent and can be developed.

Commitment

Inclusive leaders are committed. They do not just declare committed but they also act in such a way.

Motivated by a deep sense of fairness and inspired by their values, they become a visible role model. They invest in human capital understanding the positive impact of this attitude on the organization.

Leaders demonstrate commitment when they accept personal responsibility for creating a more inclusive working environment, when they behave so that everyone is treated fairly and respectfully and become aware of their uniqueness. They also demonstrate this characteristic when processes are transparent and meet individuals' needs. They properly allocate resources, meaning money, time for knowing their staff, mentoring, sponsoring, and energy.



Individuals are included when they feel valued and respected

Courage

Courage is shown by understanding personal weaknesses, sharing power, insisting on their values, and promoting accountability. These leaders are modest and humble. They know they do not know everything and admit it. They are not afraid of revealing their limitations. They dare to reexamine and modify strongly established processes to develop inclusive behaviors and encourage diversity.

Cognizance of Bias

Bias causes discrimination. Everyone is subject to it. Explicit biases refer to the attitudes and beliefs we have about a person or cluster on an aware level. Implicit biases are attitudes or stereotypes that influence our understanding, actions, associated selections in an unconscious manner. There are personal and process biases. Individuals show personal biases whereas organizations show process ones. An implicit process bias could affect recruitment or promotion methodology.

Inclusive leaders address personal and process biases in several ways. They recognize that all individuals are influenced by stereotypes and prejudice. They are aware of the term privilege and how this affects persons opportunities. They understand how privileged persons benefit, and on the other hand how people, who do not have similar advantages, face obstacles. They seek to acquire skills to manage implicit biases. They review and revise policies and procedures to

minimize biases.

Curiosity

Leaders who exhibit curiosity ask for answers instead of providing them. They show no fear if others judge them as unconfident, incompetent, unintelligent, or insufficient. As humans are promoted and given higher positions in organizations, they assume they need less to learn. But inclusive leaders are open-minded and more than willing to expand their knowledge.

Curiosity is beneficial for leaders. It improves deep rational thinking and decision-making. It advances innovation and diminishes group conflict. It increases better communication, and team effectiveness. Curious leaders are respected because of their efforts. They stimulate trust and collaboration among their personnel.

Leaders demonstrate curiosity when they are committed to lifelong learning. Curious leaders seek to understand their people by making questions and engaging with respect and empathy. They are patient, they do not make haste judgments, and support diverse ideas.

Cultural Intelligence

Several cultural factors affect the way individuals interact within an organization, and consequently have a strong influence in the workplace. Some are nationality, gender, race, ethnicity, age group, sexual orientation, religion, and organization's role. Moreover, organization's culture, and

cultural groups within organizations shape the relations among staff.

By being mindful of cultural intelligence leaders care about executing in a cross-cultural environment. They are aware of the similarities and differences of cultures and identify how organizations' everyday activities are affected. They organize strategy accordingly, and they are ready to adapt to various cross-cultural environment situations. For example, meeting with an Asian colleague requires having a behavioral strategy to establish a trustful environment while, at the same time, individuals operating in a cross-cultural workplace need to be flexible and adaptive in case of an unexpected or unofficial discussion with a member of a culturally diverse group.

Collaboration

Inclusive leaders create a teamwork culture. They encourage and support cooperation between diverse individuals. They insist on maintaining a workplace where the staff feels welcome to think independently. They encourage their personnel to work together more effectively and thrive upon their professional development.

Collaboration is found in workplaces when team members give their opinions and manage challenging tasks freely. It is also found where diverse teams are formed, and when team conflicts are expected and addressed appropriately.

COVID-19 Pandemic: Effects on

Articles



“She Runs, He Runs, We Run” mixed relay event, which brings together participants of all ages and ranks, as well as their family members – 2017. © NATO

Diversity and Inclusion

Virtual or hybrid work has been more and more adopted by many organizations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It has also broadened the traditional meaning of working environment which prior to the pandemic mainly included working in the same physical place. After the pandemic, it is expected that remote work and virtual events (conferences, meetings, etc.) will probably continue,

though not on the same scale as at crisis peak.

According to recent research, a key challenge to this reforming workplace appears to be that it is more difficult to establish new relationships rather than preserving the existed ones. Additionally, some processes when executed face to face appear to have better results rather than in a virtual environment. These processes include negotiations, critical decisions, brainstorming sessions, etc. Therefore, organizations are in danger of experiencing less collaboration leading to less inclusive workplaces and lower levels of new development.

Conclusion

People are the most treasured resource for every organization. Investing in diversity and inclusion,

and actively supporting and practicing inclusive leadership are decisive factors for making individuals feel engaged and belonging, ultimately leading to mission success. Organizations, leaders, and colleagues are key relations in establishing an inclusive working environment. As our society and workplace become more diverse, organizations need to be more intensive about inclusion.



Georgios CHAROUSIS
OF-3 (GRC A)
Training Manager
MPSOTC

References:

- Kevin Cashman (2017). *The Global Leadership Dilemma: To Be Inclusive Or Not To Be Inclusive?*
- Anthony Paradiso (2020). *The Importance of Inclusion in the Workplace.*
- Kellie Wong (2020). *The Quick Guide to Diversity and Inclusion in the Workplace.*
- Eric Arthrell, Carolyn Lawrence, Jodi Baker Calamai, Alex Morris (2019). *Status, fear, and solitude. Men and gender equality at the top.*
- Juliet Bourke, 王大威 (2017). *Diversity and inclusion: The reality gap.*
- Jeff Waldman (2016). *The Importance of Diversity and Inclusion On Employee Engagement.*
- David Rock, Heidi Grant (2016). *Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter.*
- Wharton School (2019). *Beyond Diversity: How Firms Are Cultivating a Sense of Belonging.*
- Culture Amp. *“Six Ways to Foster Belonging in the Workplace”.*
- Michael C. Bush (2018). *“This is what makes employees happy at work”.*
- Chiradeep BasuMallick (2020). *Five reasons to focus on equity alongside diversity and inclusion.*
- Kristie Rogers (2018). *Do Your Employees Feel Respected? Show workers that they’re valued, and your business will flourish.*
- Andrea Alexander, Bonnie Dowling, Sara Prince (2021). *Reimagining the virtual workplace around inclusion and engagement.*
- Malini Janakiraman *Inclusive Leadership: Critical for a Competitive Advantage.*
- NATO *Diversity and Inclusion Annual Report 2019.*
- Bernadette Dillon, Juliet Bourke (2016). *6 Characteristics of Inclusive Leaders.*
- Susan Lund, Anu Madgavkar, James Manyika, Sven Smit, Kweilin Ellingrud, Mary Meaney, and Olivia Robinson (2021).
- Deloitte (2016). *Six Signature Traits of Inclusive Leadership.*
- Peter Bailinson, William Decherd, Diana Ellsworth and Maital Guttman (2020). *Understanding organizational barriers to a more inclusive workplace.*

HISTORICAL LOGISTICS CHALLENGES: THE SPANISH ROAD (1567-1659)

Historical Framework

The Spanish Empire that King Philip II had inherited from his father Charles I in Europe included the present-day territories of Belgium and Netherlands. Part of their hierarchy did not accept the Spanish dominance and soon the attempts commenced against the Spanish governors besides they were Flemish or Dutch natives. The conflict was called “the Low Countries’ Wars” lasted over 80 years and affected also all Habsburgs Kings.

Although the first twelve years were very successful for the Spanish forces -the Flanders Army- 15 main towns were occupied after rebels’ military defeats, they were forced to change the tactical procedures into guerrilla ones. Consequently, the end of the conflict was far to conclude in a short-term period. And what is more, the European powers rivals as France and England were ready to take advantage to tear the Major Empire in that time, by supporting directly or indirectly any war against it.

Then, as professor Geoffrey Parker stated,¹ the Habsburgs Spanish Empire was the first European power to deploy sophisticated arguments of global strategy to justify its foreign policy choices; later world powers re-use them all, it was the “domino



theory”. Its main argument was that if the Dutch revolt was not suppressed by force and their attempt was prolonged, the Habsburg power would come crashing down as a house of cards, provoking rebellion in another Spanish outpost like Milan or Naples.

Also, as the Low Countries’ wars persisted and became an international confrontation the domino theory was gaining momentum: as long as Spain could make its enemies fight in the Netherlands, they could not attack Spain.²

As a result of this Strategy, the decision taken was to firmly maintain those territories under the Spanish Sovereign and it was required to mobilize an Army recruited from Spain and Italy and keep it well-sustained during all phases of its activation and


deployment.

Setting up the forces: the distance dilemma.

To face this problem all routes were studied. At first, the fastest strategy movement was by sea and, consequently, the logical route was to depart from the ports of northern Spain, cross the English Channel, and reach the southern Flemish ports. During the 1540-50s Spanish ships from the Cantabrian coast had been travelling those seas safely, but in 1558 hostilities with England started and this would be a major setback. The English pirates, the Dutch Sea beggars who even dared to make raids on the Bay of Biscay with a fleet of 70 ships, the French Huguenots from the port of la Rochelle, and even

¹The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road. Chapter 5. The Army of Flanders and Grand Strategy pages 109-110.

²JP 4-0 Joint Logistics, Feb 2019.



the Royal Navy prohibited the use of the English Channel for the Spanish ships.

This situation forced the study of alternative land routes, which materialized on the so-called Spanish Road, devised by Cardinal Granvela in 1563 when Philip II planned to visit the Netherlands. The advantage of this route was that it spread almost entirely through territories that belonged to the Hispanic Monarchy or its allies. Cardinal Granvela planned this route based on pre-existing paths used by merchants. Traders who moved with their wares from France to Italy normally crossed the Mont Cenis and Maurienne passes in winter and the Little St. Bernard pass and the Tarantaise Valley in summer. Both routes were suitable for pack-mules and boasted numerous fully equipped sites to rest.

Allies Agreements

The Spanish Habsburgs insisted on recruiting soldiers from their own territories as much as possible, then

the strategy movement started in Castile to the ports of Barcelona and Cartagena; and they travelled by sea to Genoa. From 1528, the Genoa Republic had linked its destinies to the Spanish monarchy becoming not only a great financial supporter and occasional ally, but also providing the main seaport of disembarkation for troops and equipment in Italy. As reciprocity compensation, Spain protected the Republic against its enemies, especially against the French, to guarantee the Genoese possession of Corsica.

From Genoa, the troops were leading to Milan, capital of Lombardy, where the forces of Naples and Sicily joined the famous "Spanish Tercios"³ and they constituted the main land forces strength. Beyond Lombardy was the Duchy of Savoy, which was a traditional ally, reaffirmed by the Treaty of Groenendal (26 March 1559), whose friendship with Spain was reinforced by its poor geography, which caused it to be permanently at the mercy of the neighboring France, although the weakness of the Valois after Henry II's death allowed some stability by ensuring a corridor between Milan and the Franco-County.

The Franco-County was a small territory inserted on the border with France that was ruled by the Netherlands. It was bound to remain neutral by a treaty signed in 1508, a clause of that treaty allowed free transit through it, so that the troops could cross it without compromising



its neutrality.

Next was the Duchy of Lorraine. Located between the Meuse and Rhine rivers, linked the Franco-County with Luxembourg. Although from 1547 a treaty between Spain and France ensured its neutrality, the Dukes of Lorraine ignored it to intervene in the French wars of religion at the head of the Catholic league.

After Lorraine, the troops passed through Luxembourg, but there would still be a territory outside the domains of the monarchy: Liege, completely surrounded by territories of the Habsburgs but it was a safe ally.

Alternative routes

Once France was able to solve its internal problems, it became a threat

³Unit comprised between 10 and 12 companies (3000 men) commanded by Maestre de Campo, included three specialties: Pike men, Harquebusiers & Musketeers. It was inspired in Legio Romana structure.



to the delicate balance that guaranteed the safety of the route. The French king launched several attacks on Burgundy (1595, 1597) that damaged the Franco-County by briefly interrupting the corridor and forcing the way east. But the main problem came up as a result of a territorial conflict between France and Savoy. In 1600 France decided to seek compensation by occupying all Piedmont territories to the Rhone, thus putting in grave danger the continuity of the Spanish Road. Immediately, Spanish diplomacy was launched, demanding a safe route that would guarantee the passage of its armies. France then proposed an alternate route through the Swiss cantons. The new itinerary crossed the Catholic cantons of the Swiss confederation and the result of 30 years of negotiations was a treaty with the Grisons who controlled the Engadine and Valtelina passages.

Again, the loss of Alsace by the Habsburgs in 1621 forced Spain to act in the heart of the Empire. The situation could not be more critical, because that same year the twelve-year truce with the Dutch rebels without was concluded and neither side doing anything to extend it. Meanwhile, France had been poisoning relations between Spain and the Swiss cantons, repeatedly disrupting the flow of soldiers. Again the road was moving to the east, it crossed southern Germany from Juliers, bordering the north of Milan by Valtelina, to the republic of Venice, his only trusted ally in Italy outside the upstart Savoy. However, the Valtelina War (1621–39) was decided on the side of the Grisons when France intervened in their favor occupying the valley in 1624.

The successes of Louis XIII with the occupation of Savoy in 1630-31 and of Lorraine in 1632-33 resulted in the definitive loss of the military corridors used by Spain. The annexation of these territories would be justified under the pretext that both had attempted to dethrone the French monarchs on several occasions, but for Richelieu it was for purely strategic reasons.

For its part, Spain tried to remedy Flanders' isolation by increasing recruitment in the Tyrol and Rhine regions. In 1634 a Spanish-imperial Army in front of Ferdinand of Austria, the Cardinal-infant, defeats the Swedish and Protestant forces at the Battle of Noerdlinger briefly opening the way from the Alps to Brussels.

First Expedition

The route started in 1567 and the Duke of Alba and 10.000 troops were the first travelers on his journey to become the new governor of the Netherlands. To prepare the route, the Duke of Alba ordered opening widenings in the steep valley that rises from Novalesa by Ferreira to the Cenis Pass to a team of 300 sappers,



with a ferry or a bridge.

This system, to use combination of local's guides, engineers, cartographers and scouts in an advanced party, was also adopted by the follow-up expeditions. As a result the Spanish road, like all others routes consisted of several parallel or semi-parallel strings of fixed points-essential bridges, fords or ferries which connected the community large enough to accommodate travelers decently- and the tracks between them.

with or without compensation. The increase in the size of the armies and in the scale of military operations in the sixteenth century was intensified the burden of this casual arrangements and it was all the more difficult to find large communities to support them. The solution to ensure logistics on the way brought up the "staples or étapes" which was a concept used by French traders for several years. It was adapted by the military as centres where supplies were stored and camped, some of them were fixed and others were provisionally mounted in accordance with the route on which the troops would move.

Don Cristobal de Benavente, former inspector-general to the Army of Flanders Army, had to explain to the Cortes of Castile the advantages of a system where:

Instead of giving money to every soldier to support himself on the march...it is given to the place where he has to spend the night, obliging to provide all the necessary food, giving specifics orders, as in an étape, about how much bread wine, meat cheese and other provisions should be given to each soldier, and sending in advance a commissioner who would arrange this obligations in the same place where the soldiers have to spend the night, just as has to be done for the same after they disembark in Genoa, making étapes for them in Lombardy and the Grisons, or in Savoy, Lorraine and Luxemburg.

Nevertheless, the system was both simple and sensible. One village became the centre, the staple, where troops' food was collected and distributed. The feeding was

which would go through the troops, building and dismantling makeshift bridges in his wake. He even took over a painter who accompanied the expedition to draw maps and panoramic views of the army route. In addition, guides from each region were hired. The Duke of Alba's guide was Ferdinand of Lannoy, the cartographer who made such a precise map of the Franco-County that the Duke blocked its publication for ten years to keep the established routes secret.

Thanks to these preparations, the expeditions crossed the mountains smoothly, despite difficult weather. An advanced party preceded each expedition to check the route and refurbish surviving sections of paved road or improved difficult passages with bridges or causeways. They also provided all rivers in the Army's path

Feeding and lodging a marching Army: The staple or étape

The additional problem was how to feed and lodge the troops, whereas it also had to include civilians who accompanied them as lackeys and authorized women and children, as well as horses and mules. For example, Alba's Expedition included 9.611 soldiers and 965 warhorses and it was planned to feed 16000 "mouths" and 3000 horses. Feeding this mobile group for one or two months came with a serious dilemma. To establish permanent storage sites along the road, as it was done in the initial Staging Area in Milan, cannot be afforded for one or two expeditions per year.

The traditional method of provisioning European Armies was primitive: everything necessary for the soldiers was requisitioned on the spot,

agreed previously by an offer and it was accepted by military suppliers' officers who signed a contract called "capitulation" that fixed the amount of food to be provided and the prices they would demand for it. If the troops slept in beds,⁴ the houses in the étape and the surrounding villages received special chits, called billets of lodgement. They stipulated the number of persons to be accommodated in each house and the number of horses to be stabled. After the troops left, the merchants and the householders presented the capitulations and billets of lodgement to the local tax-collectors claimed their outlays against future or past tax liability.

Troops using the Spanish Road encountered two sorts of military étape. The first type, founded only in Savoy, was permanent and offered accommodation as well as food. All communities in the étape area contributed to the cost of providing food and services under the Savoy ducal representative, as modern Host Nation Support; and all shared the profit or loss. After troops had left, the area came back to its normal commercial activities but it was enriched with those extra ones.

The second type was quite different since relatively few merchants travelled regularly between Chambery to Brussels. The initiative, therefore, came from the provincial governments either acting directly or through private contractors to supply the troops. The contract system



Spanish Troops Convoy to the Flanders Wars in 1643 painted by Augusto Ferrer-Dalmau (Barcelona 1964) original title: "The Spanish Road".

Year	Commander	Number approximately	Departure Date		Arrival Namur	Total Days
			Lombardia	Saboya		
1567	Alba	10.000	20 Jun.	6 Jul.	15 Ag.	56
1573	Acuña	5.000	4 May.	16 May.	15 Jun.	42
1578	Figueroa	5.000	22 Feb.	2 Mar.	27 Mar.	32
1578	Serbelloni	3.000	2 Jun.	14 Jun.	22 Jul.	50
1582	Paz	6.000	21 Jun.	?	30 Jul.	40
1582	Carduini	5.000	24 Jul.	5 Ag.	27 Ag.	34
1584	Tassis	5.000	26 Abr.	6 May.	18 Jun.	54
1585	Bobadilla	2.000	18 Jul.	25 Jul.	29 Ag.	42
1587	Zúñiga	3.000	13 Sep.	24 Sep.	1 Nov.	49
1587	Queralt	2.000	7 Oct.	15 Oct.	7 Dic.	60
1591	Toledo	3.000	1 Ag.	?	26 Sep.	57
1593	Mexía	3.000	2 Nov.	23 Nov.	31 Dic.	60

thus benefited everyone; The Army ensured that the troops were properly fed; soldiers got their rations without delay and usually on credit; and the contractors received prompt payment for the food they provided. But, of course, in the sixteenth century no system of relative complexity could function without any occasional disaster. Mainly this would happen when contractors overreached themselves and failed to get their provisions in time and at the proper étape.⁵

Movements and transportation.

In addition to food, the étapes often had to provide the troops with baggage transport. In Alpine valleys, where carriage was by pack-mules and each company on would require between twenty and forty mules. It was not easy to concentrate enough animals at a single place and time. Once they left the Alpine valleys, four-wheeled cars transported the troops' baggage. Each company required between two and four cars, depending

⁴Only when they and their horses could not survive at night in the open.

⁵Those situations forced locals communities to prepare improvised support to the troops and consequently, soldiers claimed the lack of preparations and normally the extra cost of the services. There are some well reported cases in 1601 in the étape of Beaume-les-Dames and in 1603 in the town of Pontarlier, both in Franche-Comté.

Articles

the quantity of baggage. As it was not easy to collect so many vehicles to address this problem, special contract were negotiated with carters of Bresse in Savoy or Lorraine to guarantee transport along the whole length of the Road.

The advanced preparations -roads, food, accommodations and transports- naturally increased the speed with which troops could be brought to the front. If everything went according to plan, a regiment would cover the journey from Milan to Namur, some 1000 kilometres, in just over one month. An expedition of 5,000 men in February 1578 took only 32 days (crossing the Alps in the depths winter), while another in 1582 took 34 days-over 30 kms a day for just over one month: a remarkable achievement for any army in any age. The normal speed of troops using the Spanish Road averaged 20 kms a day, with average duration of 48 days. See the chart.

The overall speed of an expedition often reflected the manner in which it travelled. A force of 3000 men or less might have marched along the Spanish Road as single contingent but larger forces normally travelled in sections. If possible each contingent would receive a cavalry escort for its defence,⁶ and the different divisions of the army would follow each other

at intervals of one day's march, the second detachment reaching the étape used by the first the previous night, and so on. Only when the commander feared an attack, as Alba did in 1567 after he left Savoy, did a large expedition close ranks and march as a single unit.

Despite the fact that the adverse weather conditions could invalidate even the most elaborate preparations for overnight and could force to use improvised tracks and change pre-used étapes, the infrastructure that created the Spanish Road marked a vast improvement on any other previous system for moving troops to a distant theatre of operations. The étapes cushioned the civilian population against the violence and destruction normally associated with the passage of troops. Where they nevertheless occurred, the government would pay compensation. Even more the cost of each expedition to the state remained modest: an average of 50 florins to send each Spanish and Italian soldier from Lombardy to the Netherlands.

Conclusions

As Professor Parker wrote: ingenuity and tenacity therefore enabled Habsburg Spain to make its military expatriation system work - and at surprisingly little cost. Despite

the formidable logistical problems posed by the distance and geography, the Monarchy managed to assemble and maintain a large army hundreds of miles from its political center.

The way that the Spanish Road was planned and executed reminds of concepts that nowadays are very realistic: secure strategic movements for the land forces by host nation agreements; integrated advanced party to prepare the routes, Host nation support and use of contractors for supplies (class I) and transportation; the introduction of the staples similar to the staging areas and to be ready to use alternative routes even providing force protection to the convoys, all of them are very familiar to the NATO logistics community after five centuries.

To conclude, the Spanish Road was one of the most amazing logistics feats carried out by an army at any period in the military history.



Rufino CALLEJA
OF-5 (ESP A)
ACOS
NRDC-GR/G4

⁶Similar to modern Force Protection concept.

References:

- *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (1567-1659)*. Editorial Cambridge Second Edition 2004, Professor Geoffrey Parker.
- *A Pike in Flanders. The epic of the Spanish Road*. Editorial EDAF 2007.Mr. Marínez Láinez.
- *The Spanish Tercios and the Spanish Road*. Editorial EDAF 2012.Mr. Marínez Láinez.
- *A path, a History and a Legacy: The Spanish Road through the Tercios*. Spanish Army Magazine "Ejército" number 869 September 2013. Several authors
- *The Spanish Road and the Tercios' footprint in Europe*. 2014 Exhibition booklet. Several Authors.


LOGISTICS AND THE GULF WAR

The Gulf War was underwritten by logistics. Building the theater infrastructure, deploying forces, sustaining the campaign and bringing the forces "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm" was the close coordination between the logistical and operational Commands and the Commanders' understanding that logistics must dovetail with the mission and concept of operations of the projected force. The Theater mission, Concept of Operations and Scheme of Maneuver are examined to bring out the criticality of logistics in effecting surprise and deception.

Support, Maintenance, and Logistics

There is no sustainability without logistics, and logistics involved a massive effort during the Gulf War. All of the forces of the Coalition had to improvise and develop new methods of support, maintenance, and logistics systems. For Great Britain and France, this meant developing new division-level and air force sustainability systems on what was often an ad hoc basis. For countries like Saudi Arabia it meant shifting to both a major new role in Host Nation support, and restructuring its system to support offensive operations across the Kuwaiti border.

It was the US however, that faced the most serious problems in terms of land force sustainment, because it had to deploy massive land, air, and



Desert Shield: Major Supply Routes and Logistical Bases

Figure 1

naval forces, with two US Army Corps and a USMC Corps equivalent. US land forces required logistic support and sustainment for 300,000 men, 12,400 tracked and 114,000 wheeled vehicles, 38,000 containers and 1,800 helicopters during the ground offensive.

Deploying Sustainability

The US had to unload more than 500 ships and 9,000 aircraft to supply its ground forces and 1,800,000 tons of ship cargo from ports to combat units. The total air and sealift effort for land forces is summarized in Figure 2. The in-theater effort took 3,568 supply convoys traveling a total of 35 million miles over some 2,746 miles of roadway in the theater. It shipped and received more than 115,000 tracked and wheeled vehicles, and more than \$2.5 billion worth of munitions. Logistics Units also constructed more than \$615 million worth of support facilities. Alongside with sustainment

Units, they were also responsible for maintaining the Coalition's military equipment at readiness rates that generally exceeded peacetime rates - in spite of desert conditions.

During the last 14 days before the launching of "Desert Storm", the US Army had to deploy forward almost 115,000 short tons of munitions, more than 29 million meals and 36 million gallons of fuel. The four US military services issued up to 19 million gallons of fuel a day during the peak operations. During the land operations, the XVIII Corps required 5,000 short tons of ammunition and 2.1 million gallons of fuel per day. By the end of "Desert Storm" logistics had served over 94 million meals, pumped 1 billion gallons of fuel, delivered 31,000 short tons of mail, and shipped 13,000 short tons.

This endeavor faced a series of problems which caused serious implications for the future. United States Central Command

Articles

(USCENTCOM), the US Army, and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) had never really planned anything approaching the scale of the movement and logistic support required by Desert Storm.

Similarly, the US Transportation Command was able to cope with many aspects of the required sealift and airlift, but it took time to organize so complex a lift effort, and the five and one-half months granted by Desert Shield were critical to its success. The Transportation Command did not have a detailed mobilization plan to shift to support of a major war, and had significant information and data processing problems. It took months to overcome lift shortfalls, and even after lift became available, deliveries often averaged a three week delay compared to the USCENTCOM's desired arrival in theater.

Once major logistics movements began, a number of additional problems arose. Changes in USCENTCOM's requirements and priorities for land forces often created new major lift problems. USCENTCOM rarely informed the Transportation Command for changes that occurred, and changes in sea and airlift had to be made without warning. Army units failed to provide the proper shipping data, and ships were misloaded or underloaded, air base facilities were over-saturated, and seaports often shipped cargo on a first-in first out basis, regardless of priority.

In-Theater Logistics Systems

In-theater logistics presented a

US Lift of Ground Forces

	Personnel		Cargo		
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Airlift	293,000	99.05	175,000	7.68	
Sealift	2,800	0.95	2,105,000	92.32	
Total	295,800	100.0	2,280,000	100.00	

Historical Trend in Total Sea and Airlift of Land Forces in First Six Months of Conflict

	Passengers	Cargo (STons)
Korean War	45,800	1,622,200
Vietnam War (All of 1965)	168,400	1,376,400
Gulf War	295,800	2,280,000

Source: GAO, December, 1991 and Association of the US Army, "Special Report: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, The Logistics Perspective, Arlington, Association of the US Army, September, 1991.

Air and Sealift Required to Deploy US Land Forces
Figure 2

wide-range of problems. Although troops began arriving as early as August 9, 1990, the US Army - as central manager for all of the services in-theater - had no Logistics C2 headquarters in the theater, and deployment of such headquarters was delayed because it was not considered as high priority forces. This meant that the US Army had to improvise a Logistics Staff, and it was only on August 19, that the US was able to create an Army Center (ARCENT) Support Command (SUPCOM) (Provisional). This Command eventually had more than 750 personnel, of which more than 60% were from the Reserves component. It also came to include both a theater support Command and two Corps Commands. This experience indicates the need to fully plan for major regional contingencies before a crisis begins, and the need to have rapidly deployable Logistics Commands or maintain the cadre of such Commands in theater.

This ad hoc Logistics Command theater faced further problems because combat forces were sent ahead without their combat and

service support units, and had little capability to support themselves. This made the US heavily dependent on Host Nation Support, although no formal agreement existed for such support. This was resolved temporarily when Saudi Arabia agreed to provide all food, water, fuel, facilities, and transportation for free, but it was not until October 17, that the US began serious negotiations to create a more formal agreement, which was not completed until mid-November. Saudi Arabia then gave US \$760 million to cover past expenses. This indicates the need to reach such agreements before major contingencies arise.

The US Army was dependent on Reserve Units for certain key functions like water purification, storage, distribution, petroleum operating units, supply and service companies, and truck units. This meant that it had to rely on Host Nation Support and contract support until these units were called up and deployed. It became apparent that revisions were needed to the total force concept to ensure that US Army forces could be properly supported in rapid deployments without being



*Rations for the troops.
Unloading at a Saudi Port*

dependent on Reserves.

Changes in the timing, size, and character of the combat forces being deployed created problems for in-theater logistic, as well as strategic lift, because each change in combat forces meant new logistic requirements, and sometimes critical lift space delivered the wrong parts and equipment. The general problems in tactical communications in US forces meant that insufficient communications capability was available, and that logistics units often had to use commercial tele-phones. In many cases, logistics requests had to be sent by courier, leading to delays of 8 up to 15 days from the Company level to transfer to the US.

During peak operations, requests rose to as many as 10,700 per day, cho-king the system, wasting manpower on courier operations, leading to multiple re-quests and status queries, and an abuse of the priority system that led 64.9% of all requests to be called high priority. The Army was also forced to deploy 72% of its truck Companies to the region to support only 25% of its Divisions. It

could only do so because it mobilized large National Guard and Army Reserves support forces.

List of some of the daily logistic and support problems that the US Army and other services encountered during this period show an impressive series of detailed mistakes, misuse of lift capability, delays, and operational problems that might have been largely avoidable with prior planning, proper communications and proper automation of the logistic system.

These problems make it clear that the US found that its contingency planning for logistics and sustainment fell far short of its actual requirements to meet the new tempo of warfare employed in Desert Storm. These initial problems were compounded, however, by the failure to fully exercise logistics and support in the war games before Desert Shield/Storm, and by the decision on November, 1990 to massively reinforce US land forces for the liberation of Kuwait. This decision required the US to stock 60 days of supply for a much larger force, when the defense concept for Desert Shield only required 30 days of supply in

theater.

This decision not only presented major new problems in stocking fuel and creating suitable distribution systems, but it also required major efforts to stock and deploy munitions -which could only be moved efficiently in large quantities by sea. The US had already experienced serious problems in moving munitions. The Army lacked adequate active combat, service support manpower, and Units to handle moving and deploying ammunition once the flow of movement by sea began on August 17, and many key munitions did not reach adequate levels even for defensive purposes until the USS Cleveland reached the theater on September 21. New problems arose when the US decided to replace its M1 tanks (with 105mm guns) with M1A1 (with 120mm guns), which required a swap-out of tank Ammunition.

As time went on, the US had to build up a truly massive land theater lift system. As it has been noted earlier, the US Army had to acquire twice as many HETs from other countries as it could deploy from within its own resources. This logistic lift, however, did not meet US Army or common user needs. The US had to obtain more than 4,000 trucks, flatbeds, lowboys, water and POL tankers, refrigeration, and trailers to supplement its medium and heavy transport assets, plus nearly 2,000 4X4s from Japan. During the 21 days before the land Campaign began, 2,100 of the 3,500 convoy vehicles were Saudi, and 1,400 were US Army. Convoys logged more than 35 million miles, and included 1,700 moves by HET, and 10,100 by flatbed

Articles

truck. The US Army had to use more than 2,000 civilian drivers, and 3,000 soldiers as back-up drivers whereas CENTAF had its own truck fleet of 100 tractor trailers and tankers and 200 drivers.

Every increase in the amount of movement and stocks deployed also required the US to improve a new material distribution system and constantly improvise new approaches to consumables storage. The need for logistic and sustainment adaptations and fixes increased as US forces acquired more experience in operating equipment in the desert.

Furthermore, the US then had to reverse much of its effort after the war to repair, clean, and reship the equipment that it was sent overseas during the conflict. This effort created a whole new set of problems.

Cleaning equipment to meet US entry requirements was a far larger effort than had been calculated before the war. Most equipment showed considerably more wear than had been calculated. Reserve units that were specialized in handling the required effort used political contacts to return early - abandoning their duty and forcing untrained fulltime actives to learn the task. Many unused items shipped to the Gulf could not be accounted for, and many packing materials had been used for other purposes.

Conclusion

The Desert Shield/Storm logistics effort was unprecedented in recent military history. Throughout the deployment logistics was an integral part of the plan, if not the vital part,

until hostilities ceased on 28 February 1991. Clearly, the competence of logisticians was an enabling factor in the successful combat operations against the forces of Iraq. Desert Shield/Storm validated training, doctrine, and organization for support. Nevertheless, the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm may be used to refine force structure, improve training, and revise doctrine even now in the 21st century.



Nikolaos POULIOS
OF-4 (GRC A)
Battle Captain
NRDC-GR/RSPT

Bibliography

- "Military Lessons of the Gulf War", London, Greenhill, 1991
- "The Gulf War Assessed", Arms and Armor, London, 1992.
- "Logistics in the Gulf War," *RUSI Journal*, Autumn, 1991.
- "Success Behind the 'Storm Front'," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, May 11, 1991, and Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report*, Department of Defense, April, 1992, Brigadier General Robert H. Scales.
- "Operation Desert Storm: Transportation and Distribution of Equipment and Supplies in Southwest Asia, Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-30, December, 1991.
- Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report*, Department of Defense, April, 1992.
- Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, *The Logistics Perspective*, Arlington, Association of the US Army, September, 1991.
- "Desert Shield/Desert Storm: US Transportation Command's Support of Operation," Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-54, January, 1992.
- Lt. General William G. Pagonis with Jeffery L. Cruikshank, *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*, Cambridge, Harvard Business School Press, 1992.
- The interview with General Pagonis in *Defense Week*, November 2, 1992, and Lt. General Henry J. Hatch and Janet A. McDonnell, "Laying the Groundwork for Theater Operations, *Military Review*, March, 1992.
- "Unleashing the Might of Materials Handling," *Modern Materials Handling*, July 4, 1991.
- "Operation Desert Storm: Army's Use of Water Purification Equipment, Washington, GAO/NSIAD-91-325, September, 1991.
- Lt. General William G. Pagonis with Jeffery L. Cruikshank, in *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*,
- The chronology for Desert Shield in Part II of Volume V of Eliot A. Cohen, editor, "The Gulf War Air Power Survey".
- "Seabased Logistics," Memorandum from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy, "Preliminary Report on Lessons Learned During Desert Storm," March 8, 1991.
- Brigadier General Charles C. Krulak, "CSS in the Desert," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October, 1991.
- Murray Hammick, "Lost in the Pipeline: Speed Stretched Logistics to the Limit," *International Defense Review*, 9/1991.
- "Operation Desert Storm: Increased Work Loads at Army Depots Created Supply Backlogs," Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-152, April, 1992.
- "Operation Desert Storm: Lack of Accountability Over Material During Redeployment," Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-258, September, 1992.

NATO'S ROLE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (NON ARTICLE 5 CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS)

In the "Charter of The United Nations" which was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco at the conclusion of the United Nation Conference on International Organizations, there isn't any explicit reference to Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

Nevertheless, this cornerstone document provides the foundation to the PSOs.

The initial step to initiate such operations is a resolution issued by the UN Security Council.

After the mandate and the duration have been established by UN Security Council, UN Secretary General (SG) is *de facto in lead*. He will start talks with the member nations willing to participate, which will decide in autonomy, the numbers of troops and vehicles to commit to the PSO. UN SG will also appoint an *Operational Commander on the ground*.

The different national contingents under the Operational commander appointed remain dependent on their respective nation from an administrative and logistic point of view.

The only exception to this process was one of the first PSOs, the United Emergency Force (UNEF) which instead was established directly by UN General Assembly to end the Suez Crisis in 1956. *In fact, in this extremely fragile situation some*

members of UN Security council were directly involved in the crisis so it was decided for resolution of the General Assembly to initiate the mission.

After the Cold War period, when many PSOs were vetoed by various members of the UN Security Council, there was sensible increment in number of such operations. In "An Agenda for Peace" written by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in 1992, he pointed out that 13 PSOs have been conducted from 1945 to 1987 and the same number from 1987 to 1992.

Unfortunately, in some cases, the different points of view within the UN Security council limited the scope of the resolution undermining the effectiveness of the entire mission.


In addition, many countries are reluctant to delegate Operational Control (OPCON) directly under a

foreign authority. This is one of the reasons why regional organizations may step in.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter refers to regional organizations, such as NATO in the context of appropriate action in maintenance of international peace and security.

NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) may decide to intervene in crises beyond NATO borders to help strengthen, uphold or restore peace and security.

According to NATO doctrine, PSOs can include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. These different types of peace support efforts do not represent a sequential process where one necessarily has to lead to the next.



Articles

Conflict Prevention

A peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

The purpose of conflict prevention is to keep inter-state and intra-state disputes from escalating into armed conflict.

Peacemaking

A peace support effort conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement involving primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.

Peacemaking involves primarily diplomatic-led activities aimed at establishing a negotiated agreement between major conflicting parties, such as a ceasefire or peace agreement, and is conducted after a conflict has started.

Peacekeeping

A peace support effort designed to assist the implementation of a ceasefire or peace settlement and to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. It is conducted with the strategic consent of all major conflicting parties.

The purpose of peacekeeping is to prevent the recurrence of conflict, mitigate humanitarian crises and help to develop state authority where state capacity and legitimacy is weak or contested. The Peace Support Force (PSF) should be prepared to use force

to implement the mandate.

Peace Enforcement

A peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It is likely to be conducted without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.

The purpose of peace enforcement is to restore peace and security in situations where, for example, the UN Security Council has authorized coercive action on the basis of the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of aggression.

Peacebuilding

A peace support effort designed to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by addressing the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support efforts.

Although Peacebuilding is predominantly a civilian-led, military support may be required to help build the capacity of specific security related processes, such as security sector reform.

A PSO (e.g. Peacekeeping) can be conducted under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, when it is based on the strategic consent of the major conflicting parties following a peace settlement or ceasefire, where a cessation of hostilities has occurred.



Instead, when a PSO (e.g. Peace Enforcement) is conducted without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties, it will require UN Security Council authorization in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In such instances, the UN is likely to authorize a third party, whether it is a regional security actor, such as NATO, or a coalition of states to implement the mandate.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has become increasingly involved in PSOs, deploying in support of the wider interests of the international community. NATO's first three peace-support operations took place in Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

In December 1992, the Alliance stated that it was ready to support PSOs under the authority of the UN Security Council.

Between 1992 and 1995, the Alliance took several key decisions which led to enforce, a UN embargo and sanctions in the Adriatic Sea and a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Alliance also provided close air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and authorized air strikes to relieve the siege of



Sarajevo and other threatened areas designated by the United Nations as safe areas.

Under the terms of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60.000 troops was deployed in the country. This Peace enforcement effort was based on Security Council resolution 1031 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In 1996 a 32.000-strong Stabilization Force (SFOR), was subsequently activated in order to deter renewed hostilities and to help create the conditions needed for the implementation of the civil aspects of the DPA. It was based on resolution 1088 also under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.



Since June 1999, NATO has been leading a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the contested province. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), deployed in the wake of a 78-day air campaign launched by the Alliance in March 1999 to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding. KFOR was initially composed of almost 50.000 personnel from NATO, Partner and non-NATO countries and based on Security Council resolution 1244 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In 2002 at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik, it was agreed:

"To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives."

This decision effectively paved the way for NATO to deploy for the first time outside of the Euro-Atlantic area, in Afghanistan in 2003. An International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413 and 1444 to enable the Transitional Authority itself and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to operate in the area of Kabul, and its surroundings with reasonable security.

In October 2003, Resolution 1510 opened the way for a wider role for ISAF to support the government of Afghanistan in regions of the country beyond the confines of the capital.

When the NATO Charter was established in 1949 by the Treaty of Washington, there was no mention of any relationship with the UN Security Council because the ultimate scope was the Collective defense of the Member States (Article 5 operations). Yet, over the years the Alliance proved to be a reliable partner of UN and a flexible instrument for any peace support effort. In fact, NATO, working with a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach, has the capabilities, experience, proper procedures and an integrated command and control structure to deal with any non-Article 5 crises management operations (as NATO currently defined PSOs).



Michele CAMPANALE
OF-4 (ITA A)
Chief OPS/PLANS
NRDC-GR/G ENG

NRDC-GR CHANGE OF COMMAND



On Friday the 12th of March 2021, at the premises of “Pedion Areos” Camp in Thessaloniki, Lieutenant General (GRC A) Dimitrios KOUKKOS handed over the Command of NRDC-GR, to Lieutenant General (GRC A) Anastasios SPANOS.

The ceremony was attended by the Hellenic Republic Deputy Minister of National Defence Mr. Alkiviadis STEFANIS, the Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff General (GRC A) Konstantinos FLOROS and the MOD General Secretary Mr. Antonios OIKONOMOU.

Due to the COVID-19 protocols, the ceremony was attended by the absolutely minimum military personnel and without the presence of guests and media.



Visits - Community Relations

ARRC COMMANDER VISIT



On Wednesday the 24th of March 2021, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Commander, Lieutenant General (GBR A) Sir Edward SMYTH-OSBOURNE accompanied by an ARRC delegation, visited NRDC-GR in Thessaloniki.

The distinguished visitor had an office call by the NRDC-GR Commander Lieutenant General Anastasios SPANOS at the Hellenic C' Army Corps historical building, where they had the opportunity to discuss about issues of common interest. Afterwards he visited the premises of NRDC-GR where he received a brief on the structure, mission and training activities of the HQ.

He had the chance to visit the "STEADFAST LEDA 2021" Exercise Area inside the "Pedion Areos" Camp where the Phase IIB [Crisis Response Planning (CRP)] was conducted, with the participation amongst others of ARRC Staff members. Finally, he visited the Thessaloniki War Museum.



Visits - Community Relations

LANDCOM COMMANDER VISIT

On Tuesday the 11th of May 2021, the Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) Commander Lieutenant General (USA A) Roger CLOUTIER accompanied by a LANDCOM delegation, visited NRDC-GR in Thessaloniki.

The distinguished visitor had an office call by the NRDC-GR Commander Lieutenant General Anastasios SPANOS at the Hellenic C' Army Corps historical building, where they had the opportunity to discuss about issues of common interest. Afterwards he visited the premises of NRDC-GR where he received a brief on the Multi Corps Land Component Command (MC LCC) role that NRDC-GR has till the end of 2023. After the briefing there was a thorough and fruitful discussion about the MC LCC concept. Finally, he visited the Thessaloniki War Museum.



NRDC-GR OFFICERS' MEDALS AWARD

On Tuesday the 20th of April 2021, a number of NRDC-GR Staff Officers were awarded with Medals of the Hellenic Republic for their exceptional service and performance. NRDC-GR Commander Lieutenant General Anastasios SPANOS awarded the medals to the recipients during a short ceremony that took place at the HQ premises.



US MILITARY ATTACHÉ VISIT

On Wednesday the 19th of May 2021, the United States of America Army Attaché Colonel (USA A) Reed ANDERSON accompanied by his successor, Lt Colonel Nathan (USA A) MANN visited NRDC-GR in Thessaloniki.

The two visitors had an office call by the NRDC-GR Commander Lieutenant General Anastasios SPANOS at the Hellenic C' Army Corps historical building, where they had the opportunity to discuss issues of common interest. Afterwards they visited the premises of NRDC-GR where they received a brief on the structure, mission and training activities of the HQ.



Seminars - Conferences

THE MULTI CORPS LAND COMPONENT COMMAND (MC LCC) SEMINAR - DEEP DIVE ON THE NEW NRDC-GR ROLE



NRDC-GR conducted a comprehensive study “deep dive” seminar on the role of the NRDC-GR as it assumes the mission as a MC LCC. NRDC-GR assumed the role of MC LCC in two periods: 15 DEC 2020 to 25 JAN 2021; and 3-4 FEB 2021. The aim of the two time periods was to (1) present and discuss the knowledge acquired during the preparation period of the Headquarters and (2) exploit the conclusions drawn from the respective working groups.

During the 15 DEC 2020 to 25 JAN 2021 time period, selected colleagues from NRDC-GR and

other organizations within the NATO Force Structure (NFS) analyzed, via teleconference due to COVID 19 restrictions, four main areas: operations, planning, communication and support. The outputs from this engagement highlighted the need for emphasis on command relationships, allocation of critical assets and the timelines of delivering force packages at the point of need.

During the 3-4 FEB 2021 time period, 40 distinguished speakers and participants from across the NFS spectrum further defined MC LCC requirements and discussed possible sourcing solutions. The seminar began with opening remarks and challenge from the Chief of Hellenic Armed Forces General Staff General Konstantinos Floros. He emphasized on the geographical significance of maintaining security

and stability in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean Region, to include the Balkans. He applauded the efforts of NRDC-GR, thus far, in fulfilling that role. The Deputy SACEUR and other Flag Officers hypothesized and visualized, through pointed and vivid dialogue, the role of the MC LCC in the Major Joint Operations Plus (MJO+) environment. All functional areas were represented as the forum was open to all and non-attributional to ensure candid discussion.

Both events proved NRDC-GR as an adaptable organization that champions synergy, common values and team spirit. The MC LCC milestone events yielded tangible results that follow-on Command and Staff working groups can use to refine processes and products relative to the NRDC-GR MC LCC responsibility to contribute to NATO's readiness and meet global challenges.



Domenico COLELLA
OF-3 (ITA A)
COORD SO
NRDC-GR/G5



NRDC-GR INTERNSHIP INDUCTION TRAINING 2021

On February 8, 2021, NRDC-GR, conducted the first Internship Induction Training for 2021, at its premises, following all the COVID-19 protocols. The NRDC-GR Chief of Staff, welcomed the new members of the NRDC-GR Internship Program (NIP) and wished them a fruitful and educational experience, even under the working restrictions dictated by the pandemic.

Furthermore, they had the opportunity to participate in the preparation of the Exercise “STEADFAST LEDA 2021”, the upcoming challenge and main venue for the HQ as a Multi – Corps Land Component Command (MC LCC) HQ.



Seminars - Conferences

IKAROS I-21 SEMINAR

On the 10th and 11th of March 2021, NRDC-GR/Air Operations Coordination Centre (NRDC-GR/AOCC) organized and conducted the “IKAROS I/21” Seminar.

The aim of the seminar was to familiarize and enhance the knowledge of NRDC-GR Staff on matters related to air domain. The seminar focused on how to recognize, comprehend and exploit the challenges for Air Land Integration (ALI), in the context of NATO Multi-Corps Land Component Command (MC-LCC).

The seminar was organized in close cooperation and coordination with NRDC-GR Fires and Targeting and G3 Air Branches. NRDC-ESP Subject Matter Experts (SME) provided a briefing via VTC adding a valuable contribution regarding the newly developed Tactical Air Command and Control concept and ALI for the upcoming exercise STEADFAST LEDA 21. On the second day of the seminar a newly established internal Integrated Command and Control (ICC) functional system training took place, focusing on ICC planers role.

Valuable interaction, exchange of ideas and proposals between participants and sharing of experiences, resulted in a successful and productive outcome.



STEADFAST LEDA 21 CRISIS RESPONSE PLANNING

From Tuesday the 16th until Friday the 26th of March 2021, NRDC-GR conducted the Crisis Response Planning (CRP) at the premises of “Pedion Areos” Camp in Thessaloniki, Phase IIB of the Exercise “STEADFAST LEDA 2021”(STLE21) with the participation of Staff Officers from other NATO HQs involved in STLE21 (LANDCOM, ARRC, NRDC-ESP, JFTC).

On Friday the 19th, the Mission Analysis Brief (MAB) took place. The NRDC-GR Commander LtGen Anastasios SPANOS attended the event which was shared with the other HQs via VTC.



OPERATIONAL ORDER DEVELOPMENT FOR STEADFAST LEDA 21



From Monday the 29th of March until Friday the 16th of April 2021, NRDC-GR conducted the Operational Order (OPORD) Development at the premises of “Pedion Areos” Camp in Thessaloniki, Phase IIB of the Exercise “STEADFAST LEDA 2021”(STLE21) with the participation of Staff Officers from NRDC-ESP.

On Wednesday the 14th, the OPORD Development and Back Brief presentations took place. The NRDC-GR Chief of Staff MGen Konstantinos GOUNARIS attended the event which was shared with the other HQs via VTC.





NRDC-GR HERALD



NRDC-GR
Herald



Statue of
Alexander the Great
King of the Ancient Greek Kingdom of Macedonians